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CONFUCIAN THEORY: ITS APOLOGIA, CRITIQUE,
AND PROBLEM OF "DEMOCRACY"
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Confucianism has been the most persistent, persua­
sive and influential teaching in East Asian history. More 
than any other thought, it has molded the minds and behavior 
of the people in China, Korea, and Japan for many centuries. 
Confucianism has provided these people with their ethical 
and moral norms as well as suggested methods of government, 
and the impact of this Confucian theory and its ideology 
upon their political and social life is still discernible 
today.
The Man and His Time
For any meaningful study of Confucianism, it is 
necessary to understand Confucius as a person and the time 
in which he lived, since the ideas of Confucius are about 
twenty-five hundred years old.
2K'ung Fu-tzu (551-479 B.C.), known in the West as 
Confucius, was born in the state of Lu, a portion of north­
eastern China, roughly corresponding with the modern prov­
ince of Shantung. It is generally understood that Confucius 
was a remote descendant of the imperial family of the Shang 
dynasty (1766?-1122 or 1027 B.C.), but the exact social 
status of his personal and contemporary family remains in 
doubt.^ They might have been distantly related to the 
nobility, but he and his immediate family seem to have been 
relatively poor. His father died when Confucius was about 
three years of age, and his mother reared him. When he was 
about twenty Confucius received a minor political appoint­
ment in the state of Lu, at which position he seems to have 
worked faithfully. He was later promoted to a higher posi­
tion. By that time he became known all over Lu because of 
his honest work and his knowledge of the classics.
However he was eventually forced to go into exile
due to a political intrigue in Lu. Confucius is known to 
have then drifted around various parts of China for eight 
years and not to have returned to his home state until the 
age of fifty-three. Since the old enemy who caused his exile
% .  G. Creel, Confucius : The Man and the Myth
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951), p. 30ff.
was no longer in power, he was employed again by the Lu 
government. Due to his influence it is said that the Lu 
government subsequently became the least corrupt government 
in China, a fact which later endangered the position of the 
ruling classes of neighboring states. Thus jealous neigh­
boring rulers helped stage a coup to eliminate Confucius; 
once again he was stripped of his position and began the 
second long period of wandering in his career. During this 
period Confucius travelled with a small group of followers 
and was known to have maintained his subsistence by tutoring 
a number of students. This period provided an excellent 
opportunity to acquaint himself with politics of different 
parts of China. After fourteen years of wandering Confucius 
returned to his homeland and seems to have spent the rest of
his life in teaching. He died at the age of seventy-two or 
2
three.
2
The life and teachings of Confucius have quite 
naturally attracted a vast quantity of hagiographie writings, 
most of it highly fanciful. This brief account of Con­
fucius ' life is based on the following sources: James Dyer 
Ball, The Celestial and His Religions or the Religious Aspect 
of China (Hongkong: Kelly and Walsh, 1906), pp. 36-40; 
Augustus W. Loomis (ed.), Confucius and the Chinese Classics 
(Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1882), pp. 44-49; Chi-yun Chang, A 
Life of Confucius trans. Shih Chao-yin (Taipei: China Culture 
Publishing Foundation, 1954), pp. 11-13; Carl Crow, Master- 
Rung: The Story of Confucius (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1938); H. H. Dubs, "Political Career of Confucius," Journal 
of the American Oriental Society, LXVI (October, 1946), pp.
Confucius lived during the time known as the Spring 
and Autumn period, which is the latter period of Chu dynasty 
(1127-403 B.C.). Many centuries before Confucius, the Shang, 
China's first historical dynasty, was established. In 1122 
B.C. the Shang dynasty of China is known to have been 
attacked by a coalition of tribesmen from the west.^ The 
conquerors established the Chu dynasty. They expanded their 
territory so much that they had great difficulty in ruling 
the vast land with their highly centralized structure of 
government. Their empire later began to disintegrate, and 
China became divided again into numerous kingdoms, ruled by 
the former members of the Shang ruling class. There then 
grew up a feudal system in China, and each vassal had abso­
lute power and ruled autonomously in his area.
In the course of years the descendants of the early 
feudal lords gradually lost their closeness. Consequently, 
power struggles among feudal rulers were increasingly evi­
dent, and political power was gradually usurped by the
274-82; Wu-chi Liu, Confucius : His Life and Times (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1955), Chaps. Ill, V, & VI; Shigeki 
Keizuka, Confucius trans. Geoffrey Bownas (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 42-65; and H. G. Creel, 0£. cit., 
pp. 29-71.
3
Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History 
and Culture, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), pp. 
40-42.
families who provided candidates for the highest offices of 
the various feudal states.^ The ruling classes had little 
interest in common people's welfare, and there were more 
sycophants in politics than at any other previous time in 
history. Among the states internecine strife, treachery, and 
intrigues predominated. To make matters worse, not only were 
the Chinese states constantly fighting each other, but 
barbarians from the north frequently invaded the Chinese 
states.
The state of Lu where Confucius lived was relatively 
weak and small. Despite this it suffered comparatively 
little from the wars, probably because of its location. In­
ternally, however, the politics of Lu were as chaotic as 
those of her neighbors. Most of the ruling class were 
morally corrupt; nepotism, adultery, incest, and bribery 
abounded. Meanwhile amorality reigned in the relationship 
among states, and the rulers often had to undertake intrigues 
and secret pacts for survival.^ Describing the political 
situation of that period, Mencius said:
4
Ibid., pp. 42-51, et passim.
^The Analects reveals the nature of politics in Lu. 
See also Shigeki Kaizuka, o£. cit., pp. 14-19; Sang-eun Lee, 
Hyndae wa Dongyang Sasang [Modern Times and the Oriental 
Thought] (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1963), pp. 187-89.
^Kenneth S. Lautourette, op. pit., pp. 48-56.
Again the world fell into decay, and principles 
faded away. Perverse speakings and oppressive 
deeds waxed rife again. There were instances of 
ministers who murdered their sovereigns, and of 
sons who murdered their fathers.7
The prevailing conditions of his day greatly influ­
enced Confucius' teachings. Confucius believed that only 
a personally virtuous ruler could save the world and that 
moral cultivation of the rulers was the only way to reestab­
lish security and order. The purpose of Confucius was well 
described by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145?-90? B.C.), a prominent 
historian, in his Introduction to the Mémoires Historiques.
When the authority of the emperor of Chu declined, 
the princes severely flaunted their powers. Con­
fucius, regretting the general neglect of the 
rites and the decline of music, attempted to re­
vive the classical tradition with a view to 
popularizing the kingly way, to giving direction 
to an unruly age on the right track of development.
Development of Confucianism
The teachings of Confucius were not very widely known 
during Confucius' lifetime, although he was much respected as 
a great teacher.  ^ As a political reformer Confucius
^Mencius, Bk. Ill, pt. II, Chap. IX, sec. 7.
g
Quoted in Chi-yun Chang, 0£. cit., p. 3.
9
One of Confucius contemporaries, for example, said; 
"Great indeed is the Master K'ung'. His learning is so ex­
tensive, and yet he does not render his name famous by any
accomplished little when he was alive, and his teachings did 
not attract many people. It was not until many years later 
that his teachings were recognized and he was highly honored 
by his countrymen.
It was during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) 
that the Confucian doctrine became the official government 
theory and ideology and that Confucianism, for the first time, 
acquired prestige, and under the protection of the government 
Confucius' teachings began to be widely known. A corollary 
of this newly acquired prestige was the proliferation of 
many Confucian scholars. After the fall of the Han dynasty, 
however, the study of Confucius' teachings gradually waned.
Although Confucianism was accepted as an official 
theory for political institutions during and after the Han 
dynasty, it had shown little ideological development. Be­
ginning about the eleventh century, however, a strong re­
vival of Confucianism occurred. At that time, Confucian 
scholars' intellectual activity was stimulated and even deter­
mined by the speculations of Buddhism and Taoism. Scholars 
began to consider problems dealing with nature, with the
particular thing." [The Analects, Bk. IX, Chap. II, sec. 1.] 
Confucius was regarded as China's first private teacher in 
history; see Yu-Ian Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philos­
ophy, ed. Derk Bodde (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), 
p. 39.
8external world, and with man as a part of nature. According 
to one authority in the field, Chinese philosophy passed from 
its ancient to its modern period with the emergence of these 
concerns.
The best known scholar in this movement was Chu Hsi 
(1130-1200 A.D.), and the movement is known as either Chu 
Hsi-ism or Neo-Confucianism. It was mainly because of the 
genius of Chu Hsi that the unorganized ideas of his prede­
cessors were "welded into a coherent, all-inclusive system 
of thought, which speedily became accepted as the basis of 
Chinese o r t h o d o x y , e s p e c i a l l y  in politics and government.
According to Neo-Confucianism, the universe is dual. 
There is a physical world of concrete matter on the one hand 
and a metaphysical world made up of abstract "essence" or 
principle (li) on the other. Any object of matter or any 
phenomenon has a corresponding principle or which mani­
fests itself and gives order (direction) in this world. In 
other words, according to the illustration given by Bodde, 
it is the metaphysical principle that pertains to boats that
^^Ch'u Chai, "Neo-Confucianism of the Sung-Ming 
Periods," Social Research, XVIII (September, 1951), p. 370.
^^Derk Bodde, "Chinese View of Immortality: its ex­
pression by Chu Hsi and its relationship to Buddhist 
thought," Review of Religion, VI (May, 1942), p. 369.
9causes such boats (as found in our physical world) to move 
only on water and not on land, just as it is the principle
12pertaining to carts that causes carts to move only on land.
Thus there are individualized principles in all
phenomena. The highest activity of the Confucian scholar is
to search constantly for these objective principles and to
cultivate himself so that he might transcend the phenomenal
world and perceive the relationship between matter and 
1 1principle. In human beings, principle manifests itself 
through the mind, which acts as a temporal container for li. 
An example of Chu Hsi's exegesis follows:
Confucius spoke of "the conquest of self 
and return to propriety." The Doctrine of the 
Mean says : "Advance toward equilibrium and
harmony"; or again: "Prize the virtuous nature 
and pursue the path of inquiry and study." The 
Great Learning speaks of "The mind of the body 
is unstable; the mind of the spirit is but small.
Be discriminating; be undivided, that you may 
sincerely hold fast to the mean." The teachings 
of the sage, whether they be a thousand or ten 
thousand words, are only that men should preserve 
Heavenly Principle and extinguish human desire.
Man's nature is originally clear, but it is 
like a pearl immersed in impure water, where 
its luster cannot be seen. Being removed from 
the dirty water, however, it becomes lustrous 
of itself as before. If each person could
12
Derk Bodde, loc. cit., p. 370.
^^Chu-tzu Yu-lei [Classified Conversations of Chu 
Hsi], XII, 8, cited in Yu-Ian Fung, 0£. cit., pp. 559-60.
9a
himself realize that it is human desire that causes 
this obscuring, this would bring enlightenment. It 
is only on this point alone that all one's efforts
must be concentrated.14
The importance of Neo-Confucianism in East Asian life can­
not easily be exaggerated, for this highly abstract theory 
dominated the academic world until the end of the nineteenth 
century. On the one hand, it revolutionalized earlier Con­
fucianism by introducing metaphysical speculation with which 
classical Confucianism had little concern. On the other 
hand, however, it did not change basic institutions, methods 
and theories of government inherited from the classical 
teachings of Confucius.
Confucian Persuasion in Korea and Japan
The Confucian system of thought, society, and gov­
ernment has a long history in Korea. It was probably during 
the early days of the Koguryu dynasty (37 B.C.-668 A.D.) 
when the teachings of Confucius were i n t r o d u c e d . por many 
centuries Confucianism continuously influenced Korean 
society, but it did not really dominate Korean life until
^^ Ibid.
^^According to a reliable book, Samkuk Sagi [Chron­
icles of the Three Kingdoms], a king of Korea established a 
national university to teach Confucianism in 372 A.D. Thus 
it might be said that the introduction of Confucianism to 
Korea took place before that date.
10
the establishment of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910 A.D.)* The 
founder of Yi supported such scholars as Chong Do-jun 
(7-1398 A.D.) who criticized Buddhism in light of Confucian­
ism.^^ This government promotion of Confucianism eventually 
led to the situation where Confucian literature was the only 
object of study throughout the period. Any slight deviation 
from Confucianism was quickly labelled heresy.
From the beginning of the Yi dynasty in Korea , Con­
fucianism dominated almost conçletely the thought and philos­
ophy of the nation; hence it is virtually impossible to 
separate the politics of Yi Korea and Confucianism. The 
Confucianism that eventually dominated the Yi dynasty was 
Neo-Confucianism, which had been introduced to Korea in the 
late Koryo (918-1392 A.D.), and which became the official 
ideology of government and of the yangban class.
The reasons for the adoption of Neo-Confucianism in 
the late Koryo were manifold. Some maintain that, among
^^Chong was actively engaged in the promotion of 
Confucianism as a political ideal and as a practical code of 
ethics. His first attempt was a revision of the legal code 
in accordance with Confucian ideal. See I-sop Hong, "Poli­
tical Philosophy of Korean Confucianism," Korea Journal,
III, No. 9 (September, 1963), p. 12.
^^Tuk-hwang Kim, Hanguk Sasang-sa [A History of 
Korean Thought] (Seoul: Namsan-dang, 1958), pp. 111-12.
For a Confucian criticism on Buddhism at this time, see Chong- 
hong Park, "Historical Review of Korean Confucianism,"
Korea Journal, III, No. 9 (September 1, 1963), pp. 6-8.
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other reasons, there had been a lack of Intellectual stimuli
and that traditional Buddhism was somehow identified with the
18invading Mongols. Whatever the reasons may have been, with 
its cosmogonic presunqjtions and metaphysical speculations 
Neo-Confucianism provided an effective substitute for Bud­
dhism. It predominated in the formulation of ethics in Korea 
as well as in intellectual and political assumptions.
The teachings of Confucius also influenced Japan, 
and it was one of the chief cultural factors that have molded 
the Japanese character. Since its introduction, Japan "has 
made [Confucianism] become gradually the most important part 
of her cultural heritage, not ever equalled by its influen­
tial rival. B u d d h i s m , a n d  her political and social insti­
tutions were shaped after the pattern of Chinese, i.e. Con­
fucian, organizations.
It is generally known that Confucianism was brought, 
to Japan in 404 A.D. by a Korean scholar, ^ but it appears
l^K. P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, "An Outline 
History of Korean Confucianism," Journal of Asian Studies, 
XVIII, No. 1 (November, 1958), p. 86.
19Joseph John Spae, Ito Jinsai: A Philosopher, 
Educator, and Sinologist of the Tokugawa Period (Peiping:
The Catholic University of Peking Press, 1948), p. 11.
G. Aston, "Nihongi," Translations and Proceed­
ings of the Japan Society (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
12
to have evoked little interest at first. Probably the
earliest literary product of Confucianism in Japan is found
in prince Shotoku's Seventeen Article Constitution (604 A.D.)
and the Taika Reform edicts (645-650 A.D.). From about the
seventh century Confucian teachings had increasingly visible
21influence upon Japan, especially among the learned class.
However, it was not until the beginning of the 
seventeenth century that Confucian ideology was adopted as 
the official governing creed. In 1608, leyasu, the first sho­
gun of the Tokugawa, appointed Hayashi Kazan, a renowned 
Confucian scholar, to the Shogunate, thus rendering official 
support to a movement which within a few years was to make 
Confucianism "the strongest intellectual and ethical force in 
Japan." After a century of power struggles, the early 
rulers of Tokugawa hoped Confucian scholarship would bring
Trubner & Co., 1896), I, pp. 261-62. See also, Basil H. 
Chamberlain, Translation of Kojiki, annotated by W. G. Aston, 
2nd ed. (Kobe, Japan: J. L. Thomson & Co., 1932), pp. 305-6.
21Sadao Kiyohara, Gairai shiso no Nihon-teki hattatsu 
[Japan's Development of Imported Ideas] (Tokyo: Syobunkan, 
1944), p. 146. Joseph J. Spae says fifteen out of the seven­
teen articles quote, more or less verbally, passages from 
the different fundamental books of Confucianism, 0£. .cit.,
p. 18.
22
Edwin 0. Reischauer, Japan: Past and Present (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 87. Ençhasis added.
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a historical and ethical justification for their government 
and pacify the country.
The adoption of Confucianism served useful purposes 
for the Tokugawas. Not only were its standards of conduct 
chiefly concerned with loyalty, but also the devotion to 
scholarship itself served to transform bellicose warriors 
into peaceful scholars. Especially for the latter purpose 
the Tokugawas endorsed and promoted Neo-Confucianism. In 
addition, the implications of Neo-Confucianism that culti­
vated men should instruct the common people in behavior and 
that good government is dependent upon the ruler's wisdom 
and the subjects' obedience also served the Tokugawas' 
purposes.
The Scope and Problems of Inquiry
Although "Confucianism" has been undoubtedly the 
most important ideology that has molded social and political 
life in East Asia, it cannot easily be defined. For one 
thing, branches such as Han Confucianism, Sung Confucianism 
(Neo-Confucianism), Yi Confucianism, Tokugawa Confucianism, 
etc., vary in the emphasis they place on various aspects of 
Confucianism. In addition, during the course of its evolu­
tion it has acquired so many concepts and ideas from other 
schools such as Taoism and Buddhism that some parts of
14
Confucian philosophy would hardly be recognizable to its
progenitor.23
Furthermore, countless individual Confucian scholars 
offered varying degrees of emphasis as well as varying inter­
pretations . To some it is primarily family ethics and 
ancestor worship; to others it is a guiding principle which 
determines social status between men of "superior quality" 
and men of "inferior quality." Still to others, it is 
primarily a method of government, or the relationship which 
should exist between the ruler and the ruled. It is even 
considered as the metaphysical speculation that will sup­
posedly lead to the realization of the ultimate truth of the 
universe. Hence, there is no way of describing simply and 
clearly the full shape of "Confucianism"; the term is indeed 
amorphous. All in all, it is a loosely organized body of 
ideas that have been applied almost indiscriminately to 
phenomena scattered over vast reaches of time and culture.
This does not mean to say that the study of Con­
fucianism is impossible because of the difficulty of defining 
it. A great deal of study and research has been done, for 
example, in such subjects as Platonism, Christianity, logical
^^Wu-chi Liu, A Short History of Confucian Philos­
ophy (London: Whitefriars Press, Ltd., 1955), pp. 13-14.
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positivism, and other inclusive philosophic and théologie 
systems. Those and other economic-political systems as Marx­
ism and democracy are equally difficult to define. Thus the 
difficulty of definition cannot be too great a barrier to a 
serious inquiry.
This study will concentrate on the thoughts and 
ideas that derive from the basic texts of Confucianism. Con­
fucian thoughts about human nature, the social order, and 
government are contained in the Four Books and, to some ex-
g /
tent, in the Five Classics. Since these books remained the 
basic sources for political method and theory of all branches 
of Confucianism, this study will treat the thought in them 
and will not be concerned with minor differences in the in­
terpretations of the various schools.
One can hardly overemphasize the importance and the 
magnitude of Confucian theory for the understanding of tradi­
tional as well as modern East Asian politics and political
24
The Four Books is composed of the Analects, the 
Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Work of 
Mencius. The Five Classics is composed of the Book of 
Poetry, the Book of History, the. Book of Changes, the Book 
of Rites, and the Spring and Autumn Annals. Almost all 
Confucian scholars for over two millenia singly re-inter­
preted or elaborated on these materials. Historians gen­
erally agree that many of those materials are not the works 
of Confucius because some of them were in existence before 
Confucius' time. Despite the fact, the materials have been 
closely identified as the core of Confucianism.
16
culture, as one might have noticed above in the discussion 
of the development of Confucian thought and its impact upon 
Korea and Japan. However, one must realize by way of caution 
that Confucianism does not of course compose the. entirety of 
Chinese thought or East Asian thought. There have been many 
other schools of thought. Confucianism, however, is more 
easily understood by the majority of East Asians, though few 
study it today. Confucianism has become a way of life, and 
it has been a basic concomitant of East Asian culture which 
colored the values of nearly all fields of human endeavor, 
particularly those concerned with political, social, and in­
tellectual activities.
At this point, a comparison can be made with Judeo- 
Christianity in the West by way of illustrating the position 
and the nature of Confucianism in East Asia. To many Asians 
Confucian persuasion is unconscious by now like the Judeo- 
Christian ethics and precepts which are partially followed 
by many who do not consciously accept them. Also, in the 
West, the Christian precepts are often stated--though not 
lived— by those who do not know the origin. To an extent, 
the nature of Confucianism is very much like that of Judeo- 
Christianity in the West.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the
17
nature of Confucian theory. Especially the study focuses 
on the Confucian treatment of social order, method of govern­
ment, and the political leadership. In all fairness, it must 
be said at the outset that the following two chapters are 
dealing with the apologetic and "happy" side of Confucian 
theory of social order and politics. Contrary to the common 
notion that Confucianism is primarily a personal ethics and 
decorum, it contains a strong flavor of political thought and 
ideology.
Confucian theory of government and its ideology has 
enjoyed a remarkable length of life span, but in the late 
nineteenth century this seemingly viable and flexible thought 
was seriously challenged for the first time. Confucian 
nations confronted Western imperialism at that time, and Con­
fucianism was unable to explain the kinds of problems Western 
industrial and commercial technologies were posing. Under 
the circumstances, Confucianism suffered a severe decline. 
Many began to question the validity of Confucian doctrine, 
and some even condemned it, calling it anachronistic. This 
controversy was particularly intense in China in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century. Thus it seems quite 
pertinent to a study of Confucian theory to investigate and 
analyze some of the important and typical arguments raised
18
against Confucianism at that time in order to uncover the 
critical and "unhappy" side of Confucianism. More often than 
not, those arguments advanced by the iconoclasts under national 
stress provide valuable insights to the true nature of Con- 
fucian life.
Also, an attempt will be made to compare and con­
trast Confucian theory with modern theory of democracy. Such 
an effort seems relevant because Confucianism was the dominant 
ideology in China, Korea, and Japan before these countries 
changed to Western political systems. Furthermore, it has 
been one of the major "concerns" of the United States since 
World War II that such Asian nations build lasting and genuine 
democratic systems of government.
Finally, this study will present further critical 
views of Confucianism and examine its weaknesses not treated 
by the Chinese leaders and the intellectuals earlier in the 
chapter. Here it is argued that Confucianism has failed in the 
modern world in the sense that the ideals of Confucius are no 
longer subscribed to by East Asians (at least officially) and 
since Confucian nations have adopted Western systems of life 
and government. Hence it will be judiciously argued also that 
there exist in Confucian thought characteristics that hindered 
adaption to technological modernization. An attempt will be 
made to analyze some of these characteristics.
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF MAN AND SOCIAL ORDER
Chinese philosophy, more specifically Confucian 
philosophy, differs basically from that of the West. While 
Western philosophy has by and large aspired to abstraction, 
Confucianism tends to express itself in an extraordinarily 
concrete way. A convincing reason for this will probably 
never be found. Fung Yu-Ian advances the thesis, however, 
that Chinese philosophy, being primarily rural in its nature, 
does not concern itself with metaphysics as does Western 
philosophy, which developed in the Greek city-state and in 
the various urban centers of Europe.^ The Chinese people 
have always been preoccupied with concrete relational norms 
that govern the conduct of individuals, and they have paid 
little attention to metaphysics, epistemology and logic.
They seem not to have been bothered by numerous logical con­
tradictions within their philosophy.
Fung Yu-Ian, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 
Derk Bodde, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959). See 
also Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 269-71.
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As it is generally understood, some predominant 
conception of the nature of man and the meaning of human 
existence underlies every political system. Most of the 
great Western political theories have, more often than not, 
quite explicit discussion of the nature of man. Confucian 
teachings, especially classical ones, center around ethics, 
family life and government, because these concerns were in­
separable in Confucian thought. To understand the Con­
fucian system of orderly life and government, it is neces­
sary first to examine how Confucius conceived of human nature,
The Nature of Man
Confucius seems to have had a strong belief that 
human nature is basically good, but unfortunately his theo­
retical explication is somewhat less than adequate. It seems 
that his approach to the question is mainly normative.
Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his 
uprightness, and yet live, his escape from death 
is the effect of mere good fortune.%
This is the most frequently quoted passage on the subject,
2
The Four Books, Analects, Bk. VI, Ch. XVII. The 
English versions of Confucian literature in this paper are 
derived mainly from the work of James Legge, which was done 
about a century ago but which is still regarded as one of 
the best translations. Some quotations came from Ch'u Chai 
and Winberg Chai, eds. and Trns., The Humanist Way in 
Ancient China ; Essential Works of Confucianism (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1965).
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but it does not explain why Confucius considered man good. 
The purpose and meaning of man's existence is found only in 
his striving for uprightness. Confucius ençhasized that the 
primary duty of man is to perfect himself in moral terms.
It was Mencius who elaborated upon and expanded 
Confucius' theory of human nature. In fact, Mencius was 
the first to enunciate distinctly the doctrine that the na­
ture of man inclines him to goodness. Mencius said:
Now by striking water and causing it to leap up 
you may make it go over your forehead, and by 
damming and leading it, you may force it up a 
hill; -- but are such movements according to the 
nature of water?
The tendency of man's nature to good is like 
the tendency of water to flow downwards. There 
are none but have this tendency to good, just 
as all water flows downwards.^
Mencius believed that man's basic nature is good re­
gardless of individuals' social positions and morality. 
However, he offered no empirical evidence to substantiate 
this. According to Mencius, therefore, human beings are 
basically equal. Mencius' conversation with an officer of 
Chu illustrates the way in which he held all men equal:
Master, the king sent persons to spy out whether 
you were really different from other men.
^Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. II.
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How should I be different from other men'. Yao 
and Shun were just the same as other men.^
Mencius based his theory of human equality not only 
on his belief in man's basic goodness but also on observable 
biological likenesses. To him there is no difference be­
tween ordinary men and sages:
Therefore I say. -- Men's mouths agree in having 
the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying 
the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing 
the same beauty: -- shall their minds alone be 
without that which they similarly approve?
What is it, then, of which they similarly approve?
It is, I say, the principles of our nature, and 
the determinations of righteousness. The sages 
only apprehended before me that of which my mind 
approves along with other men. Therefore the 
principles of our nature and the determinations 
of righteousness are agreeable to my mind, just 
as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is 
agreeable to my mouth.5
For Confucianism man's nature is such that he is 
capable of leading the good life, which means living in 
accordance with his basic nature. If a man falls into evil 
ways, it is not because there is any defect in his nature, 
but because he did not develop and utilize the goodness which 
is intrinsic to all human beings.^ Thus Confucianism
Mencius, Bk. IV, pt. V, Ch. XXX. Yao and Shun are 
the legendary emperors who ruled the country for the best of 
the people.
^Ibid., Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. VIII, sec. 2.
Gpor a detailed explanation see Reginald F. Johnston, 
Confucianism and Modern China (London: Victor Gollancy, Ltd., 
1934), pp. 17 et seq.
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believes that in society some men become of ill nature be­
cause of bad environment.; men are thus subject to environ­
ment. It does not, however, deal with the question of the 
origin of bad environment or evil. Since the universe is 
moral, environment here seems to mean the influence from bad 
fellows. But then it may be asked how did the latter become 
bad in the first place? Confucianists do not answer. They 
ignore the question and simply do not argue that man has 
capacity to do evil within himself.
Mencius speculates, however, that prosperous and lean
years may have an influence upon young men because of "the
circumstances through which they allow their minds to be
ensnared and drowned in evil."^ He uses barley-growing as
an analogy. After one plants the seeds of barley one does
not always harvest exactly the same quality of barley. This,
according to Mencius, is because of the differences in soil,
unequal distribution of rains and dews, etc. In other words,
it is not due to the difference in the seeds but due to the
environment.^  Mencius quickly added:
Thus all things which are the same in kind are 
like to one another; -- why should we doubt in
^Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. VII, sec. 1.
®Ibid., sec. 2.
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regard to man, as if he were a solitary ex­
ception to this.9
Mencius illustrates the ways in which the original 
nature of man can degenerate with a simile of a virgin 
forest :
The trees of the New Mountain were once beautiful.
Being situated, however, in the borders of a 
large state, they were hewn down with axes and 
bills; -- and could they retain their beauty?
Still through the activity of the vegetative 
life day and night, and the nourishing in­
fluence of the rain and dew, they were not with­
out buds and sprouts springing forth, but then 
came the cattle and goats and browsed upon them.
To these things is owing the bare and stripped 
appearance of the mountain, which when people 
see, they think it was never fully wooded. But 
is this the nature of the m o u n t a i n ? ^ ^
Thus Mencius is quite unequivocally and firmly con­
vinced that human nature is basically and innately good and 
that evil is the result of environment, but he still leaves 
the question of whether all men have equal capacity to be 
good.
Confucius seems somewhat contradictory on this point
At one time he said:
By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice 
they get to be wide apart.
9
Ibid., sec. 3.
l^Ibid., Bk. VI, pt. 1, Ch. VIII, sec. 1.
llAnalects, Bk. XVII, Ch. II.
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This would seem to inçly that the differences between men in 
terms of degree of goodness are caused by man's behavior and 
the environment in which he lives. On the other hand, Con­
fucius is also quoted as saying:
Those who are born with the possession of 
knowledge are the highest class of men. Those 
who leam, and so readily, get possession of 
knowledge, are the next. Those who are dull 
and stupid, and yet compass the learning, are 
another class next to these. As to those who 
are dull and stupid and yet do not leam; -- 
they are the lowest of the p e o p l e . 12
From this statement, one gathers that Confucius himself be­
lieved there existed some innate inequality among men which 
causes trouble. In conclusion the mainstream of Confucianism, 
however, held men equal in the sense that their basic nature 
is good and that it is the environment which generally makes 
men different.
Yet in terms of process of personal and social de­
velopment Confucianism teaches that those who possess knowl­
edge are superior, and they have to instruct those inferior 
to them so that the latter will be able to carry out the proper 
social relationships. Fortunately, Confucianism also believes, 
human nature is such that men of inferior knowledge in­
stinctively emulate the examples of men of superior knowledge.
l^Ibid.. Bk. XVI, Ch. IX.
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Furthermore, men, regardless of their level of knowledge, 
are superior to any animal.
More specifically the road to goodness and super­
iority is knowledge, which consists primarily of understand­
ing nature. Thus the concept of nature in Confucianism is 
of great importance for an understanding of human nature. 
Confucius provided the following definition:
What Heaven has conferred is called THE NA.TURE; 
an accordance with this nature is called THE 
PATH of duty; the regulation of this path is 
called INSTRUCTION.1%
In the work of Mencius, "Kao Tzu said: 'That which comes
with life is natural.
Nature in Confucianism is the product of the will 
of heaven, and heaven is moral and teleological. Nothing 
is left to whim or chance. The Confucian heaven is also 
impersonal and naturalistic and encensasses no personal image 
or god.^^ Confucius, in fact, was reluctant to discuss the
^^Confucius was quoted as saying, "It is in accor­
dance with the nature of things that of all beings on earth 
Man is the noblest."
^^The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. I, sec. 1. The term 
"path" is synonymous with Tao.
^^Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. III.
^^"Heaven" is used both in the physical and super­
natural sense, and some writers often interpret it as "God."
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other world. Once he was asked by his disciple about how 
to serve the spirits; Confucius replied: "While you are not 
able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?" The 
same disciple then asked about death, and Confucius responded: 
"While you do not know life, how can you know about death?"!?
According to Confucius, knowledge is understanding 
nature and the will of heaven. A man of knowledge under­
stands nature and acts in accordance with its principles. 
Knowledge of the moral universe would direct men to live ac­
cording to the assigned nature of things and to obey Tao or 
the Way in tune with the law of nature.
The Confucian teachings saw heaven and moral law 
closely related in origin and aim. Heaven bestowed morality 
upon man, and man thus has a moral obligation to it. Alfred
For this reason some students were led to consider Confucian­
ism a religion. It is not. Confucius has been regarded as 
a great sage, not as a god. Confucianists have no personal 
god and do not appeal to any external object in order to be 
inspired in their moral life. See, among others, Fung Yu- 
lan, 0£. cit., pp. 3-5; Reginald F. Johnston, 0£. cit., pp. 
76-99; Yi Sang-un, Hyundae wa Dongyang Sasang [Modern Times 
and Oriental Thought] (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1963), pp. 91-96;
D. T. Suzuki, "A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy," 
Monist, XVII (April, 1908), pp. 242-85; C. K. Yang, "The 
Functional Relationship between Confucian Thought and 
Chinese Religion," John K. Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought 
and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1957), pp. 269-90; and Derk Bodde, "Dominant Ideas," China,
H. F. PfecNair, ed. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1946), pp. 18-28.
Analects, Bk. XI, Ch. XI.
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Doeblin describes this Confucian relationship between the
moral universe and man as follows :
Nature does not consist merely of physio-mechan­
ical forces; observation, admiration, and mere 
reckoning also do not approach her true essence.
Only together do humanity and Heaven build the 
universe, of which man is an integral part, not 
just any. In this combination, it is only 
humanity which can cause disturbances so that 
it becomes man's duty to preserve permanently 
the balance of cosmos. We have here a mystically 
real connection. Humanity is continually under 
influences flowing from the stars and from the 
earth itself; these influences, the natural 
events of the year, and atmospheric phenomena 
are manifestations with which man must bring 
himself into accord. Tao means the law of 
natural events which, at the same time, regulates 
human action. To act in obedience to this law 
is to act humanely and to give and take in social 
relationships.
The Confucian concept of nature and the universe is 
directly related to yet another concept, that of Ming. 
Confucius once said; "If my principles are to advance, it 
is so ordered. If they fall to the ground, it: is so 
o r d e r e d . H e  believed there were certain forces that
^®Alfred Doeblin, The Living Thoughts of Confucius 
(New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1940), p. 22.
^^The Chinese word Ming is difficult to translate 
into English. It has been rendered literally as fate, des­
tiny, or decree, but the actual meaning of the word is 
equivalent to the will of Heaven. Thus the relationship 
between the concepts of nature and ming is clearly discern­
ible. See Fung Yu-Ian, op. cit., p. 45.
ZPAnalects. Bk. XIV, Ch. XXXVII, sec. 2.
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control the order of the universe, and man's duty in this 
teleological and immutable universe is to conform to the 
Way (Tao) of the universe. Man cannot alter his role as a 
man.
This fatalism permeates the whole of Confucianism, 
and it has shaped the Confucian outlook significantly. 
According to the concept of Ming, life and death are pre­
destined, and one should accept his lot in life. Confucius 
emphasized the importance of Ming, and the man of knowledge 
must understand it. One should do his best without worrying 
whether or not he is succeeding. To act in this way is to 
know Ming, and knowing Ming is an important requisite of a 
superior man. "Without recognizing the ordinances of Heaven, 
it is impossible to be a superior man."^! This Confucian 
concept of Ming is very similar to Calvin's. To Confucian­
ists, however, the purpose of life of man is, unlike Calvin's 
glorification of God, to conform with nature.
Confucius believed that if man does not conform to 
nature or the will of Heaven, i.e., to Ming, he will undergo
"calamities" and great m i s e r y . T h u s  the right way of liv­
ing is in accordance with nature; as Confucius was quoted:
^^Ibid., Bk. XX, Ch. Ill, sec. 1.
Z^lbid., Bk. VI, Ch. XVII.
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to love those whom men hate, and to hate those 
whom men love;--this is to outrage the natural 
feeling of men. Calamities cannot fail to come 
down on him who does so.23
As evidenced in the preceding quotation, men in the
Confucian world are expected to follow the accepted way of
life, and anyone v^o acts against tradition will incur
misery. Confucius said at one time:
Let a man who is ignorant be fond of using his 
own judgement; let a man without rank be fond 
of assuming a directing power to himself; let 
a man who is living in the present age go back 
to the ways of antiquity;--on the persons of all 
who act thus calamities will be sure to c o m e . 24
It is thus virtuous for man to know his own nature
and Ming and to act accordingly; so long as a man understands
his nature and his station in life Heaven will offer him its
protection. Confucius said in a strain of fatalism:
If Heaven wished to let this cause of truth 
perish, then. I, a future mortal, should not 
have got such a relation to that cause. While 
Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, 
what can the people of K'wang do to m e ? 2 5
Mencius was unruffled when someone informed him that a court
sycophant had thwarted his opportunity of employment by the
po
The Great Learning, Ch. X, sec. 17.
^^The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XXVII, sec. 1.
^^Analects, Bk. IX, Ch. V., sec. 3.
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prince of Lu. He said:
A man's advancement is effected, it may be, by 
others, and the stopping him is, it may be, 
from the efforts of others. But to advance a 
man or to stop him his advance is really beyond 
the power of other men. My not finding in the 
prince of Lu a ruler who confide in me, and put 
counsels into practice, is from Heaven. How can 
that scion of the Tsang family cause me not to 
find the ruler that could suit m e ? 2 6
If Ming governs human life, how does one understand
one's own destiny? Confucianists believe that study and
moral cultivation reveal the role of each individual. A man
of superior knowledge is quite capable of discerning the
will of heaven. Confucius according to himself seems to
have had little trouble in acquiring such understanding:
At fifteen I set my heart upon learning. At 
thirty, I had planted my feet firm upon the 
ground. At forty, I no longer suffered from 
perplexities. At fifty, I knew what were 
the biddings of Heaven. At sixty, I heard 
them with docile ear. At seventy, I could 
follow the dictates of my own heart; for 
what I desired no longer overstepped the 
boundaries of right.2/
Familial Model for Social Order
Viewing human nature as basically good, Confucian­
ists had enormous faith in man's capacity for social order.
^^Mencius, Bk. I, pt. II, Ch. XVI, sec. 3.
27Analects, Bk. I, Ch. IV.
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However practically they thought human relations within a 
family provide the ultimate model for man's fulfillment and 
for social order. Though this feature of Confucianism ob­
viously never can be fully accounted for, some have attempted 
to give at least a partial explanation. The Chinese were 
primarily farmers who needed help from every family member. 
Their social relationships therefore grew out of family rela­
tionships. Chinese socio-economic conditions formed the 
basis of Confucianism, and it in turn expressed the ethical 
significance of these conditions. As Fung Yu-Ian explains,
"a great deal of Confucianism is the rational justification 
or theoretical expression of this social s y s t e m . "28 Con­
fucianists held that the family was the ideal pattern for all 
forms of human association, because within a family the mem­
bers do not claim their rights but rather seek to perform 
their mutual obligations.29
Man therefore is a social animal, and the position 
or meaning of the individual is found only in his relation 
or his relative status in such social units as the family 
and more broadly the community. Confucianists did not
^®Fung Yu-Ian, 0£. cit., p. 21.
29
John Pratt, "Confucian China," Contemporary 
Review, Vol. 186 (November, 1954), p. 267.
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conceive of man as a physio-biological being apart from 
other men. Order in society can be maintained only through 
identifying one's obligations and meeting them faithfully, 
because a man is not just an individual--a neutral, class- 
free, equalitarian being; but rather, he is a corporate- 
inçlied being, such as a superior man, an ordinary man, the 
ruler, the subject, father, husband, friend, son, etc. By 
identifying with the proper roles, a man acquires his mean­
ing, and social order ensues from such identification. As 
Wittfogel put it, "Confucianism presents the socio-political 
aspect of the matter with unusual clarity.
Confucius and his followers believed that only the
principles of family relationships can provide peace and order
in the state:
From the loving exançle of one family a whole 
state becomes loving, and from its courtesies 
the whole state becomes courteous, while, from 
the ambition and perverseness of the One man, 
the whole state may be led to rebellious dis­
order- -such is the nature of the influence.31
The family life in Confucianism is the primary 
source of good social behavior. Confucius is quoted from
30Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative 
Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1957), p. 320.
qi
The Great Learning, Ch. IX, sec. 3.
34
the Book of Poetry about an ideal family and its harmonious
relationships :
Happy union with wife and children is like the 
music of lutes and harps. When there is concord 
among brethren, the harmony is delightful and 
enduring. Thus may you regulate your family, 
and enjoy the pleasure of your wife and children.
In such a state of things, parents have entire 
conçlacence.32
Peaceful and harmonious family life should therefore be
lessons for all men. And these lessons should be applied
in man's political and social life because family structure
alone provides the highest model for harmony and order.
Confucius said:
Things being investigated, knowledge became 
complete. Their knowledge being complete, 
their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts 
being sincere, their hearts were then recti­
fied. Their hearts being rectified, their 
persons were cultivated. Their persons being 
cultivated, their families were regulated.
Their families being regulated, their states 
were rightly governed. Their states being 
rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made 
tranquil and h a p p y . 33
The most important relationship insofar as social 
order is concerned is that between father and son. This 
relationship is the basic guide to all especially in their 
political life. Confucianists regard filial piety the chief
32
The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XV, secs. 2 & 3.
^^The Great Learning, The Text of Confucius, sec. 5.
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cornerstone of the entire social structure, and it diffuses 
its influences through all the behavior of human life. Thus 
it has functional and social effect beyond the family.
For Confucius filial piety therefore originates with
the bonds of common parentage and extends to all other human
relationships. It must be observed with certain accepted
rules of rites. Extolling filial piety, he said:
To gather in the same place where they earlier 
have gathered; to perform the same ceremonies 
which they earlier have performed; to play the 
same music which they earlier have played; to 
pay respect to those whom they honored; to love 
those who were dear to them; in fact, to serve 
those now dead as if they were living, and those 
now departed as if they were with us still. This 
is the highest achievement of filial p i e t y . 34
One of his disciples asked Confucius exactly what is this 
filial piety he puts such a great emphasis upon. Confucius 
answered: "Filial piety is seen in the skillful carrying out 
of the wishes of our forefathers, and the skillful carrying 
forward of their undertakings."^^ "It is not being dis­
o b e d i e n t . "36 He elaborated by saying "that parents, when 
alive, should be served according to propriety; that, when
34xhe Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XIX, sec. 5.
33ibid ., sec. 2.
36&nalects, Bk. II, Ch. V, sec. 2.
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dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and 
that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety."37
Filial piety is universal, and without it there can
be no proper human relationships. It precedes all other
human obligations. When Confucius was asked by his disciple
about not serving government, he harked back eloquently to
the importance of filial piety:
What does the Shu-ching say of filial piety?-- 
You are filial, you discharge your brotherly 
duties. These qualities are displayed in 
government. This then also constituted the 
exercise of government. Why must there be 
THAT--making one be in the g o v e r n m e n t . 38
All other virtues emanate from filial piety, the
highest virtue:
Filial piety is the basic principle of Heaven, 
the ultimate standard of earth, and the norm 
of conduct for the people. Men ought to abide 
by the guiding principle of Heaven and earth as 
the pattern of their lives, so that by the 
brightness of Heaven and the benefits of earth 
they would be able to keep all in the world in 
harmony and in unison.39
Asked if there were any virtue superior to filial piety,
Confucius responded :
37%bid., sec. 3.
38ibid.. Bk. II, Ch. XXI, sec. 2.
^^The Book of Filial Piety, Ch. VII. Quoted from 
Chu Chai and Winburg Chai ed. & trans., The Humanist Way in 
Ancient China : Essential Works of Confucianism (New York: 
Bantam Books, Inc., 1965), p. 329.
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It is the nature of Heaven and earth that man 
is the most honorable of all beings. Of all 
human conduct none is greater than filial piety.
In filial piety nothing is greater than to 
revere one's father. In revering one's father, 
nothing is greater than making him a peer of 
Heaven.
Confucius continued:
The tao of father and son is rooted in the Heaven- 
endowed nature, and develops into the equity be­
tween sovereign and ministers. Parents give one 
life; no bond is stronger. They bring up and care 
for their child; no kindness is greater. There­
fore, one who does not love one's parents, but 
others, acts to the detriment of JLi. Should the 
rules of conduct be modeled on such perversity, 
the people would have no true norm by which to 
abide.
"Superior Man" v s . "Ordinary Man"
As has been seen earlier, men are nearly alike by 
nature, but they grow apart in practice. In Confucianism 
one finds a dichotomy among human beings. Those who learn 
the nature of things and abide by the principle of filial 
piety are the superior men; those who do otherwise are ordi­
nary m e n . The superior man is governed by jen
40ibid., Ch. IX, p. 330.
4llbid.
4^"Superior man" is a translation for Chun-tzu, 
which has been rendered in various ways. The most common 
translations other than "superior man" are "gentleman," 
"princely man," "noble man," "ideal man," etc. "Ordinary
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(benevolence), yi (righteousness) and (rites or pro­
priety) , whereas the ordinary man is governed by appetite 
and desire.43
Naturally Confucius preferred the superior man, and 
one central idea of Confucianism is based on the premise 
that an ordinary man cherishes the aspiration to become a 
superior man. The superior man continues to advance himself 
through cultivation and education. As Confucius said, "The 
superior man learns, in order to attain to the utmost of
his principles."44 And also, "The superior man seeks to
develop the admirable qualities of men and does not seek to 
develop their evil qualities. The ordinary man does the op­
posite of this."43
The moral and intellectual qualities of the super­
ior man are crucial in the sense that the whole system is 
completely dependent upon them. Confucius extolled the 
qualities of the superior man so much so that the entire
man" is a translation of Hsiao-jen, which has also been 
translated variously as "inferior man," "common man," "mean 
man," "average man," etc. Chun-tzu originally and literally 
means the "lord's son" or "prince's son," and Hsiao-ien, the 
"small man."
43
Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. XX and Bk. IV, Ch. XI.
44ibid., Bk. XIX, Ch. VII.
45lbid.. Bk. XII, Ch. XVI.
39
Confucian literature is replete with references to t h e m . 46 
The following is a partial list of the superior man's qual­
ities :
The superior man, in his thoughts, does not go 
out of his p l a c e . 47
What the superior man seeks, is in himself.
What the mean man seeks, is in o t h e r s . 48
The object of the superior man is truth. . . .
The superior man is anxious lest he should not 
get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty 
should come upon h i m . 49
The superior man is catholic and not partisan; 
the ordinary man is partisan not catholic.50
The superior man in the world does not set his 
mind either for anything or against anything; 
what is right, he will follow.51
The superior man thinks of virtue; the ordinary 
man thinks of comfort.52
For a discussion of the ideal qualities of the 
superior man, see Shigeki Kaizuka, Confucius, Geoffrey 
Bownas, trns. (New York; The MacMillan Co., 1956), pp. 
96-100.
4 7 A n a l e c t s , B k .  XIV, C h .  XXVII. 
48lbid.. B k .  XV, Ch. XX.
49ibid., B k .  XV, Ch. XXXI.
50lbid., B k .  II, Ch. XIV.
S l l b i d ., B k .  IV, Ch. X.
52Ibid., B k .  IV, Ch. XI.
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The superior man is affable, but not adulatory; 
the ordinary man is adulatory, but not affable.
The superior man is distressed by his want of 
ability; he is not distressed by men's not 
knowing him.54
The superior man cannot be known in little matters 
but may be entrusted with great c o n c e r n s . 55
The superior man does not promote a man singly 
on account of his words, nor does he put aside 
good words because of the man.56
Therefore the superior man does not use rewards, 
and the people are stimulated to virtue. He does 
not show anger, and the people are awed more than 
by hatchets and battle-axes.57
The superior man conforms with the path of the 
mean. . . .  The superior man accords with the 
course of the m e a n . 58
The superior man in everything puts forth his 
utmost endeavor.59
The superior man must be watchful over himself 
v^en he is alone.&0
53lbid ., Bk. XII, Ch . XXIII.
S^ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XVIII.
55ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXIII.
SGlbid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXII.
57?he Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XXXIII, sec. 4. 
58ibid., Ch. XI, sec. 3.
5^The Great Learning, Ch. II, sec. 4.
GOlbid., Ch. VI, sec. 2.
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It is apparent from the above that the superior man 
is gentle, impartial, careful, open-minded, dedicated, sin­
cere, unpretentious, etc. The significance of the superior 
man in Confucian society is that he alone can provide social 
order and justice. The ordinary man, being not so capable 
of ruling himself, must be subservient to the superior man. 
However, despite Confucianists' enqihasis upon the qualities 
of the "superior man," they do not show any intention to 
institutionalize those qualities. Instead they singly wish 
to depend on the "superior man" as an individual in the gov­
ernment, and on the influence of his examples.
The Three Cardinal Principles
Confucianism posits three crucial principles of vir­
tue, the cultivation of which is the right way--and the only 
way--to attain the status of superior man. These three 
principles are jen, yi, and li.
The concept of jen (benevolence) is the most funda­
mental; the whole Confucian system is saturated with this 
c o n c e p t . As Liang put it, jen is the root of all Confucian
^^Jen's ideograph is composed of two characters 
meaning "man" and "two." Jen is the product of the proper 
relationship between human beings. Though, as are many 
other Oriental expressions, it is difficult to translate 
into English, it has been translated as "humanity,"
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theory, and without understanding it, it is not possible to 
understand Confucianism.^2 It is the sum total of all vir­
tues, and it is the central thesis from which the whole sys­
tem was developed. The ideal of Confucian life, ethics and 
politics flows from this principle of jen. It is "the char­
acteristic element of h u m a n i t y . K a p l a n  explains the 
concept as follows :
The basic virtue which a man is to cultivate 
Chinese call j en or human-heartedness. . . .
Now jen or human-heartedness plays the part in 
Confucian thought of righteousness in Judaism, 
charity in Christianity, detachment in Buddhism, 
and so on. It is the fundamental quality of 
character on which all else depends. "What is 
virtue?" Confucius once asked. "To love your 
fellow man." Man is everything; .jen is just 
being wholly a man. . . .  It is the quality of 
humanity in its full sense. Jen is humane, love, 
justice. All three is jen.64
Jen, or benevolence, not only expresses the ideal
"human-heartedness," "love," "goodness," "perfect virtue" 
in addition to "benevolence." For detailed discussions of 
the concept of j en, see George K. C. Yeh, The Confucian 
Conception of Jen (London: The China Society, 1943), and 
Huang K'uai Yuen and J. K. Shryock, "The Meaning of Jen in 
Confucianism," Open Court, Vol. 44 (December, 1930), pp. 
745-50.
62
Liang Chi-Chao, History of Chinese Political 
Thought during the Early Tsin Period, L. T. Chen, trns. 
(London: Paul Kegan, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1930), p. 38.
^^The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XX, sec. 5.
^^Abraham Kaplan, 0£. cit., p. 273.
43
quality of the superior man but also is necessary for the
good life. Confucius discusses the importance of jen in
the Analects ;
If a superior man abandon benevolence, how can 
he fulfill the requirements of that name? The 
superior man does not, even for the space of a 
single meal, act contrary to benevolence. In 
moments of haste, he cleaves to it. In seasons 
of danger, he cleaves to it.^S
Jen is more essential to man than fire and 
water. I have seen men die from stepping 
into fire and water, but I have never seen a 
man die from stepping into jen.
I have not yet seen a man who loves jen nor a 
man who detests what is contrary to j e n . He 
who loves ien esteems nothing else above it.
He who detests what is contrary to j en seeks 
to be jen-minded so that he will not let any­
thing contrary to jen appear in his person.
Is there anyone who is able even for a single 
day to apply his energy to jen? Well, I have 
not seen a man whose energy was not equal to 
it. Should there be any such man, I have never 
met him.67
Although 1 en is known to enconpass all human virtues, 
Confucius and his disciples did not enumerate its specific 
qualities in great detail. At one time Confucius said five 
virtues constitute jen. They are respect, magnanimity.
^^Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. V, secs. 2 & 3. 
66Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXIV.
G^Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. VI, sec. 1.
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sincerity, earnestness and kindness:
With respect, you will avoid insult; with 
magnanimity, you will win over the multitude; 
with sincerity, men will trust you; with 
earnestness, you will have achievements; and 
with kindness, you will be fitted to command 
others
Jen also seems to include the virtues of filial piety and
proper observance of the r i t e s . C o u r a g e  is part of jen
because Confucius said: "though a courageous man need not
have jen, one who has jen will, ipso facto, be courageous."^®
Confucius himself seems to have had difficulty in
explicating the exact ingredients of jen. However, he did
indicate the way by which j en might be approached. A simple
and fundamental way of having j en is to love one's fellow
man. (Jen consists of loving others."^1) Also,
He who hated what is not jen, would practice 
jen in such a way that he would not allow 
anything that is not jen to approach his 
person.'
One must thus desire jen. As Confucius said, "Is j en really
G^ibid., Bk. XVII, Ch. VI.
69lbid., Bk. XIV, Ch. V.
7®Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XXII.
71lbid., Bk. XII, Ch. XXII.
^^Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. VI, sec. 1.
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so far away? I desire jen, and see, it is by."^3
Loving one's fellow man and desire for jen are fun­
damental in the attainment of jen, but they are by no means 
complete for that purpose. One must also practice all other 
humanly virtues, make an effort to have the right attitude 
and cultivate his mind constantly:
One who is firm of spirit, resolute in character, 
simple in manner, and slow of speech is near to 
jen.74
The mechanic, who wishes to do his work well, 
must first sharpen his tools. When you are 
living in any state, take service with the 
most worthy among its great officers, and make 
friends of the most virtuous among its s c h o l a r s . 75
When a disciple asked about the method of attaining j en,
Confucius answered:
Now the man of perfect jen, wishing to be 
established himself, seeks also to establish 
others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he 
seeks also to enlarge others. That may be 
called the way to practice ien.'O
The attainment of jen is achieved through the cul­
tivation of the other cardinal principles, i.e., and li.
73lbid.. Bk. VII, Ch. XXIX.
^^ibid.. Bk. XIII, Ch. XXVII.
75ibid.. XV, Ch. IX.
7*Ibid.. Bk. VI, Ch. XXVIII, sec. 2.
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The concept of 2 I is understood by the man of jen, for it 
means the appropriateness to a situation or the "oughtness" 
of a situation. As Fung Yu-Ian said, it is a "categorical 
imperative."77 An action that is appropriate or imperative 
is said to conform to yi, or righteousness. Yi implies an 
obligation which is unconditional and absolute. Confucianists 
believe there are certain things that should be done for their 
own sake because they are morally obligatory or appropriate 
in themselves. It is the right thing to do at the right time 
and in the right place without any thought of profit or per­
sonal interest. At this point, Confucianists are very much 
like Kant in the West: the moral duty of man is known a 
priori, rejecting utility as a basis for duty or action.
"The superior man comprehends righteousness; the ordinary man 
comprehends profit."78
Yi therefore is the extremely important moral force 
and a prerequisite of the superior man. Confucius is quoted 
as saying:
The superior man holds righteousness to be of 
highest importance. A man in a superior 
situation, having valor without righteousness 
will be guilty of insubordination; one of the
^^Fung Yu-Ian, o£. .cit., p. 42.
78Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. XVI.
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lower people, having valor without righteousness, 
will commit robbery.79
Yi as a categorical imperative is, however, different from
Tao (the Way), which is universal and applicable to all.
Yi, though not inconsistent with Tao, is an individualized
action, manner, or duty to each person, place and social 
80
status.
Li is another cardinal principle for social order
in C o n f u c i a n i s m .  81 in fact it seems to spell social order
itself of a kind. '’By is meant not only the sacrificial,
court and social ceremonials and the rules of personal conduct,
82
but also the social and political institutions.” Fung Yu- 
lan agrees, saying signifies ”in addition to its usual 
present-day definition of ’politeness’ or ’courtesy,’ the 
entire body of usages and customs, political and social
79
Ibid., Bk. XVII, Ch. XXIII.
80
H. G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 134-35.
81
Li is perhaps one of the more difficult words to 
translate into English. It has been translated as ’’rites,” 
"rituals,” ’’ceremony,” ’’propriety,” ’’politeness,” ’’courtesy,” 
"etiquette,” etc. Li Chi (The Book of Rites) contains 
detailed descriptions of ancient rites and proprieties for 
the whole gamut of human situations, such as birth, marriage, 
burial and mourning.
82
Francis C. M. Wei, The Spirit of Chinese Culture 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), p. 59.
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institutions."®^ Still, does not seem to be an insti­
tutionalization of such virtues as politeness, propriety, 
courtesy, etc. It is largely consisted of ceremonial and 
ritual codes on various social and political occasions. It 
is apparent that Confucius believed the observance of has 
not only personal and ethical values but also will bring about 
social and political order by reducing c o n f u s i o n . Confucius 
is quoted as saying:
To subdue one's self and return to propriety, 
is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day 
subdue himself and return to propriety, all 
under Heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to 
him. Is the perfect virtue from a man himself, 
or is it from others
In fact, Confucius thought that %i was a measure of 
civilization. For him, it represents one of the essential 
requirements of the superior man because ^  is "the outward 
expression of inward feeling," and "it is rooted in Heaven 
and comes to flower in man."®® The concept of means in
83
Fung Yu-Ian, A History of Chinese Philosophy,
Derk Bodde, trns. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1952), p. 68.
®^"When rulers love to observe the rules of pro­
priety, the people respond readily to the calls on them 
for service." (Analects, Bk. XIV, Ch. XLIX.)
G^ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. I, sec. 1.
®®Ibid., Bk. XVI, Ch. XIII.
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actuality, according to Weber, "to control activities, 
physical gestures, and movements as well with politeness and 
with grace in accordance with the status mores and the com­
mand of 'propriety.'"87 Fung believes that the performance 
of IJ. acts as a catharsis for the emotions and also that it 
prevents emotions from running to excess by serving as a 
fixed ritualistic framework within which emotions can be
expressed.88
Li thus is a means of expressing one's feelings in 
a way beneficial both to the individual and to society. In 
order to avoid social disorder, it is necessary that there 
be certain socially acceptable patterns of actions through 
which emotions can be expressed. Rites establish standards 
of behavior; man can easily conform his behavior to what is 
socially desirable. IÆ is a necessity for the Confucian 
good life.
Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, 
becomes laborious bustle; carefulness without 
the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; 
boldness, without the rules of propriety becomes
8 7 Max Weber, The Religion of China ; Confucianism 
and Taoism, Hans Gerth, ed. and trns. (Glencoe, 111.: 
The Free Press, 1951), p. 156.
88
Fung Yu-Ian, A History of Chinese Philosophy,
I (Peiping, 1937), Ch. 14, esp. pp. 344-46.
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subordination; straightforwardness, without 
the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness. ^
Without an acquaintance with the rules of 
propriety, it is impossible for the character
to be established.90
Li is also important for the preservation of social 
status and hierarchy of order in society. The absence of 
li reduces the degree of self-understanding, thereby bring­
ing about confusion in identifying % i . In other words, 
meticulous adherence to rituals and propriety remind a per­
son of his status and duties. Therefore aids a person in 
developing righteousness, or %i. The Analects present an 
anecdote in which Confucius insisted upon following formality 
and propriety at the time of his favorite disciple Yen 
Yuan's death:
When Yen Yuan died. Yen Lu begged the carriage 
of the Master to sell and get an outer shell 
for his son's coffin. The Master said, "every 
one calls his son his son, whether he has 
talents or has not talents. There was Li 
(Confucius' son); when he died he had a coffin 
but no outer shell. I would not walk on foot 
to get a shell for him, because, having fol­
lowed in the rear of the great officers, it was 
not proper that I should walk on foot."91
89
Analects, Bk. VIII, Ch. II.
90
^ Ibid., Bk. XX, Ch. Ill, sec. 2.
Sllbid., Bk. XI, Ch. VII.
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Despite Confucius' emphasis upon rites and pro­
priety, the underlying moral principles and good social be­
havior are more Important than mere observance of 1^. Ob­
servance of simply secures good social behavior. In 
other words, 1^ Is designed to develop correct habits and 
to establish a person's character. It Is a means by which 
one may carry on proper social relations. Thus li. Is an 
objective system of order but although representing a state 
of mind, a "superior man" can attain It through study and 
self-cultivation. It Is In a sense the objective form of 
civilization for a person.
Hsun Tzu* s View
There was another great Confuclanlst whose view 
was In some ways quite different from that of Confucius and 
Mencius. Hsun Tzu (ça. 312 B.C. - In some respects
turned Confucianism In directions which Confucius and Mencius 
would have deplored. The basic reason for this would seem 
to be that Hsun Tzu had little faith In humanity and took a 
completely different view on human nature. Hsun Tzu's writ­
ings also produced Han Pel Tzu, the founder of the Legalist
02Hsun Tzu seems to have had little Impact upon the 
actual social and political life of East Aslans. His In­
fluence was chiefly on academicians.
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philosophy in China, and his works "have a strongly real­
istic strain on which some of the Legalist writings build."
n o
In spite of this, Hsun Tzu is classified as a Confucian.
Hsun Tzu generally takes the same views on society 
and social order as do Confucius and Mencius, with excep­
tions in certain areas. One of the most striking differ­
ences is found in the concept of human nature. While Mencius 
argued that human nature is innately good and evil is the 
result of environment, Hsun Tzu believes that human nature 
is evil, artificial, and the good is something acquired.
Hsun says :
The nature of man is evil; his goodness is 
acquired. As to his nature, man is born, first, 
with a desire for gain. If this desire is fol­
lowed, strife will result and prudence will dis­
appear. Second, man is born with envy and hate.
If these tendencies are followed, injury and 
cruelty will abound; loyalty and good faith will 
disappear. Third, man is b o m  with the lusts of 
the ear and eye, leading to the love of sound and 
beauty. If these lusts are followed, lewdness 
and disorder will spring up; H. and yi, together 
with good manners, will disappear. Hence, if 
man gives rein to his nature and follows his 
passions, he will strive and grab, leading to a 
breach of order and confounding of reason, and 
culminating in violence. Only under the re­
straint of teachers and laws and the guidance of 
rules of 1^ and yi, does man conform to prudence,
^^Oliver E. Benson, "Classical International Sys­
tems; Four Models of Power Politics," (unpublished manu­
script), n.d., p. 12.
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observe good manners and yield to order. From 
all this, it is evident that the nature of man 
is evil and that his goodness is a c q u i r e d . 94
For Hsun Tzu, human nature does not contain such 
virtues as jen, yi, and li. These virtues are consciously 
created by the ancient sages by restraining such emotions 
as love, anger, joy, hate, etc.^S Thus it is clear that 
man cannot have harmonious and orderly life if he is gov­
erned by his innate nature.
Since Hsun Tzu has very little faith in human 
nature for social order, he turns to emphasize the impor­
tance of laws and teachings of the sages. Thus, for him, 
social order can be obtained not through the innate good­
ness of man but through scrupulous following of the regula­
tions laid down by the ancient sages. Those regulations 
demand that each man must adhere to the social differentia­
tion, i.e., a functional specialization in the Platonic 
sense.
Thus, in order to build social order, Hsun Tzu ad­
vocates a class society in which the superior men who are 
governed by Tao and li should check the inferior men who are 
94
The Work of Hsun Tzu, Ch. XXIII. Quoted from 
Essential Works of Confucianism trans. & ed. Ch'u Chai and 
Winberg Chai, o£. cit., p. 232.
9 ^ I b i d ., p p .  2 3 5 - 3 6 .
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governed by appetite, desire, and emotion. Social class Is 
necessary because men are not able to be skilled In every­
thing. Hsun Tzu says, "If there Is no distinction of occu­
pation, then people will have difficulty In getting work 
done."96
However, social order will not arise simply from 
people who have been placed In various grades and classes 
according to their abilities. Hsun Tzu believes that many 
people would not be happy with their assigned classes and 
stations In their lives. Since It Is the nature of man to 
seek comfort, fame, and wealth, there ought to be certain 
laws and regulations to curb those. For Hsun Tzu, and 
are those that lead to harmony In class divisions. One of 
the most Important functions of l_i Is to restrain and set 
limits on man's desires by Indicating what Is proper for him. 
YI acts very much along this line, and also checks on desires 
by making people shameful and morally wrong for them to seek
Q -]
things that do not belong to them. Though Hsun Tzu seems 
to believe In an Institutionalized system of order by em­
phasizing 11, his conception of ^  Is not different from 
that of Confucius and Mencius. In other words. It Is largely
96ibld., p. 239.
97lbld.. p. 235.
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consisted of custom, decorum, and various rites governing
go
marriage, burial, etc.
In summary, Confucianism believes that the nature 
of man is basically good and that evil in man's nature is 
the result of environment although it did not explain the 
evil there. Man can be morally perfectible. Moral perfec­
tion is to be accomplished through understanding and conform­
ing to the pattern of nature and the will of Heaven. The 
order of society should be built after the familial model, 
and family virtues must be extended into social life. Super­
ior men must be exemplars of such qualities as jen, yi, and 
li, among others. Confucianism is extremely rationalistic in 
its theory of order and does not resort to the supernatural 
or to a supramundane diety. Rather, it seeks an orderly 
society through moral cultivation of individuals. Hsun Tzu 
is the only Confucianist who takes a completely opposite view 
on human nature. However, Hsun seems to be not so different 
in his view on the method for social order except for his 
greater emphasis upon jj.. Hsun Tzu believes that social dis­
harmony is not caused by environment but rather by man's in­
nate evil.
98Hsun's view on politics and government will be 
examined in the following chapter.
CHAPTER III 
CONFUCIAN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Confucianism seems largely preoccupied with the 
nature of man and the cultivation of human virtues which 
supposedly would produce an orderly life of the individual 
man. Many believed that Confucian teachings were primarily 
concerned with ethics and with how a man should conduct him­
self in relation to other men. Bertrand Russell, for exam­
ple, believed that Confucianism is "largely occupied with 
trivial points of etiquette," and that its "main concern is 
to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions.
Russell's statement contains a certain amount of truth. 
From a modern point of view, Confucianism seems somewhat 
apolitical, and its comments on politics appear incidental 
and peripheral. Confucius, indeed, was not too concerned with 
politics apart from other aspects of human life. During most 
of his life Confucius was preaching to his disciples and
Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (New York:
The Century Co., 1922), p. 190. Russell admitted he could 
not appreciate the merits of Confucianism.
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counseling princes about attaining the good and virtuous 
life. He believed that the highest quality of morality 
should be the basis of all human interaction and that poli­
tical disorder could be cured only through the development 
of the innate quality of men--especially of the ruler--and 
through acting according to lessons learned from family life. 
For Confucius, therefore, politics is basically a part of 
ethics. Yet it might very well be that the Confucian empha­
sis on ethics is designed primarily to have political intent. 
In other words, the Confucian "ethics" does not seem to have 
so much function of improving the "internal" and "subjective" 
qualities of men as attaining socio-political order.
For although the line between its ethical and politi­
cal theory is not at all clear, Confucianism does provide a 
good deal of theory on politics and government. Thus it is 
the purpose of this chapter to examine specifically Confucian 
political theory on the nature of the state, methods of gov­
erning, the problem of leadership, political legitimacy and 
the nature of justice and law. Even though Confucianism 
embraces more than these aspects of political theory, they 
shall be the center of focus since they are the major items 
of Confucian political thought and since they are the subjects 
of significance in comparing Confucianism with modern poli­
tical life and particularly with democracy.
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Origin and Organization of the State
Confucian literature suggests that the state is a
O
product of slow social development. It is a natural product 
of social intercourse among a large number of people. Con­
fucianism posits no contract among men or between the people 
and the sovereign. There is no room for any theory of man 
in the original state of nature because in Confucianism it is 
assumed that man has always lived as a member of the family 
and that there have always been human relationships.^ There
was no concept of an individual or an early man all by him­
self devoid of any sort of familial relationships with other 
men. In Confucianism the very existence of man presupposes 
family relationships and concomitant duties and obligations.
Since Confucianism views social life as an exten­
sion of family life, political relationships are merely one 
phase of social relationships. The state is thus an
2
The term "state" here is used in the broad sense, 
which might include such concepts as "nation," "kingdom," 
"country," etc. Confucian literature seems to make no 
clear distinction between the terms "state" and "govern­
ment"; they seem to be used interchangeably.
3
The Book of History, which appeared long before 
Confucius lived, describes the five relationships which 
were meant to portray social phenomena as contrasted with 
natural phenomena.
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outgrowth of human relationships and a part of society.4 
The following quotation reveals rather succinctly this evo­
lutionary concept of society:
Heaven and earth existing, all material things 
then got their existence. All material things 
having existence, afterwards there came male and 
female. From the existence of male and female 
there came afterwards husband and wife. From 
husband and wife there came father and son.
From father and son there came sovereign and 
subjects. From sovereign and subjects there 
came high and low. Following the distinction 
between high and low came the arrangements of 
propriety and righteousness.5
Confucius thus viewed the state as only a larger 
household, having all the ethical and authority relation­
ships found in the smaller household, the family. To
Confucianists, a state is not, as Aristotle argued, a com­
bination of well run families; and family is not an atomic 
unit. The state simply came into being as a result of in­
crease in population and the necessity for economic coopera­
tion and defense.
Confucius seems to have had little concern about 
the organization of the state, but he did assert that there
^Leonard Shih-lien Hsu, The Political Philosophy of 
Confucianism (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), 
p. 29.
^From The Book of Change. Quoted in Leonard S.
Hsu, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
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were certain elements basic to a state. Answering a ques­
tion raised by his disciple Tsze-kung,
The Master said, "The requisites of government 
are that there be sufficiency of food, 
sufficiency of military equipment, and the 
confidence of the people in their ruler."
Tsze-kung said, "If it cannot be helped, and 
one of these must be dispensed with, which of 
the three should be foregone first?" "The 
military equipment," said the Master.
Tsze-kung again asked, "If it cannot be helped, 
and one of the remaining two must be dispensed 
with, which one of them should be foregone?"
The Master answered, "Part with the food. From 
the old, death has been the lot of all men; but 
if the people have no faith in their rulers, 
there is no standing for the state."&
For Confucius, therefore, food, weapons, and a 
sovereign are the essential ingredients that compose a state, 
but the qualified sovereign (right form of government) is 
the utmost in importance. The first two are national 
economy and defense, and the last one is a type of govern­
ment. Thus Confucianists believe that when there is the 
right form of government (a qualified sovereign) the essen­
tial functions of the state as such government--economy and 
defense--will be achieved automatically. When a man of vir­
tue occupies the highest post in the government, people 
below him will be influenced by his good behavior, and his
^Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. VII.
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virtuous qualities will be propagated throughout the state. 
In effect, that Is, the question of the Institutional struc­
ture of government has little meaning In Confucianism. Con­
fucius slnply took the existing monarchlal government for 
granted.
Under the monarchy Confucianism then subsumes a 
hlerarchlal form of society which Is patterned after the 
hlerarchlal form of the family. Confucianism believes that 
It Is most natural to have government organized In such a 
way as the family Is organized since It views the family as 
a microcosm of the sociopolitical order.^ The family Is 
part of nature, and since nature, to Confucianists, Is seem­
ingly harmonious and orderly. It provides an excellent model 
for the structure of government. One Confucian classic 
claims the ancient rulers built political Institutions based 
upon a model of natural phenomena.® Confucius himself 
thought nature and the family objects worthy of study In de­
veloping the structure of government and state.
^Ibld.. Bk. II, Cb. XXI.
®The Book of Change, Hsiang Chuan, pt. 2, hex. XXII, 
Confucius was known to be extremely sensitive to natural 
phenomena, for they would teach him the principles of 
orderly life. See Analects, Bk. X, Ch. XVI.
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Purpose and Method of Government 
and Political Leadership
For Confucianism the ultimate goal of government is 
to attain a moral and orderly life, both of which should be 
based again upon the virtue of the ruler. Though Confucian­
ists do not make it very clear, it seems that moral life is 
orderly life and vice versa. People's welfare and defense 
are important but they are really secondary. As Confucius 
said at one time:
When a country is well governed, poverty and 
a mean condition are things to be ashamed of 
When a country is ill governed, riches and 
honor are things to be ashamed of.^
Again, as the following passage illustrates, Confucius, with
a strain of Taoism, felt that moral, esthetic development is
more important than the materials.
With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, 
and my bended arm for a pillow; -- I have 
still joy in the midst of these things. Riches 
and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to 
me as floating clouds.
The Confucian ideal should be achieved through the 
advancement of man's innate moral quality, and the means to 
reach the professed goal of government is to teach people
9
Analects, Bk. VII, Ch. XII, sec. 3.
lOlbid., Bk. VII, Ch. XV.
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how to cultivate their innate morality. The purpose of 
Confucian politics is therefore educational. The educational 
task should begin at the top with the sovereign because he 
is the most influential man in the state. As Confucius 
said:
He who exercises government by means of his 
virtue may be compared to the north polar 
star, which keeps its place and all the stars 
turn towards it.
It was understood therefore that the most important
function of government is the cultivation of the mind, and
for that purpose the role of the sovereign is vital.
From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the 
people, all must consider the cultivation of 
the person the root of everything besides.12
It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that 
what should spring from it will be well 
ordered. It never has been the case that what
was of great importance has been slightly
cared for, and, at the same time, that what 
was of slight importance has been greatly cared 
for.13
Confucius believed that the primary task in regard 
to government is what he called the "rectification of names."
He meant by this that the actuality should be made to accord
lllbid., Bk. II, Ch. I.
1 9The Great Learning, The Text of Confucius, sec. 6. 
13lbid., sec. 7.
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with the essence attached to the name. To Confucius, "to
govern means to r e c t i f y . on one occasion Confucius was
asked what he would do first if he were to rule the country.
His reply was most Platonic: "What is necessary is to
rectify names."15 He meant that everything in the universe
should act its given role:
There is government, when the prince is prince, 
and the minister is minister: when the father is 
father, and the son is son.lo
Vice versa, one should use the correct terms for the correct
roles in order to maintain and govern the nation, or a name
must agree with the ideal essence the name implies. The
essence of the ruler is what the ruler ideally ought to be--
as in Plato--the "real" ruler; the ruler therefore must act
as the true ruler in fact as well as in name. Confucius is
quoted as saying :
If names be not correct, language is not in 
accordance with the truth of things. If
14
Analects. Bk. XII, Ch. XVII.
l^Ibid.. Bk. XIII, Ch. Ill, sec. 2.
^^Ibid.. Bk. XII, Ch. XI, sec. 2. Name in Con­
fucianism refers to a concrete object and is considered 
more than a semantic symbol. It should be an essence as 
well as an existence. Thus they believe that a prince is 
not a prince if he fails to live up to the standard of 
prince as expressed in the ideograph. The rectification 
of names therefore must be understood in this manner.
65
language be not in accordance with the truth 
of things, affairs cannot be carried on to 
success. When affairs cannot be carried on 
to success, proprieties and music do not 
flourish, punishments will not be properly
awarded. When punishments are not properly
awarded,,people do not know how to move hand 
or foot.l'
But who decides what is the essence of each name? 
Although the question is extremely important, Confucius does 
not give a direct answer. However, it is generally believed 
that the function of assigning duties and responsibilities 
to each name is in the hands of philosophers and historians 
who have studied the nature of the universe. It is not the 
function of kings, superior men, or f a t h e r s . T h u s  the 
function of a ruler is not so much in creating values in
society but rather in seeing to it that the values (the es­
sence of name) defined by the philosophers and historians 
are well applied and administered throughout the nation-- 
especially by himself as model.
Confucius, however, realized that the rectification 
of names was not accomplished by simple belief in it.^^ The 
moral forces that lead to the rectification of names stem
l^Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. Ill, secs. 5 & 6. 
18Leonard S. Hsu, 0£. cit., pp. 55-56. 
^^Analects, Bk. XIII, Ch. XV, sec. 2.
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primarily from familial virtues. The most important prin­
ciple of governing therefore again derives from the family.
What is meant by "In order rightly to govern
the state, it is necessary first to regulate
the family," is this: -- It is not possible 
for one to teach others, while he cannot teach 
his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without 
going beyond his family, completes the lessons 
for the state. There is filial piety; —  
therewith the sovereign should be served.
There is fraternal submission: -- therewith 
elders and superiors should be served. There 
is kindness: —  therewith the multitude should
be treated.20
For the purpose of rectification of names government 
leaders must have abilities to govern their families, which
in turn come from humanly virtues acquired through the cul­
tivation of the mind. Vice versa, Confucius emphasized the 
vital importance of family virtue in developing leadership 
by citing numerous examples of the past:
Yao and Shun led on the kingdom with benevolence, 
and the people followed them. Chieh and Chau led 
on the kingdom with violence, and the people 
followed them. The orders which these issued were 
contrary to the practices which they loved, and so 
the people did not follow them. On this account, 
the ruler must himself be possessed of the good 
qualities, and then he may require them in the 
people. Never has there been a man, who, not having 
reference to his own character and wishes in dealing 
with others, was able effectually to instruct them.
Thus we see how the government of the state depends 
on the regulation of the family.21
^^The Great Learning, Ch. IX, sec. 1.
Z^lbid., Ch. IX, secs. 4 & 5.
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The most influential person in administering the 
rectification of names (after the definition is made) is 
thus the ruler of the state who should possess virtue and 
knowledge of the universe. That is, Confucius believed that 
the virtuous ruler is the most important person in terms of 
immediate government.^2 For Confucius, the direction of 
influence is downward, and government is more important 
than the family in terms of influence, because a virtuous 
ruler who acts as ruler will influence the entire population 
within the nation.
In The Book of Rites he said: "As men are consti­
tuted, the thing most important to them is government."^3 
The good life is dependent upon the government and the qual­
ity of the sovereign.
Chi K'ang, distressed about the number of thieves 
in the state, inquired of Confucius how to do 
away with them. Confucius said, "If you, sir, 
were not covetous, although you should reward 
them to do it, they would not steal."24
Chi K'ang asked Confucius about government, saying,
"what do you say to killing the unprincipled for 
good of the principled?" Confucius replied, "Sir,
22
Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. VII. See also The Great 
Learning, Ch. X, sec. 1.
23
The Book of Rites, Bk. XIV, sec. 6.
Z^Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. XVII.
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in carrying on your government, why should you use 
killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for 
what is good, and the people will be good. The 
relation between superiors and inferiors is like 
that between the wind and the grass. The grass 
must bend, when the wind blows across it.”25
The ruler's virtue is so vital in the attainment of
good government that Confucius places more emphasis upon it
than upon anything else. No institutional arrangement is
more necessary for efficient and effective government. As
Confucius believed, rulership would be accomplished if the
ruler "gravely and reverently occupy his royal seat."^^ The
ruler most give examples by living up to the expectation.
Confucius said:
When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his 
government is effective without issuing of orders.
If his personal conduct is not correct, he may 
issue orders, but they will not be followed.2/
The same principle applies to other high-ranking officials
of government. Confucius rhetorically asked, if a top-
ranking official cannot rectify himself, "what has he to do
with rectifying o t h e r s ?"28
25ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XIX.
Z^lbid., Bk. XV, Ch. IV.
Z^Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. VI.
28ibid.. Bk. XIII, Ch. XIII.
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The way a ruler becomes virtuous does not differ
significantly from that of other men. A ruler must possess
such cardinal virtues as jen, y i , and ]Ay attained through
the cultivation of the mind and the study of nature. A good
part of his study consists of reading classics and history
of the past. In fact, Confucianism stresses that no amount
of governing is possible if the ruler does not possess these
virtues. Confucius is quoted as saying:
When a man's knowledge is sufficient to attain, 
and his jen is not sufficient to enable him to 
hold, whatever he may have gained, he will lose 
again. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, 
and he has enough jen to hold, if he cannot 
govern with dignity, the people will respect him.
When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and 
he has enough jen to hold; when he governs also 
with dignity, yet if he try to move people con­
trary to the rules of propriety: -- full excel­
lence is not reached.29
In politics therefore leadership is the most, and
probably the only, quality of importance. Good leadership
is the panacea for all problems of governing, and it is the
root of everything within the state:
Possessing virtue will give him the people.
Possessing the people will give him the 
territory. Possessing the territory will 
give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, 
he will have resources for expenditure. 20
29lbid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXII.
30The Great Learning, Ch. X, sec. 6.
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Yet virtuous political leadership stems immediately from
the personal qualities of the ruler, defined ultimately from
the nature itself as in turn discovered by the philosophers.
This amply attests again to the fact that politics and ethics
are inseparable in Confucian thought.
Aside from the ruler's personal qualities, Confucius
offers two other recommendations for good government, and
these two are more specifically intended to help the ruler
in the operation of government. First, Confucius advocates
the rule of li^ , i.e., propriety of rites; second, he advises
the ruler to employ competent ministers and superior men.
Concerning the rule of 11, Confucius asked:
Is a prince able to govern his kingdom with the 
complaisance proper to the rules of propriety, 
what difficulty will he have? If he cannot 
govern it with that complaisance, what has he 
to do with the rules of propriety?^^
The rules of propriety here may be construed as following
formalism and precedents, for it is a characteristic of
Confucianism that formalism is stressed in the whole gamut
of human relationships.^^ It seems that Confucius here is
trying to routinize men's way of life and their relationships.
^^Analects. Bk. IV, Ch. XII.
32See for example Analects, Bk. XI, Ch. VII.
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The Confucian emphasis upon formalism and rites is apparent
in the following passages;
Yen Yuan asked how the government of a country 
should be administered. The Master said,
"Follow the calender of Hsia; ride in the 
carriage of Yin; wear the cap of Chou. Adopt 
the music of Shao with its pantomime; banish 
the songs of Cheng; and keep away from glib 
talkers. For the song of Cheng is licentious 
and glib talkers are d a n g e r o u s ."^3
Without the rules of propriety and distinctions 
of right, and the high and the low will not be 
wealth sufficient for the expenditure. Without 
the great principles of government and their 
various business, there will not be wealth 
sufficient for the expenditure.^4
Since the ruler's virtue is so important in terms
of influence on others, Confucius advised that the head of
state should not only conform to the rules of propriety but
that he should also recruit the virtuous men in the country
for governmental positions. Confucius said: "Employ the
upright and put aside all the crooked; in this way the
crooked can be made to be upright."^3 On another occasion
Confucius said on the subject:
The duke Ai asked, saying, "What should be done 
in order to secure the submission of the people?"
33ibid.. Bk. XV, Ch. X.
34Mencius, Bk. VII, pt. II, Ch. XII.
^^Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. XXII, sec. 3.
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Confucius replied, "Advance the upright and 
set aside the crooked, then the people will 
submit. Advance the crooked and set aside 
the upright, then the people will not submit."
The upright man can best serve In the administration 
of the state. He Is the man who "In his conduct of himself 
maintains a sense of shame, and when sent to any quarter will 
not disgrace his prince's commission" and "whom the circle 
of his relatives pronounce to be filial, whom his fellow 
villagers and neighbors pronounce to be fraternal."^7
Logically, Confucius disapproves strongly of illegal
or corrupt means of obtaining government offices. One must
rise, to power by the proper method.38 Wealth and birthright
have no place In appointing high officials. In selecting
the ministers of state, Confucius admonished the ruler to
exercise great care.
The superior man does not promote a man simply 
on account of his words, nor does he put aside 
good words because of the m a n . 39
The ruler should employ his ministers by methods which con­
form to the rules of propriety; such rules can be construed
3Glbld.. Bk. II, Ch. XIX.
3?Ibld., Bk. XIII, Ch. XX.
38ibld.. Bk. XV, Chs. VI & IX and Bk. XVII, Ch. I.
39Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXII.
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here as objective principles and standards.40
Ministers and other lower officials are to be 
faithful and loyal in the administration of public affairs. 
Confucianism rejects, however, any sort of blind loyalty. 
Ministers are expected to act for the country, not for the 
ruler or prince, and even if it is against the prince's 
interest ministers should do what they think right for the 
c o u n t r y . B e i n g  a superior man first, the minister should 
serve the ruler with Tao. Thus governmental affairs must be 
handled according to the Higher "law" of ethics. On the 
other hand, Confucius believed that if serving the ruler 
with Tao should bring about friction the minister should re­
tire instead of compromise.
What is called a great minister, is one who 
serves his prince according to what is right, 
and when he finds he cannot do so, r e t i r e s . 43
Political Legitimacy, and the 
Mandate of Heaven
Probably the highest ideal of Confucianism is that 
man should be in harmony with heaven and earth so that
40lbid., Bk. Ill, Ch. XIX.
41lbid.
42Ibid., Bk. XIV, Chs. XVII, XVIII, XX & XXIII. 
43lbid., Bk. XI, Ch. XXIII, sec. 3.
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peaceful life among people can be achieved. The study of 
nature and the cultivation of the mind reveal that to 
achieve a peaceful life people need government and that 
government should ultimately and practically be run by one 
man at the top--shades of the Western Dante. "There are not 
two suns in the sky, nor two sovereigns over the people.
Of course this does not preclude a ruler from having min­
isters or assistants. Confucius therefore recognized the 
importance of central authority in society. The king or 
prince as head of state and government constitutes the source 
of all political authority, and he has virtually no limita­
tion in the exercise of power.45 The extent of the sovereign 
power is very much the same as that of Eodin.
Legitimacy of political authority is derived from
the "orderly life" of the state, which is the manifestation
of the heavenly mandate. Mencius is quoted as saying:
When right government prevails in the empire, 
princes of little virtues are submissive to 
those of great, and those of little worth, to 
those of great. When bad government prevails 
in the empire, the princes of small power are 
submissive to those of great, and the weak 
to the strong. Both these cases are the rule 
of Heaven. They who accord with Heaven are
^^Mencius, Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. IV, sec. 1.
^^Book of History, pt. II, Bk. IV-
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preserved, and they who rebel against Heaven
perish.46
Political legitimacy is granted to the one who has the man­
date of Heaven. It seems that this mandate is bestowed 
upon the man of highest virtue. Confucianists do not make 
at all clear how the mandate is granted to a specific man.
A  powerful man can become a ruler through conquest, but this 
does not mean that he is necessarily granted the mandate of 
Heaven.
When one by force subdues men, they do not 
submit to him in heart. They submit, because 
their strength is not adequate to resist.
When one subdues men by virtue, in their heart's 
core they are pleased, and sincerely admit, as 
was the case with the seventy disciples in their 
submission to Confucius. What was said in the 
Book of Poetry,
"From the west, from the east.
From the south, from the north.
There was not one who thought 
of refusing submission." 
is an illustration of t h i s . 47
Legitimacy of the sovereign is rather based upon the
ruler's virtue, and the most virtuous and cultivated person
is--or should be--the true head of the country.
E Yin said, "Whom may I not serve? My 
serving him makes him my sovereign. What 
people may I not command? My commanding
46
Mencius, Bk. IV, pt. I, Ch. VII, sec. 1.
4?Ibid., Bk. II, pt. I, Ch. Ill, sec. 2.
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makes them my people." In a time of good 
government he took office, and when confusion 
prevailed, he also took office. He said,
"Heaven's plan in the production of mankind 
is this; -- that they who are first informed 
should instruct those who are later in 
being informed, and they who first apprehend 
principles should instruct those who are 
slower in doing so."48
Confucian literature insists also that the most 
knowledgeable man should become the ruler, although it is 
somewhat less than how the mandate of Heaven
such a sovereign. That 
fen actually guides and 
g n such a way as to be- 
approbation to a ruler 
The question appar- 
of Confucianists; however,
since a ruler who wins the mandate can later lose it, it
seems more probable that the latter is the case.
The mandate of Heaven may also be granted to the
person who served the ruler most faithfully. Thus a ruler's 
son does not automatically succeed his father unless he is 
worthy and served his father with fidelity.49 Mencius
48ibid.. Bk. V, pt. II, Ch. I, sec. 2.
49
Ibid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. VI.
operates in
IS, It does
directs a ma
come a ruler
who happens
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makes them my people." In a time of good 
government he took office, and when confusion 
prevailed, he also took office. He said,
"Heaven's plan in the production of mankind 
is this: -- that they who are first informed 
should instruct those who are later in 
being informed, and they who first apprehend 
principles should instruct those who are 
slower in doing s o . "48
Confucian literature insists also that the most 
knowledgeable man should become the ruler, although it is 
somewhat less than clear about how the mandate of Heaven 
operates in finding and in keeping such a sovereign. That 
is, it does not discuss whether heaven actually guides and 
directs a man it had in mind to act in such a way as to be­
come a ruler or whether it gives its approbation to a ruler 
who happens to be the most virtuous. The question appar­
ently did not disturb the minds of Confucianists; however, 
since a ruler who wins the mandate can later lose it, it 
seems more probable that the latter is the case.
The mandate of Heaven may also be granted to the 
person who served the ruler most faithfully. Thus a ruler's 
son does not automatically succeed his father unless he is 
worthy and served his father with fidelity.49 Mencius
48lbid., Bk. V, pt. II, Ch. I, sec. 2.
49
Ibid.. Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. VI.
77
addresses the question of how heaven bestows empire in in­
terpreting the example of the legendary kings, Yao and Shun.
Shun served Yao faithfully for twenty-eight years, and when 
Yao had to retire, heaven supposedly gave Shun the empire.
To Wan Chang's challenge that Yao gave Shun the empire and 
that heaven had little to do with it, Mencius explained:
The empire can present a man to Heaven, but 
he cannot make Heaven give that man the
enç)ire. A prince can present a man to the
emperor, but he cannot cause the emperor to 
make that man a prince. A great officer can 
cause the prince to make that man a great 
officer. Yao presented Shun to Heaven, and 
the people accepted him. Therefore I say.
Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated 
its will by his personal conduct and his 
conduct of a f f a i r s . 50
It is true that Confucian literature places a good deal
of importance on the people. As Mencius said:
The people are the most important element in a 
nation; the spirits of the land and grain are 
the next; the sovereign the lightest.51
Nevertheless, the people have no function in selecting their
ruler. Presumably they need have little fear of having a bad
ruler, though, because the mandate of Heaven is never granted
to such a person. In the words of the Great Declaration and
the Book of History :
SOlbid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. V, secs. 4 & 5.
S^Ibid., Bk. VII, pt. II, Ch. XIV.
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Heaven sees according as my people see;
Heaven hears according as my people hear.52
Heaven loves the people. Whatever the people
desire, heaven gives t h e m . 53
There is, however, the admission that a ruler can 
take over the state without heaven's mandate or that a ruler 
with the mandate later may not act according to the people's 
wishes. In either case the people are justified in removing 
him p h y s i c a l l y . 54 Revolution as a means of removing the 
non-virtuous ruler is in fact highly p r a i s e d . ^5 Confucian 
literature explains that heaven's will and mandate are mani­
fested in the minds of the people and that if a ruler is re­
moved it is Ming, i.e., Heaven's decree.
Law and Justice
As has been discussed in the preceding chapter, 
Confucianism holds that there exist laws that govern nature. 
They saw an "orderly nature" and believed that the order was 
due to a principle, or nature's law. Principles governing
S^ibid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. V, sec. 8.
^^Book of History, Pt. V, Bk. I, sec. 1.
XIII.
S^Tbid., Pt. IV, Bks. I & II; Pt. V, Bks. I, II, &
^^Book of Change also devoted a full chapter to
revolution.
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man and man's social relationships form a part of natural
law. Mencius quoted the Book of Poetry as follows:
"Heaven, in producing mankind.
Gave them their various faculties and 
relations with their specific laws.
There are the invariable rules of nature 
for all to hold.
And all love this admirable virtue."
The marker of this ode knew indeed the principle 
of our nature'. We may thus see that every 
faculty and relation must have its law, and since 
there are invariable rules for all to hold, they 
consequently love this admirable virtue.56
Confucianism recognizes two kinds of law. One is
heaven's decrees and the principles of nature, and the
other is positive law.
When the prince has no principles by which he 
examines his administration, and his ministers 
have no laws by which they keep themselves in 
the discharge of their duties, then in the court 
obedience is not paid to principle, and in the 
office obedience is not paid to rule. Superiors 
violate the laws of righteousness, and inferiors 
violate the penal laws. It is only a fortunate 
chance that a kingdom in such a case is 
preserved.57
Since nature is moral, its laws are not only moral but 
superior to all other human or positive laws. It is there­
fore not too difficult to see why Confucianism minimized the 
importance of positive laws. Furthermore, it is the most
56m, 
57
Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. VI, sec. 8. 
Ibid., Bk. IV, pt. I, Ch. I, sec. 8.
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inçortant duty of man to cultivate himself in order to 
apprehend nature and its.laws. Because human nature can be 
perfected, ideally there should be little need for positive 
laws.
However, Confucius did realize the necessity of 
these laws as long as some men remained imperfect. Although 
most of the people can become good under the influence of 
the good example the ruler sets, the virtuous leader alone 
cannot easily rectify some incorrigibles. Confucius said, 
"There are only the wise of the highest class, and the stupid 
of the lowest class, who cannot be changed."^8
In Confucianism precedents and the ruler's decrees
on criminal matters largely comprised positive laws. Still,
although positive laws are necessary, government by law is
far from the Confucian ideal. The exercise of law is the
least effective means of maintaining political order.
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity 
sought to be given them by punishments, they 
will try to avoid the punishment, but have no 
sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, 
and uniformity sought to be given them by the 
rules of propriety, they will have the sense 
of shame, and moreover will become good.59
^^Analects, Bk. XVII, Ch. III.
59Ibid.. Bk. II, Ch. III.
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A ruler who depends on law is a man of poor qualification. 
Rule by man is more desirable than rule by law; the ruler 
therefore should possess the requisite moral qualities.
Rule by man in Confucian cultural context is not the rule 
by arbitrary whim. Rather, it means rule by the virtuous 
man who is in turn governed by Tao and natural law. As 
Confucius asked, "If you lead on the people with correct­
ness, who will dare not to be correct?"^® "When the rulers 
love to observe the rules of propriety, the people respond 
readily to the calls on them for s e r v i c e . P o s i t i v e  laws 
are thus somewhat disdained, and government should be run 
by the example of personal conduct rather than by man-made 
laws.
Especially does the Confucian concept of justice 
entail acting in accordance with the rules of nature and 
performing one's duty in relation to others. Yet man has 
different moral obligations to different people: affection 
between father and son, righteousness between sovereign and 
subjects, distinction between husband and wife, precedence 
between the old and the young, and faithfulness between
GOlbid., Bk. XII, Ch. XVII. 
Gllbid., Bk. XIV, Ch. XLIV.
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friends. All these relations should be harmonious yet dif­
ferent according to the functional stations.
But again, the virtuous ruler is pivotal for achiev­
ing justice. People will follow the good example the ruler 
sets, and thus justice will be maintained. Here, justice 
for Confucius is equivalent to righteousness. "Righteous­
ness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and 
the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy.
Attainment of justice is thus possible if the ruler acts and 
is treated as ruler, father as father, superior as superior, 
inferior as inferior, and so on. The virtuous ruler must 
see to it that this is effected. One man's misfortune or 
wrongdoing is the concern of the whole society because that 
misfortune or wrongdoing would disturb the social equilibrium 
which is the ultimate goal of politics.
Hsun Tzu is again not too greatly different from 
Confucius and Mencius in his writings on politics and govern­
ment. However, Hsun Tzu emphasizes certain areas far more 
than Confucius and Mencius. This makes him appear to be 
closer to the Moists and the Legalists.
As was seen earlier, Hsun Tzu wished to have social 
distinction to have harmony. Thus a class society is the 
62
The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XX, sec. 5.
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answer to disorder. "When division is equal, there is no 
distinction; when power is equal, there is no unity; when 
the multitude is equal, there is no order."^3 For Hsun Tzu, 
therefore, the most important function of government is the 
ability to assign each man within the state to his proper 
position in life. He too seems to believe that the essence 
of position or name should be determined by the philosophers 
(ancient sages according to him) .
A ruler should not only be virtuous but also be
capable of performing the governmental function of assigning
and keeping people at their right position. Hsun Tzu said:
The ruler is one who is good at organizing men in 
society. When society is properly organized, then 
all things will find their place, the six domestic 
animals will breed and flourish, and all living 
beings will fulfill their allotted span of life.^S
Another important area of difference in terms of 
emphasis is the concept of rewards and punishments. Hsun 
Tzu did not see those as a means of enforcing laws and 
regulations as the Legalists thought. Rewards appear to him 
as a means of controlling the man who is about to stay out
£ O
Essential Works of Confucianism, supra, p. 277.
G^ibid., p. 233.
^^Hsun Tzu, Basic Writings, tr. by Burton Watson 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 46.
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of his assigned position. Hsun Tzu is quoted as saying:
Encourage them with rewards, discipline them 
with punishments, and if they settle down to 
their work, then look after them as subjects;
but if not, cast them out. . . .  If anyone is
found acting or using his talents to work 
against the good of time, condemn him to death 
without mercy. This is what is called the 
virtue of Heaven and the government of a true 
king.Go
Hsun Tzu believes that if rewards and punishments 
are not employed by the ruler people will not stay in their 
class and thus chaos will ensue. Also, he seems to have a
good deal more faith in law, and assigns larger roles to law
in governing than Confucius and Mencius. But, unlike the 
Legalists, Hsun Tzu concedes the inadequacy of laws in deal­
ing with every situation. Law cannot administer by itself, 
thus Hsun Tzu recognizes the necessity of a virtuous and 
benevolent ruler.
Hsun's realistic view of the ruler's ability, and 
appropriate use of rewards and punishment, and the rejection 
of total reliance on force as the political method seem to 
be a valid contribution to Confucianism.^^
In summary, Confucianism takes an ethical approach
66
Ibid., p. 34.
^^Oliver E. Benson, o£. cit., p. 21.
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to the problem of government. If good government--the sine 
qua non of the good moral life--is to prevail, the ruler 
should be the most virtuous man in society and he in turn 
should promote and grade men by standards based on virtue. 
The moral and superior man is able to govern his family and 
to perceive the principles of heaven and is therefore quali­
fied for political leadership. Like Plato, politics for 
Confucius is conducted primarily for educative purposes,
., for teaching a person to accord his social title with 
its real essence. Government is viewed as the largest and 
most important household in the nation, and it should be 
organized hierarchically so that the good examples set by 
the virtuous man at the top flow down to the bottom. Heaven 
sanctions rulership. The sovereign is not responsible to 
the people, albeit the people's importance is emphasized.
The goal of Confucian politics and government is to attain 
social harmony, which is possible through the cultivation of 
man's innate moral quality. This in turn leads to the 
realization of each man's socio-political role.
CHAPTER IV 
THE TRIAL OF CONFUCIAN IDEOLOGY
It is difficult to determine with great accuracy 
the extent to which Confucian political and social ideology 
was effectuated in the actual life of Confucian nations, 
nor is it within the scope of this inquiry. As was dis­
cussed in the introductory chapter, general observation in­
forms that the depth of application of Confucian theories on 
ethics and politics varied from nation to nation and from 
period to period. It is, however, an undeniable fact that 
for centuries Confucianism provided East Asia with its major 
political and ethical theories and provided the ruling 
classes of East Asia with virtually their only governing 
principles and rationalizations. Furthermore, the political 
ideology of Confucianism was rarely challenged throughout the 
millenia in all the Confucian nations.
It is now known, however, that intellectuals gradu­
ally started questioning the traditional theory of government 
from about the latter part of the nineteenth century as
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massive political, social, economic and military confronta­
tions with the West began to occur.^ When Confucian nations 
repeatedly failed to expel the "barbarians" and suffered 
humiliations because of Western gun power, intellectuals were 
naturally quite apprehensive about their countries' futures, 
and the dominant classes unsure of their traditional 
apologetics.
Still, intellectual reaction to the West in China, 
Korea and Japan was not precisely identical, although the 
focus of argument in the three nations was the validity of 
traditional culture versus the utility of Western civiliza­
tion. Facing the tremendous tide of the Western impact, 
especially political leaders of the Confucian nations began 
to question their traditional mores and the validity of 
Confucian assumptions. Controversies over traditionalism 
versus westernization reached their high point around the 
turn of the century. Meanwhile debates about the traditional 
ideology were produced against each country's background and 
socio-political circumstances.
^See for a work that uses extensive Chinese documen­
tation to the understanding of the Confucian state and its 
responses to domestic and foreign crises, Mary C. Wright,
The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ungchih 
Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1957).
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In Japan newly emerged leaders after the Meiji 
Restoration had ample time and opportunity to discuss the 
problems posed by Western science and political theory be­
cause Japan faced no immediate military threat from the 
West. Particularly after the Restoration, Japanese leaders 
attempted to compromise between Confucian teachings and the 
Western knowledge Japan acquired.  ^ Compromise was compar­
atively easy and encountered little opposition partly be­
cause of the Japanese people's strong loyalty to the emperor. 
They could accept nearly any foreign doctrine if it con­
tinued support for the emperor and the nation. Thus Con­
fucianism-- itself foreign in origin--could be discarded with 
little difficulty. Thus, too, Confucianism, the official 
ideology of the Tokugawa shogunate, gradually declined after
o
the collapse of the Tokugawa regime. Since there was vir­
tually no significant opposition to westernization, it is 
quite understandable that Japan produced little systematic 
examination of Confucian ideology and that she was able to
2
Warren W. Smith, Jr., Confucianism in Modern 
Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual 
History (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1959), pp. 55-88.
3
Ibid., pp. 41-42. See also George B. Sanson,
The Western World and Japan : A Study of the Interaction of 
European and Asiatic Cultures (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1950), pp. 310-19.
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adjust to changing circumstances.
Korea had comparatively little opportunity to dis­
cuss the Western way of life and to reexamine the ideology 
of Confucius in the light of the new economic and social 
circumstances. Before any attempt to examine Confucian 
ideology could be made, Japan annexed the country. Conse­
quently Korea produced little critical analysis during its 
political crises between the time of its being opened to the 
West and its annexation.
It was China that produced the most serious de­
bates on the validity of Confucianism and the problem of 
modernization. Influential governmental officials and 
scholars began either to voice skepticism of traditionalism 
or to assert the basic soundness of the traditional outlook 
and way of life. Many intellectuals who had learned West­
ern thought directly or indirectly began to develop and 
formulate their own remedies for China's problems. These 
intellectuals became deeply disillusioned with the tradi­
tional Chinese life that had been so long cherished be­
coming deeply troubled over their country's emasculation by 
L
the West.
4
So much has been written about the intellectual, 
social and political problems of China at that time that it
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Therefore the present chapter will examine Chinese 
intellectuals' and government officials' reactions to West­
ern political systems, in the hope of putting Confucian 
political theory in a better perspective. Through examina­
tion of their reactions it is possible to ascertain how they 
felt Confucianism was or was not adaptable to China's need 
for modernization and to the concomitant need for reform of 
the political system. It is also hoped that their attempted 
analyses of Confucianism will help give considerable insight 
concerning negative and critical views of Confucian ideology. 
Their views are particularly important because it was the 
first time Confucianism was challenged on a national scale.^ 
The scope of this study will be limited to the "great de­
bate" which occurred in China from the late nineteenth cen­
tury to circa 1920.
is almost invidious to cite any particular study. Special 
recognition, however, must be given to one study that deals 
most directly with the subject: Chow Tse-tung, The May 
Fourth Movement : Intellectual Revolution in Modern China 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). For a 
documentary survey of the subject, see Ssu-yu Teng and 
John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).
^Some thinkers such as Wang Ch'ung (27-97 A.D.) and 
Li Chih (Li Tso-wu, 1572-1602 A.D.) had shown anti-Confucian 
inclinations, but the government quickly suppressed them.
See Chow Tse-tung, 0£. cit., p. 300.
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Defense of Confucianism
Though many intellectuals assailed Chinese civiliza­
tion and its Confucian assumptions, a few defended that 
civilization and what they conceived as its superior quali­
ties. These latter generally believed that there was nothing 
wrong with China as far as spirit, thought and ideology were 
concerned: what China needed was materials, technological 
skills, and guns. Yet it is interesting to observe that all 
the intellectuals, regardless of their positions on the ques­
tion, conceded that China was in trouble. Some advocated 
all-out reform; others, however, saw the need for only slight 
modification of Confucian traditions. In general, the Con­
fucian apologists were not as strongly engaged in the defense 
of Confucian ideology per se as in attacking or criticizing 
Western democratic assumptions and civilization. However, 
the purpose of their assault on Western way of life is to 
defend Confucianism explicitly and implicitly.
Although the problems facing Chinese intellectuals 
and officials were certainly larger in dimension than merely 
Confucian ideology, many made attempts to resolve China's 
problems within the Confucian framework. One of them was 
Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909 A.D.), a leading figure in the 
last period of the Ching dynasty. Chang, who was known for
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his brilliant scholarship and for his strong sense of patriot­
ism, was born into a family of the official class and had the 
opportunity to receive a superb classical education. After 
obtaining the chin-shih degree in 1863, Chang Chih-tung 
entered the civil service and served as governor-general in 
several provinces. Through his impeccable loyalty and dedi­
cation to the Ching government, he eventually became one of 
the leading elder statesmen in the capital. In 1898 Chang 
published a widely read and quite influential book. Exhorta­
tion to Learn (Ch*uan-hsueh-p'ien) . The book was hailed by 
the reformers then in power and was distributed with the 
emperor's blessing.
The essential ideas of Chang Chih-tung are contained 
in that book. In it he formulated his position in relation 
to the "Confucian controversy": "Chinese learning for sub­
stance, Western learning for function." Basically, therefore, 
Chang was a moderate who wished to avoid any extreme. To do 
this, he admitted the necessity for reform while upholding 
Chinese, especially Confucian, virtues. Substance meant, to 
Chang, Chinese moral values and principles, and function meant 
utility and practical application of those values and prin­
ciples. He believed that if the Chinese wished to be strong 
and to preserve Chinese knowledge, they must study Western
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knowledge.^ He did not esteem Western political philosophy, 
but he was willing to make use of Western science and tech­
nology. At this point Chang did not make it clear why he 
accepted Western science and technology while rejecting West­
ern political theory and values. Although he did not expli­
cate his basic argument, it seems that Chang was interested 
only in Confucianism, and thus he wanted to use Western science 
to defend Confucian ethics.
Thus under the heading of "Rectification of Political 
Rights," Chang Chih-tung is especially critical of Western 
political systems and exalts Confucian ideology. Chang was 
apparently addressing the Ching dynasty's opponents when he 
rejected the idea of people's rights. Such rights, according 
to Chang, would bring the people "not a single benefit but a 
hundred e v i l s . I f  political rights are given to each man 
and a parliamentary system is established in China, "foolish 
people will assuredly be delighted; unruly people will rise 
up; the laws will not be carried out; great disorder will 
arise on all sides."&
^Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 169. 
^Ibid ., p. 167.
®Ibid.
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Chang continued, claiming that the term "people's
rights" is a misnomer and a mistranslation from the English
language. He argued that people in the West were only
allowed to express themselves. The "people's rights" idea,
he argued, did not envision that all the people actually
could wield power and govern themselves. It bothered him
that such a concept was construed to mean that each person
is the master of himself.^ Chang explained the absurdity of
that interpretation by saying;
Each Western state definitely has a government, 
and a government has laws. Officials have ad­
ministrative laws, soldiers have military laws, 
workers have labor laws, and merchants have 
commercial laws. The lawyers learn them, and 
judges preserve them. Neither the ruler nor the 
people can violate the law. What is suggested 
by the executive may be argued by the members of 
parliament, and what is decided by the parlia­
ment may be dissolved by the ruling dynasty.
To say that nobody has the right to be his own 
master is correct, but how can we say that every 
person is his own master?^®
The concept of the rights of man is not only nonsense 
but also is utterly incompatible with Confucian ideology, 
which is, according to Chang Chih-tung, necessary for "saving
9
It is interesting to note that these have been 
Western critics of subjectivism who argue similarly. See 
E. Jordan, pp. 159 et seqq.
lOlbid., p. 168.
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China” in its crisis. If one recognizes the importance of
the bonds between ruler and minister and father and son, the
doctrines of democracy and human equality are untenable.H
Chang, using such arguments thus strongly attacked Western
political systems and their political ideology in order to
preserve the Manchu dynasty. To him Confucianism was the
best solution for China's problems because he considered it
superior to Western theory:
Our sage represented the highest ideal of human 
relationships. He established in detail and 
with clarity rules of decorum based on human 
feelings . Although Westerners have such rules 
only in abbreviated form, still foreigners have 
never abandoned the idea of decorum. For the 
norm of Heaven and the nature of man are about the 
same in China and in foreign countries. Without 
these rules of decorum no ruler could ever govern 
a state, and no teacher could ever establish his 
doctrine.12
There can be no doubt of the genuine traditionalism 
of Chang Chih-tung. Yet at the same time he wanted to pre­
serve Confucian assumptions and values he also called for re­
form in Chinese life by learning and adopting Western science
1 O
and technology. His conviction was that, even though 
llfbid., p. 165.
l^William Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan and 
Chester Tan (compilers). Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol.
11 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 84.
l^Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, 0£. cit., pp.
169-70.
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Confucian ideology and Western political systems are not 
compatible, science and technology are not only acceptable 
to the Confucian frame of mind but should be sought 
vigorously.
He may be quite correct in that the Confucian mind 
has a room for science and technology. Nowhere in Confucian 
literature is scientific exploration condemned. By science 
and technology Chang Chih-tung meant simply the ability to 
produce military hardware. Chang, however, failed to see the 
fact that Western science and technology were very much the 
product of Western commercialism and the Industrial Revolu­
tion. He thought that the ability to produce military 
weapons could be acquired independently of other Western 
values and the way of life. Also, Chang did not take into 
account the fact that the development of science and tech­
nology inevitably entails the emergence of urbanized and 
industrialized society and thus ignored the problem of how 
an industrial society would be maintained by the Confucian 
moralism or how it would affirm the traditional ethics in 
personal relations. A virtuous ruler is not the only an­
swer to problems posed by a technological and industrial 
society.
Probably no Chinese intellectual made as great an
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effort as K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927 A.D.) to solve China's 
problems by attempting to work out answers in terms of the 
Confucian ideological framework. K'ang was born near Canton, 
a scion of a distinguished gentry-official family. Through­
out his younger days, K'ang witnessed the agonizing effects 
of the Taiping Rebellion. Though he was provided with an 
excellent education along traditional lines, he began to 
develop a distaste for mastering the "eight-legged essay" 
which wao indispensable to success in the civil service 
examination. At seventeen years of age, K'ang is known to 
have come across translated materials dealing with the West, 
which aroused his curiosity. He subsequently became a 
voracious reader of materials on Western history, politics, 
and g e o g r a p h y . B y  1895 he earned the highest regular 
degree (chin-shih) .
K'ang formulated through the study of the West as 
well as Chinese classics his general philosophy which be­
came the basis of his two most famous works, the Grand Unity 
(Ta t'ung shu) and Confucius as a Reformer (K'ung Tzu kai- 
chih k'ao) . He wrote these in his late twenties. K'ang's 
persuasive arguments, his popularity among a large number
^^Jung-pang Lo, K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and 
Symposium (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967, pp. 
7-9.
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of Chinese intellectuals and the gloomy political situation 
after the Sino-Japanese War eventually convinced the young 
emperor to adopt K'ang's plans for reform. After the fiasco 
of the radical Hundred Days Reform in 1898, however, K'ang 
was forced to seek exile for many years to save his life. 
During this time he toured Japan and several European nations. 
The countries impressed him a good deal, yet he remained 
Chinese throughout.
Even though K'ang Ku-wei seems to have modified his 
views to some degree during his lifetime, as China's poli­
tical and social circumstances changed, his views were in­
creasingly considered conservative and a n a c h r o n i s t i c . ^5 
Earlier a radical and outspoken reformer, K'ang became an 
opponent of the republican government after it was established 
in 1911. He remained intensely loyal to the old dynasty and 
continued to defend Confucian ideology.
It was K'ang Yu-wei's chief argument that China 
must reform or perish and that moderate reform would not 
accomplish much. Yet while favoring constitutionalism and 
limited monarchy, K'ang rejects democratic philosophy and
^^Hidemi Onogawa, "K'ang Yu-wei's Idea of Reform," 
Kindai Chugoku Kenkyu [Studies on Modern China] (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1958), pp. 112-13.
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westernization.^^ In his discussion of Eastern and Western 
civilizations, K'ang asserted there was absolutely no 
necessity for learning anything from the West, though again 
like Chang he conceded the importance of Western science and 
technology for strengthening China.
For K'ang traditional Chinese civilization is simply
the most ideal civilization for the Chinese, and he felt it
should be preserved. While deploring the popularity of
things Western in his country, K'ang said:
In recent years, the whole country has gone mad. 
Everything in Chinese politics, religion, and 
customs is being discarded without questioning 
whether it is right or wrong; and everything 
European and American is being adopted without 
finding out whether it is good or bad. The wild 
illusionists see the strength and prosperity of 
the West, but they fail to see their cause. They 
ape the superficial and follow their footsteps, and 
they think by so doing, they will be Americans and 
Europeans themselves. Little do they know that 
they are fundamentally different, and they can 
never attain the strength of the West by aping.
On the other hand, they are losing the excellencies 
in politics, religion, and customs that our nation 
has accumulated in many millennia, and are the 
refined products of the wisdom of our s a g e s . 17
^^K'ang's general philosophy is briefly and well 
summarized in John K. Fairbank, The United States and China 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 
157-59.
^^K'ang Yu-wei, "The Trouble with China Lies in the 
Total Disregard of National Excellencies and All-Out Aping 
of the West," Pu-jen, VI (July, 1913), pp. 1-2.
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K'ang Yu-wei also believed that Confucian nations
could absorb the merits of non-Confucian nations without
losing their identity. What he meant was that Confucian
countries could effectively utilize Western science and
technology, and modify defects in their intellectual life
without losing the general system of Confucianism.
If there are weaknesses in our politics, religion, 
and customs, there should be no reason why we 
should not rectify our shortcomings by adopting 
the merits of others. . . . But our own politics, 
religion, and customs should retain their place as 
a host, and whatever is added to it is to supple­
ment and improve it. . . . This is to utilize the 
merits of others for our own sake; our country 
will thus be benefited, and our people become 
prosperous. If we discard outright our politics, 
religion, and customs in favor of aliens' without 
considering whether it is beneficial or not, we 
are volunteering to assume the status of a slave.
The approach in solving China's problems is there­
fore to be extremely selective about adopting Western fea­
tures, and K'ang did not consider it advantageous for China 
to embrace Western political systems. Basically the Con­
fucian system is sound. To K'ang Western political systems 
are inferior to the Confucian system because those were 
simply not created for the Chinese. K'ang gives two reasons 
Western political systems should not be imported into China.
18
Ibid., VII (August, 1913), p. 1.
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First, he believed any political and institutional system 
must be compatible with the temperament and customs of the 
people. To him Western political systems are totally in­
compatible with the Confucian system and therefore are
19detrimental to the Chinese. But nowhere does he show why 
these two are incompatible and he merely insists on the in­
compatibility. Second, K'ang argued that becoming familiar 
with Western systems and especially understanding their merits 
would take almost an indefinite amount of time; furthermore,
hastily discarding the Confucian political system might cause
20a political vacuum and confusion. Though K'ang's thesis 
here seems to be too vague and too general, it was very per­
suasive to his countrymen. The earlier point is very much of 
Montesquieu, and the latter is of Burke. He simply believed 
that the Western way of life does not fit to the temperament 
of Chinese, and if any change has to be made, it must be done 
on a piecemeal basis after careful study.
Thus, study of the West and East both through books 
and first-hand experience led K'ang to the conviction that 
the only prescription for curing China of its ills was
19
Ibid., p. 2.
ZOlbid., p. 3.
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reviving the ethical teachings of Confucius. K'ang pro­
ceeded to advocate establishing Confucianism as a state 
cult. Two years after the Republic was proclaimed K'ang 
wrote :
Now human virtues have degenerated, while customs 
are being corrupted. The sense of shame has been 
lost, while moral courage is strictly absent.
Laxity has even surpassed that of Ch'in and Wu-tai; 
indeed, the situation has never been so serious in 
many millennia. Those who have any knowledge at all 
know well that no nation could establish itself ex­
cept on the basis of morality. Yet those so-called 
scholars of new learning who in reality have neither 
knowledge of foreign or Chinese institutions, nor 
insight of the fundamentals of administration, are 
dazzled by the present strength of the West, and 
despise China for being weak today. They are so de­
luded that they mimic the discarded trash of the 
Europeans and Americans with undaunted passion, and 
they are so senseless that they trample underfoot 
even the essence of Chinese ethics that we have 
for thousands of years honored and respected. They 
discredited Confucianism for being out-of-date and 
impractical. How absurd'. Granting that formalities 
may vary somewhat from time to time, could there be 
any difference in new and old, Chinese and foreign 
morality? How the new scholars actually have the 
audacity to advocate that the old morals should be 
replaced by the new. Alas', the virtues of benevo­
lence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, loyalty, 
sincerety, modesty, and a sense of shame are in­
grained in human nature; could there be distinction 
between the new and the old.21
On the other hand, increasingly K'ang sought to ex­
plain the trend toward westernization in terms of the
21
K'ang Yu-wei, "On the Adoption of Confucianism as 
a State Religion and Equalizing the Worship of Confucius to 
the Worship of Heaven," Pu-jen. III (April, 1913), p. 2.
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Confucian context. That is, he felt that the problems 
facing China stemmed not from any inadequacy of Confucian 
ideology but rather from inadequate understanding of the 
"real meaning" of the Chinese sages. He insisted that all 
the so-called foreign virtues are not foreign after all.
The Western concepts of humanity, equality, liberty, popular
sovereignty, etc., according to K'ang, could be found in the
2?
works of Confucius and Mencius. To K'ang, only those 
ignorant of their cultural heritage could think they had 
discovered a new panacea for the nation's weaknesses. He 
wrote :
The blind talks of the illusionists, who are 
ignorant of Confucius' Analects and attempt 
to attack Confucian morality as out-of-date, 
need not worry us. But the fact that troubles 
us is that the whole nation is drinking from 
"the spring of insanity," and actually mistakes 
sanity for insanity.23
K'ang thus felt Confucianism must be preserved because
other cultures contained nothing new. If anyone wished to
save the nation, he "must first of all save the spirit of
22
Ibid., p. 5. He does not cite Confucian source 
to prove his point. As was seen in the preceding chapters, 
Confucianism does contain the conceptions similar to 
Western humanism, equality, and popular sovereignty. But 
it is difficult to see "liberty" concept in Confucianism.
Z^Ibid.. p. 6.
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the nation, i.e., teachings of Confucius.
Yet as a great defender of Confucianism, K'ang 
Yu-wei began to attempt to resolve China's immediate prob­
lems with the modern age by reinterpreting Confucian texts. 
For that purpose he launched a movement, the so-called "New 
Text School" of textual criticism. K'ang was apparently not 
interested in a strictly scholarly interpretation of Con­
fucianism but rather in attempting to demonstrate that the 
institutional reforms China required were perfectly com­
patible with the "spirit" of Confucianism. As de Bary and 
others put it, K'ang's intent was "rather than permit the 
sphere occupied by the Confucian Way in Chinese life to be 
further narrowed and displaced by Western 'methods,' he 
would redefine the Way and enlarge its scope so as virtually 
to include the latter. Instead of making more room for 
Western institutions alongside Confucianism, he would make 
room for them inside.
Thus in his celebrated book, Confucius As A Reformer, 
K'ang developed his own theory of history through an expli­
cation of Confucian documents. It is quite obvious in the
^^Ibid., p. 5.
25william Theodore de Bary et , op. cit., p. 65.
105
following passage that his real intent was to provide
justification for reform. He explained:
The meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals con­
sists in the evolution of the Three Ages: the 
Age of Disorder, the Age of Order, and the Age 
of Great Peace. . . The Way of Confucius embraces 
the evolution of the Three Sequences and the 
Three Ages. The Three Sequences were used to 
illustrate the Three Ages, which could be extended 
to a hundred generations. . . . For as customs 
are handed down among the people later kings 
cannot but follow the practices of the preceding 
dynasty; yet since defects develop and have to 
be removed, each new dynasty must make modifica­
tions and additions to create a new system.
Believing that every creature, including a nation, 
is subject to evolution, K'ang asserted that a nation must 
adjust to changing circumstances and that Confucius en­
visaged change.
When Confucius prepared the Spring and Autumn 
Annals, he extended to embrace the Three Ages.
Thus, during the Age of Disorder he considers 
his own state as the center, treating all other 
Chinese feudal states as on the outside. In 
the Age of Order he considers China as the center, 
while treating the outlying barbarian tribes as 
on the outside. And in the Age of Great Peace 
he considers everything, far or near, large or 
small, as if it were one. In doing this he is 
applying the principle of evolution.
Confucius was born in the Age of Disorder. Now 
that communications extended through the great 
earth and changes have taken place in Europe
26k'ang Yu-wei, "Confucius As A Reformer," in 
William Theodore de Bary ^  al., 0£. cit., pp. 69-70.
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and America, the world is evolving toward the 
Age of Order. There will be a day when every­
thing throughout the earth, large or small, far 
or near, will be like one. . . . With this 
uniformity will come the Age of Great Peace.
Confucius knew all this in advance.27
There is a good deal of similarity between K'ang 
Yu-wei and Chang Chih-tung in the sense that both conceded 
the necessity of reform, yet both repudiated Western 
political theory and systems. K'ang went further by saying 
that Confucius emphasized all along the importance of re­
form. He simply felt that Confucianism was better for 
Chinese, and did not make any effort to adjust Western con­
cepts to Confucian concepts or vice versa. As many of his 
contemporaries, K'ang was interested mainly in modernization
O  Q
without westernization. In formulating solutions to 
China's problems, he refused to go beyond the framework of
27lbid., pp. 70-71.
^^"Modernization without Westernization" was one 
major theme of Chinese political leaders and intellectuals 
in the early days. The way they used the term moderniza­
tion probably means an atmosphere in which a nation can 
produce and effectively utilize machines, weapons and tech­
nical know-how. Chinese leaders wanted to have the Western 
tools without accepting Western values. Of course, this 
later proved to be a disaster. They learned rather pain­
fully that the Western tools and machines could not be 
produced and used effectively without having Western type 
of education and specialized and industrialized social 
structure.
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Confucianism and eventually became a captive of tradition 
and prejudice.
The last defense of Chinese civilization as ideal 
was perhaps that of Ku Hung-ming (1854-1928), who was born 
in Malaya of Chinese ancestors. Ku went to China for study 
and subsequently went abroad to further his education.
At the University of Edinburgh he studied Western philos­
ophy . Upon his return to China he worked under Chang 
Chih-tung for many years and also taught English at the 
University of Peking.
Ku Hung-ming was basically a strong conservative.
He detested and ridiculed Western culture and its political 
theory and systems, despite the fact that he probably knew 
more about the West than most of his countrymen. He de­
fended the monarchy and all the traditional Chinese customs, 
often with whimsical remarks.^9 In 1915 Ku published his 
book. The Spirit of the Chinese People, both in English and 
German.30 Presumably this work was published for the pur­
pose of "saving" Europeans by introducing them to the
2QTeng Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank, o£. cit., pp.
149 and 232.
30This book was originally published in German with 
the title, Per Geist des chinesischen Volkes und der Ausweg 
aus den Krieg (Jena: Diederichs, 1917).
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"ideal" civilization, j_.e., Confucian ethics and morality.
According to Ku, the Western religion, Christianity, 
had degenerated and is no longer an effective moral force to 
maintain order and peace. Thus Europeans are fighting each 
other to obtain peace--World War I is the result. He be­
lieved that physical force to maintain civil order leads to 
militarism, which in turn leads to war. War is wasteful and 
inhuman. The real dilemma is that Europeans cannot eliminate 
militarism, because if they did anarchy would destroy their 
civilization.31
To resolve this dilemma, Europeans should study 
Chinese civilization and Confucianism, which teaches a "re­
ligion of good citizenship." That is the moral force which
32makes militarism unnecessary. Ku urged Europeans to visit 
China to learn Confucian ethics in order to avoid so much 
trouble and bloodshed.
Ku was almost blindly idealistic about Confucian 
culture; he held the firm conviction that the ethical theory 
of Confucianism provided the solution and key to the good
^^Ibid., p. ii. 
^^Ibid., p. iii 
^^Ibid., p. vii.
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life, though he failed to explain exactly why Confucian cul­
ture is superior to other cultures. As Chang's and K'ang's, 
his exaltation of Confucian ideology contains nationalistic 
overtones.
Assaults on Confucianism
Of the many thinkers of the time, few were probably 
more critical and outspoken toward the Confucian way of 
life than Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942 A.D.). Although he re­
ceived an excellent traditional education in the classics, 
Ch'en was deeply influenced by the West. Probably no Chinese 
of Ch'en tu-hsiu's stature disparaged and denounced Chinese 
culture and Confucian assumptions as much as he. Ch'en was 
an ardent member of a revolutionary group before the over­
throw of the Manchu dynasty. After the Republic was pro­
claimed, he actively supported the new literary movement. 
During this period, Ch'en derided Confucian customs and 
ethics and wholeheartedly endorsed the Western way of life.
In 1916 Ch'en became dean of the School of Letters 
of Peking University and played a leading part in the intel­
lectual revolution which occurred circa 1920. Ch'en was 
also chief editor of, and a frequent contributor to, an in­
fluential magazine. The New Youth (Hsin ch'ing-nien), which
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came to be a vanguard organ for a new generation no longer 
satisfied with Confucian ideology. After the Versailles 
Peace Conference, however, as many other intellectuals of 
his day, Ch'en lost faith in Western liberalism and democracy, 
Out of his disillusionment, Ch'en felt more and more inclined 
to Marxism, and he soon became the founder of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu deplored greatly nearly every aspect 
of the Chinese way of life, which invariably meant to him 
Confucianism. Nearly all his recorded assaults on Confucian­
ism occurred during Ch'en's pre-Communist period. While 
praising the West for its combativeness, individualism and 
utilitarianism, Ch'en attacked the decadence of the tradi­
tional ethics and Confucian values which he considered re­
sponsible for China's backwardness and weakness. In numerous 
articles in The New Youth Ch'en exhorted the young men of 
China to be individualistic, progressive, cosmopolitan, 
utilitarian and scientific and urged them to abandon the 
evils of the traditional l i f e . 34 Though a good deal of 
Ch'en's arguments are quite cogent, he seems very
34ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, 0£. cit., pp. 
240-45. See also Collected Works of Ch'en Tu-hsiu 
(Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., 1922).
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indiscriminate in his choice of words describing the West. 
Anything that is closely or loosely identified with the West 
seems to be the object of admiration. The chief merit of 
his writings lies in his critical view of Confucianism.
Ch'en made the most seriour straightforward assault
on the Confucian way of life and politics. In his article
entitled "The Way of Confucius and Modern Life" which
appeared in The New Youth, Ch'en argued that Confucianism
is totally incompatible with modern-day life and that its
ideology is completely anachronistic.^^ He wrote:
Confucius lived in a feudalistic period; there­
fore what morality he promoted, what decorum 
and teaching he handed down, what pattern of 
living he exemplified, and what form of govern­
ment he advocated were all of a feudalistic 
period. Such morality, decorum, teaching, 
pattern of living and form of government were 
formulated for the benefits and honors of 
princes and nobles ; and had nothing to do with 
the welfare of the masses.
Ch'en extolled the virtues of individualism as found 
in Western l i b e r a l i s m , 37 and he believed that Confucian
^^"The Way of Confucius and Modern Life," The New 
Youth, II, No. 4 (December, 1916) in Vftn. Theodore de Bary 
et£l., 0£. cit., p. 153 et seq.
36lbid., p. 156.
3 7 His concept of liberalism was essentially that of 
Manchester liberalism. Freeing man from the bond of tradi­
tion, Ch'en felt, man could have liberty in law and pursue
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culture is not conducive to the growth of individualism and 
independent thinking. He charged that when a son is blindly 
filial and when a wife is entirely submissive to her husband, 
there is no room for individualism since they can have no 
independent status.
More than any other aspect of Confucianism, Ch'en 
bitterly attacked Chinese customs and ethics evolved from 
the Confucian classics. He enumerated many Confucian ethical 
norms of conduct and attempted to show how absurd and re­
strictive they were in the modern context. For example, one 
Confucian text said: "The wife's words should not travel be­
yond her apartment," and "A woman does not discuss affairs 
outside the home" (Book of Rites, 1:24); "Men and women do 
not sit on the same mat," or "Brothers- and sisters-in-law 
do not exchange inquiries about each other" (Book of Rites, 
1:24); "Women must cover their faces when they go out" (Book 
of Rites, X:12); "Except in religious sacrifices, men and 
women do not exchange wine cups" (Book of Rites, XXVII: 17); 
"In giving or receiving anything, a man or woman should not
enlightened self-interest. By individualism he meant so­
cially and economically motivated one of Manchester liberal­
ism, no nihilistic or romantic individualism. See Benjamin 
I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 1963), p. 195 et passim.
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touch the other's hand" (Book of Rites, XXVII:20). Customs 
such as these Ch'en considered totally unsuited to the mode 
of life in Western society and thought modern day China 
should discard them.^^
Ch'en also argued that the principles of Confucian­
ism and those of republicanism are totally and absolutely
O Q
incompatible. He believed that, because Confucianism 
placed heavy emphasis upon the cultivation of human virtues 
and the "proper" relationship with others, it essentially 
excluded the concept of equality, a concept Ch'en considered 
basic to the republican form of government and to democracy. 
Confucianism also denies freedom of thought and speech. For 
example, it enjoins sons to accept their parents' beliefs, 
at least until three years after their death, and it compels 
women to obey their fathers and husbands. Ch'en cited such 
standards as evidence that popular elections and representa­
tive government are contrary to Confucian i d e a l s . F o r  
Ch'en, Confucian ethics and Western democracy cannot co-exist 
without conflict.
^^Ibid., pp. 154-55.
^^"Constitution and Confucius," The New Youth, II,
No. 3 (November, 1916), pp. 1-5.
40
Ibid., pp. 3-5.
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Confucian Ideology is not only unsuitable to the 
democratic way of life, but also its teachings have made the 
Chinese highly intolerant and prejudiced because it dominated 
their national life and tended to preclude other systems of 
thought. Intolerance and prejudice, Ch'en insisted, have no 
business in a d e m o c r a c y . H e  believed that Confucianism, 
in the final analysis, must be extricated if the Chinese 
wished to have democracy.
As was mentioned earlier, Ch'en Tu-hsiu later became 
a Marxist, but after the failure of the first United Front 
Movement he was purged from the Chinese Communist Party, 
which he had founded only a few years earlier. It would 
have been extremely interesting to see Marxist Ch'en Tu-hsiu's 
reaction to Confucianism, had he written much on the subject. 
However, he did not seem to have changed his view on Con­
fucianism, nor did he attack Confucianism particularly from 
a Marxist point of view.^^
Chinese Communists do attack Confucianism, but few
41
Ibid., II, No. 5 (January, 1917), p. 4.
^^Ch'en Tu-hsiu, like many other leaders in the
under- or developing countries, was a nationalist, patriot, 
and iconoclast first. Although it would be difficult to 
say how thoroughly he was sold to Marxism, it seems that he
became a Marxist to combat or overcome the weakness of China
and the strength of Western imperialism.
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have made an attack on Confucianism as devastating as that 
of Ch'en Tu-hsiu did in pre-Marxist stage, and few have come 
up with any new line in denouncing Confucianism. In other 
words, there has not yet been produced a new theoretical 
analysis of Confucianism by leading Communists that is worth 
investigating here. Probably this is due to the fact that 
many Chinese Communists are still somewhat Confucian, and 
they twist it and at times quote the Confucian apothegms for 
their own cause. It would be extremely fascinating to study 
the Confucian influence upon Communist China's internal power 
structure or upon China's behavior in regard to foreign 
affairs. But, quite obviously, this is far beyond the scope 
of this study.
While Ch'en was busy making his forays against 
vestiges of Confucianism, another scholar joined the fray.
He was Wu Yu (1871-1949 A.D.), who was born in Chengtu, 
Szechwan. Wu went to Japan and studied law and political 
science. Returning to China, he published a book and began 
editing a magazine in his home town. He became acquainted 
with The New Youth and subsequently enjoyed the intellectual
The Ching government banned his book. Discussions 
of the Intellectual Trends in Sung and Yuan Dynasties, be­
cause of its anti-Confucian nature.
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companionship of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Wu's anti-Confucian articles 
were published in The New Youth from February 1917 on. Wu 
also began to teach at Peking University in 1919 and later at 
Chengtu University and at the National Szechwan University.
Among other reasons, Wu attacked Confucian ideology 
because it upheld the traditional family system which sanc­
tioned paternalism and filial piety and loyalty. The prin­
ciple of filial piety, according to Wu, had provided the basis 
for the doctrine of absolute loyalty to the sovereign, thus 
producing the tyrannical nature of Chinese p o l i t i c s . I n  
his view, the ruling class interpreted Confucian literature 
in a way to enable them to perpetuate their power. Wu said, 
"because filial piety and fraternal duty are virtues of 
obedience," a Sung Confucian scholar was able to maintain 
that "those who possess these virtues will not offend their 
superiors, and there will be of course no rebellion.
With this Sung interpretation in mind, Wu said, "The effect 
of the idea of filial piety has been to turn China into a 
big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects.
^^"The Old Family and Clan System is the Basis of 
Despotism," The New Youth, II, No. 6 (February, 1917), pp.
1-2 .
^^"On Filial Piety," Collected Essays of Wu Yu 
(Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., 1929), pp. 15-16.
4^Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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There is little wonder that Confucianism had enjoyed of­
ficial sanction and that the ruling class effectively used 
its teachings, said Wu.
Not only is Confucianism responsible for China's 
despotic government, but also, Wu charged, it is chiefly 
responsible for the caste system and social inequality in 
China. Confucius, Wu explained, upheld the distinction be­
tween superior and inferior. Superior things are heaven, the 
sovereign, fathers, husbands and older men (or brothers); in­
ferior things are the ministers, sons, wives, younger men 
(or brothers), subjects, etc.^^ Wu Yu argued that Confucius 
never failed to see men in terms of superiority and infer­
iority and that the result of this type of ideology is that 
Chinese society lacks the concept of equality.
Probably the most thorough westemizer of all was 
Hu Shih (1891-1963 A.D.), one of the most prominent thinkers 
and intellectuals of modern China. Hu studied at Cornell and 
Columbia and became a leading Chinese follower of John Dewey. 
While openly acknowledging his intellectual indebtedness to 
J. S. Mill and Thomas Huxley, among others, Hu Shih became 
professor of philosophy and later the dean of the College of
^^"Disadvantages of Confucianists' Advocacy of the 
Caste System," The New Youth, III, No. 4 (June, 1917), p. 1.
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Arts and Science of Peking University.
Hu was a close friend of Ch'en Tu-hslu, and he 
worked for The New Youth and also wrote quite extensively. 
Rejecting Confuclan doctrine as Impractical and absurd, Hu 
took more Interest In the literary reform movement and In 
expounding European philosophy and the pragmatism of James 
and Dewey than In Confuclan theory.
Hu's treatment of Confucianism Is contaln’ed In his 
general discussion on Chinese and Western civilizations. Hu 
found virtually nothing to boast of In Chinese civilization. 
Including of course Confucianism.^^ He saw In It nothing 
useful for the reconstruction of Chinese society: the tra­
ditional culture, to him Is decadent, non-progressive and 
Illogical. He wrote:
Its past glories belong to the past; we cannot 
look to them for solution of our problems of 
poverty, disease, Ignorance, and corruption.
For these four evils are what remain of the 
Chinese civilization to-day. What else Is 
there? Has the country produced during the 
last hundred years a painter, a sculptor, a 
great poet, a novelist, a musician, a dramatist, 
a thinker, or a great statesman? Poverty has 
snapped the life of the people, and opium and 
disease have killed their creative faculties 
and made them sluggish and slovenly. Shall
^^"Confllct of Cultures," China Christian Yearbook: 
1929 (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society, 1930), p.
119.
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we postpone any longer the coming of the 
civilization of science and technology which 
alone furnishes the only tools for combating 
our deadly enemies and supplies the only pos­
sible foundation for a new and living 
civilization.
Hu Shih did not treat Confucian ideology more spe­
cifically. He was not much concerned with the content of 
Confucian texts. Rather, he denounced the whole of the 
traditional culture on an empirical and utilitarian basis.
He felt that the old traditions could do nothing for China 
today.
Syncretism
While Confucianism was on trial, with the parties 
divided between those who asserted the relevancy of Con­
fucian ideology and those who considered it useless in solv­
ing China's problems or at least as hampering the process of 
modernization, a sober compromise of this great controversy 
appeared. The significance of this compromise is that it 
was advanced by a man of great influence and knowledge.
That man was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929 A.D.), who 
had a thorough knowledge of both Eastern and Western cultures 
Liang became one of the best known followers of K'ang Yu-wei 
and showed a great deal of interest in the reform movement.
49lbid., pp. 119-20.
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After the 1898 fiasco he was exiled to Japan. There he be­
came one of the most knowledgeable Chinese scholars and 
journalists and one of the prolific writers of modern China. 
Many Chinese intellectuals and students read Liang's writ­
ings, which dealt with a wide range of political, social, and 
cultural issues. A major work of Liang is entitled A History 
of Chinese Political Thought. Liang became a source of 
inspiration and a patriotic hero, and he was no doubt an in­
tellectual giant towering over most Chinese in modern times.51 
Returning to China after the Republic was proclaimed, Liang 
taught at several colleges. His last ten years were spent as 
a professor at Tsing Hua University.
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao conceded that Confucius was the 
center of Chinese civilization and that his influence on the 
Chinese way of life had been and continued to be tremendous. 
Liang therefore felt that the teachings of Confucius and Con­
fucian ethics should be effectively utilized in the Chinese 
educational system. However, he called any attempt to mimic 
foreign religions in creating a Confucian church for worship
^^L. T. Chen, trns. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co., 1930).
^1Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind 
of Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1959), pp. 2-6.
121
and in establishing Confucianism as a state religion 
S2ridiculous.
In his earlier days Liang thought that Confucius,
though certainly not the only one, was one of the great
53thinkers of the past. While praising the West, Liang 
despised the Chinese way of life because of what he con­
sidered its ignorance, backwardness and conservatism.54 
In his later years, however, Liang began to emphasize 
eclecticism and selectivity in his approach to the study of 
comparative civilization. For example, he said of 
Confucianism:
What we need to learn is the essential spirit 
of the system and not the conditions under which 
it was produced, for once we come to the conditions, 
we shall not be free from the restrictions of time.
For example, Confucius said a great deal about ethics 
of an aristocratic nature which is certainly not 
suitable today. But we should not take Confucius 
lightly simply because of this. Shall we cast Plato 
aside simply because he said that the slavery system 
should be preserved? If we understand this point, 
we can study traditional Chinese subjects with im­
partial judgment and accept or reject them
judiciously.55
S^ibid., pp. 104-08.
55lbid., pp. 121-22. See also Teng Ssu-yu and J. K. 
Fairbank, 0£. cit., pp. 220-23.
54%bid., pp. 142-44.
^^Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Travel Impressions of Europe, 
in Wm. Theodore de Bary, o£. cit., pp. 186-87.
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On borrowing from the West, Liang recommended:
If we want to expand our civilization, we must 
borrow the methods of other civilizations be­
cause their methods of study are highly refined.
[As Confucius said:] "If one wants a job well 
done, he must first sharpen his tools." For 
what other reason was it [than the failure to 
do this] that while everyone in the past read 
Confucius and Li Po, no one got anywhere? I 
therefore hope that our dear young people will, 
first of all, have a sincere purpose of re­
specting and protecting our civilization; 
secondly, that they will apply Western methods 
to the study of our civilization and discover 
its true character; thirdly, that they will 
put our own civilization in order and supple­
ment it with others' so that it will be trans­
formed and become a new civilization; and 
fourthly, that they will extend this new civili­
zation to the outside world so that it can 
benefit the whole human race.56
After his return from a tour in Europe, Liang no 
longer admired the West as he once did. He now deemed 
Western civilization as decadent and declining, the victim 
of its own obsession with science and materialism. The 
failure of science and materialism demonstrated that China 
should not accept them blindly. To Liang, the West over­
emphasized materialism and lacked spiritualism. China's 
challenge was to solve the problem of how to apply the Con­
fucian ideal of equilibrium so that every man might live a 
balanced life. Liang wrote:
^^Ibid., p. 187.
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What is our duty? It is to develop our 
civilization with that of the West and to 
supplement Western civilization with ours so 
as to synthesize and to transform them to 
make a new civilization.^7
Thus one of Liang's solutions to China's problems 
was to adopt a constitution, a feature of his syncretism. 
Liang used both Chinese and Western materials to support his 
argument for adopting a constitution. On the Confucian side 
of the argument, Liang thought that constitutional govern­
ment is the form of government most compatible with the wel­
fare of the people. Confucianism, insisting upon a benign 
rulership, argues that a ruler who himself does not follow 
the law cannot expect his subjects to obey him. According 
to Confucius, the best qualified man should be the ruler, 
and this man should be a model citizen whose behavior people 
should emulate. A model citizen is also one who best obeys 
the laws, and hence, Liang contends, the Confucian rulership 
of virtue and benevolence presupposed the necessity of a 
constitution since constitutionalism means the rule of law.^^
.On the Western side of the argument, Liang thought 
there was much evidence to support his preference for
5?Ibid., p. 185.
C Q
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, China and the League of Nations 
(Peking: Society for the Study of International Relations, 
1918), pp. 29-34.
124
constitutionalism. Throughout history, the nations that 
did not have constitutions always suffered from lack of free­
dom and poor living conditions. Examples Liang cites are 
Latin America, Russia, Turkey, etc.59
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was in many ways quite different 
from other leading intellectuals of his time. He did not 
denounce and reject Confucian ideology completely in favor 
of Western models, nor did he simply attempt to accomodate 
Western science and technology in a rigid Confucian frame­
work. Liang envisioned a new world with virtues extracted 
from both Confucian ethics and Western cultural constitu­
tionalism. He was simply to constitutionalize Confucian 
"spirit."
Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were quite apprehensive about 
China's inability to "expel" the West and Western culture. 
When China's traditional values and assumptions were chal­
lenged from the outside, they commenced a great debate on 
the relative worth of Chinese and Western civilizations.
Early leaders felt the necessity for reform, but they con­
ceived the purpose of reform as being to preserve their 
traditional way of life. In the early part of the twentieth
59Ibid.
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century, however, Chinese intellectuals became increasingly 
sophisticated and knew more about Western culture. Thus 
the real trial of Confucian ideology was not conducted until 
that time.
After World War I, much of the critical analysis 
also revolved about the comparative worth of Eastern and 
Western civilizations. Confucianism, as the primary molder 
of Chinese civilization, was dealt with directly or in­
directly. Those who deplored China's weakness quickly and 
mercilessly blamed Confucian ideology. To them Confucianism 
was the culprit. Those who defended Confucianism either were 
impelled by a strong sense of nationalism or suffered an 
almost reactionary complex of cultural superiority. The re­
sult was that they generally failed to make a strong case 
for Confucian ideology in the rapidly changing age. Many of 
them hated Western culture and democratic principles more 
than they liked Confucian way of life and government. Thus, 
they were more critical of West than defending their tradi­
tional ideology. And those who attacked Confucianism gen­
erally failed to recognize the fact that they could not 
depart from the Confucian cultural tradition overnight and 
they had to live with the past even after the Western-style 
republic was established in 1911.
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Their analysis of Confucian theory, however, shed a 
new light on the nature of Confucianism. Apparently, Con­
fucian "way of life" had never been the way it was described 
in the texts. Whether their re-evaluations were justified 
or not, they exposed some of its true and negative and "un­
happy" side. Some of the defects of Confucian theory were, 
in the final analysis, inevitable results of the social, 
economic, and political conditions of the time, while others 
may have resulted from intellectual indolence and lack of 
self-reflection on the part of Confucianists.
The worth of the debate was, in view of subsequent 
events, more in raising yet unsolved questions than in prob­
lem solving: Can a "spiritualistic" state-of-mind ethical sys­
tem offer a solution to an industrial and technological order 
that has no "mind" and no "heart"? For the growth of huge 
industrialized society has brought about the decline of the 
protestant ethic in the West; Confucianism may, too, face a 
similar destiny in the wake of modernization and 
industrialization.
CHAPTER V 
CONFUCIANISM AND WESTERN DEMOCRACY
As has been discussed, the Confucian nations, such 
as China, Korea, and Japan, have adopted Western political 
structures and features at different times since the "de­
bacle" of their traditional political systems based upon 
Confucian principles and tenets.^ The present political 
institutions of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Re­
public of China have their prototypes in Europe, and modern 
political democracy in Asia is almost exclusively the 
product of the influence of Great Britain, France, and the 
United States.
Not only do the above mentioned Asian nations pre­
tend to be developing democratic systems, but also the ideas 
of democracy seem to have a great deal of attraction and 
appeal elsewhere in the world. Thus many political and
^The People's Republic of China is of course an 
exception. Comparison and analysis of modern Communist 
political systems is not within the purview of this study, 
albeit Communism claims to be "true democracy."
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military dictatorships that have appeared in recent times 
have attempted to rationalize them as democratic or to pre­
tend to be laying down the ground work for future democracy.
Problems, however, arise when non-Western nations 
adopt Western political institutions and ideology in the 
hope of having a western style of democracy. The importa­
tion of Western political values and assumptions raises the 
question of what will become of the traditional ideology 
and how it will interact with the new. These are problems 
of the first magnitude to many political scientists today.% 
Certainly it is assumed in this study that traditional be­
liefs, values, and attitudes persist for some time after the 
formal departure of traditionalism. It is also assumed that 
if a traditional ideology is compatible with the imported 
ideas and system of government, the political change toward 
desired goals can be accomplished much more smoothly.
The core problem of this chapter then is to consider 
how the traditional Confucian theory of government and its 
basic concepts can be compared with those of modern
2
For example, see Fred R. vonder Mehden, Politics 
of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.). The 
Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc., 1963); and David E. Apter, The Politics of 
Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
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democratic political systems. More specifically, it is in­
tended to examine whether or not Confucianism is congenial 
to the ideas and theory of modern democracy.^ A serious 
problem is posed at once, however, by the nature and meanings 
of democracy. As Dahl says: "One of the difficulties one 
must face at the outset is that there is no democratic 
theory--there are only democratic t h e o r i e s . T h u s  one im­
portant question here is: with what theories of democracy 
should one compare or contrast the Confucian theory and 
ideals?
Thus in this chapter, a comparison is made first 
with an apologetic view of the classical concept of democracy. 
Although the view admittedly is considered by some to be 
"naive," "foolish," and "childlike," an examination of it 
nonetheless seems relevant to this study. That is, since to 
a great majority of the people today this view of democracy 
seems to mean equality of men, freedom, and certain basic
3
It should be reminded that this is a study of a 
hypothesis. Of course Confucian ideology is only a part of 
the political culture and it does not pretend to prove the 
actual Confucian nations are capable--or incapable--of the 
ideological change and transformation in order to have the 
Western style of democracy.
^Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 1.
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rights, a government of, by, and for the people, an attempt 
is made to compare this "classical" view of democracy with 
the normative, apologetic ideas of Confucianism. This 
analysis will be followed by realistic and critical views of 
modern democratic theories and comparison and contrast with 
Confucian thought.
Nature of "Democracy" and 
Confucian Thought
Several influential and widely adopted books on the 
American democracy and systems of government for college 
students written by modern political scientists freely admit 
the elusive nature of democracy. Then they proceed to say 
that "democracy rests on a belief in the fundamental dignity 
and importance of the individual, in the essential equality 
of human beings, and in the individual's need for freedom. 
One work also contends that the concept of equality is "the 
most fundamental belief of democratic theory," and the con­
cept of humanitarianism must be added to the concept of 
equality.^
^James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason, Government by 
the People, 7th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 8. Emphasis added.
%arian D . Irish and James W. Prothro, The Politics 
of American Democracy, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 62.
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Democratic theory of government Is also said to be 
based on "majority rule and minority r i g h t , a n d  the ideal 
of democracy is "self-government." In a democracy the 
electorate chooses the major policy officials in "free and
Q
relatively frequent elections." Not only does the majority 
govern through regular elections but also people have equal 
political power. Furthermore, democracy is bound up, ac­
cording to these texts, with the principle of constitution­
alism which in turn means "limited government." Such 
"authorities" agree with Thorson who says that "to see 
popular sovereignty, political equality, individual political 
rights, and majority rule . . .  is to see four aspects of 
the same general principle . . . More than merely compatible 
with one another, they are necessary to one another."^
Equality.--The concepts of political equality and 
"dignity of man" are especially closely related to this 
idealistic notion of modern "democracy." Thus man's equality 
and dignity are "mouthed" a great deal by some of these
^Ibid., p. 64.
8James M. B u m s  and Jack W. Peltason, 0£. cit., p.
9.
q
Thomas Landon Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 143.
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political thinkers and political writers as being synonymous 
with "democracy" even though they do not define either of 
these terms.
It may seem simple to describe the nature of human 
equality, but of course the word "equality" is quite confus­
ing in actual application.^® It is used when one makes com­
parisons, and a comparison can be made only when those things 
which are compared have some quality or attribute in common. 
However, "in social and political theory . . . equality is 
more often prescriptive than descriptive."^^ Thus the con­
cept of equality has been stated by these political ;^riters 
and speakers to imply that in Western democracies there is 
equal treatment and equal consideration in certain phases of 
political and economic life.
Again, the theory of natural rights is generally
closely related to the concept of equality. Locke said that
the state of nature is:
. . .  a state also of equality, where in all 
the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no
10
See Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government : An 
Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1963), pp. 289-92.
I, Berns and R. S. Peters, The Principles of 
Political Thought (New York: The Free Press of the Mac­
millan Co., 1965), p. 124.
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one having more than another, there being 
nothing more evident than that creatures of 
the same species and rank, promiscuously born 
to all the same advantages of Nature, and 
the use of the same faculties, should also be 
equal one amongst another, without subordination 
or subjection . . .1%
And the law of Nature:
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, 
that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions.^^
The Western concept of human equality, it is argued, there­
fore, involves some equal political and economic right as 
well as the equal moral worth of men as children of "God" or 
"nature."
When one turns to the Confucian conception of 
equality of man it may seem slightly different from that of 
Western democracy in terms of description; but, actually, 
one finds there seems on the surface little fundamental 
difference. As has been seen, Confucius believed that "by 
nature, men are nearly a l i k e i . e . ,  human nature is
12
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, cited in 
William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers : Plato to the 
Present, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1969), p. 401.
^^Ibid., p. 402.
^^Analects, Bk. XVII, Ch. II. See p. 24.
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virtually equal in its taste, desire, and appetite. There 
Is almost no difference between the sages and the ordinary 
men In terras of n a t u r e . H o w e v e r ,  Confucianists also be­
lieve that men are different and unequal In their "outward" 
expression such as ability to perform their functions, ex­
press their Intelligence, and morality. They are also ad­
mittedly unequal due to social Institution, practice, and 
mores. Apparently, Confucianists then seem to argue that 
men are by nature not alike In terms of ability. Intelligence, 
and morality, although they are alike In terms of taste, 
desire, and appetite. Although this appears only confusing 
and contradictory It lays the basis for comparison with the 
democratic "prescriptive view."
That Is, although there are differences (Inequalities)
In worldly possessions and wealth among men as a result of
differences In abilities, these differences should not be
socially Important as Mencius said:
If on self-examination, I find that I am not 
upright, shall I not be In fear even of a 
poor man In his loose garments of haircloth?
If, on self-examination, I find that I am 
upright, I will go forward against thousands 
and tens of thousands.
^^Menclus, Bk. IV, pt. V, Ch. XXX.
^^Ibld■, Bk. II, pt. I, Ch. II, sec. 7.
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Confucius also said in a similar vein, while praising one of
his disciples, that the disciple:
dressed himself in a tattered robe quilted with 
hemp, yet standing by the side of men dressed in 
furs, and not ashamed. 17
Thus the Confucian conception of man suggests that although
men are not equal in outward conditions they ought to be seen
and treated as of equal moral worth.
Thus man's equality and human nature as described by 
Confucianists have many similarities to the thought of West­
ern democratic philosophers. For example, Aristotle, 
though not a democrat, had nearly the same view of man. Man 
is a rational animal and man's dignity consists in his 
rationality. Man's capacity to reason is above vegetative 
and appetitive faculties. Much later, Godwin, the 
anarchist-democrat, suggests the Confucian view that human 
nature is not only originally good but also perfectible:
"Man is not originally v i c i o u s . ( C o n f u c i u s  and Mencius,
^^Analects, Bk. IX, Ch. XXVI, sec. 1.
18
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Introduction to 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeen (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1947), p. 330.
19William Godwin, ^  Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice, ed. & abridged by Raymond A. Preston, vol. II 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1926), p. 70.
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as has been discussed, believed that human nature was in­
nately good and man's ability to understand the law of 
nature would lead to good life.)
The Confucian view of equality as based on its own 
kind of "natural law," is also somewhat similar to the Stoic 
and Christian view of man. Lindsay says that the Stoics 
were the first (in the West) who conceived "the notion of
an all-pervading supreme law of nature to which positive law
20should be subject." The Greek Stoics thus made a vital 
contribution to the modern democratic system with their con­
cept of the equality of man under a universal reason and 
based on "natural reason" of most men and thus with the sub­
sequent development of the Roman jus gentium. This Stoic 
philosophy of natural law became wedded closely to Christian­
ity, and through the teachings of Christianity the natural 
law conception of equality has been transmitted to modern 
times.
Also in an equally early period it is important to 
note that Confucianists in Asia were also arguing that men 
may be equal in moral capacity regardless of social, economic,
20
A. D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State, Vol. I 
(New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 
54-55.
137
and political positions. Put oppositely all men are accord­
ing to Confucianists subject equally to a universal and 
eternal law of moral nature: the obligation to moral up­
rightness. The fact that all do not have the same capacity 
of reasoning and of intelligence is not as important as this 
equality in moral capacity and this moral worth. That is, 
all men are equal because they are governed by the natural 
law even though the nature of man in terms of rational 
capacity may be unequal. Moral worth based on moral capacity 
becomes a kind of sine qua non--as rationalist capacity does 
in the West.
Self-Government and Representation.--Modern demo­
cratic theory, of course, also claims that democracy essen­
tially means self-government and this self-government is 
realized through representation; and democratic political 
systems rest upon the principle that no government is legiti­
mate which does not derive its powers and functions from the 
consent of the governed in some sort of institutionalized 
express manner. Thus in "democratic" political systems, 
rulers are supposed ultimately to represent people and they 
are ultimately responsible to the people who are the ultimate 
sovereign.
138
Such a concept of representation did not exist in 
Athenian political life, for they had a more direct democracy 
and did not have the individualistic sense of "right." As 
the nation-state grew both in size and complexity after the 
Industrial Revolution, government through representation be­
came necessary and desirable for the faster execution of 
governmental functions--i.e., for efficiency under techno­
cratic conditions. Yet through representation people are 
still supposed to control their government. Hallowell says 
that in representative government "the people do not give 
their consent once and for all time, but the giving of con­
sent is conceived as a continuous process. Consent is con­
ceived, moreover, not as passive acquiescence but as active 
21approval."
As is known the concept of representation, however, 
poses a serious problem as a principle of modern democracy 
and of popular sovereignty. The notion that one person is 
being made present by another has metaphysical overtones 
which are quite perplexing. The idea that one mind can ac­
tually represent another mind let alone a number of minds is
^^John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of 
Democracy (Chicago: The University, of Chicago Press, 1954), 
p . 49.
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practically fallacious. Yet, Hobbes thought representation
was an actual possibility. Thus, his entire conception of
state and community rests upon the idea of representation.
He wrote in 1651:
A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a 
multitude of men do agree and covenant, every one 
with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly 
of men, shall be given by the major part the right 
to present the person of them all, that is to say, 
to be their representative, every one--as well he 
that voted for it, as he that voted it, shall author­
ize all the actions and judgments of that man, or 
assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were 
his own, to the end, to live peaceable amongst them­
selves, and be protected against other m e n . 22
On the other hand, Rousseau, who also gave serious 
thought to the nature of representation, rejected the concept 
as a sound basis of democratic government. Rousseau argued 
that no one can indeed represent the mind of another for a 
certain period of time, and democratic government must be 
operated according to the notion of the "general will," which 
is not necessarily the will of all but the "true" will of the 
entire p o p u l a c e . S u c h  a concept of course raises as many 
problems as it solves--i.e., how each mind can see a "general
22
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, quoted from William 
Ebenstein, 4th ed.. The Great Political Thinkers: Plato to 
the Present, p. 378. Emphasis original.
23
J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract. Quoted from 
William Ebenstein, ibid., pp. 453-59.
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mind" even in Rousseau's town meeting government.
Although a number of other theories of representa­
tion have been advanced, Including those which have as­
sumed that political representation must be of the people 
In Its entirety, modern democratic political systems gener­
ally subscribe to the contradictory notion that a repre­
sentative Is both a microcosm and a deputy of the body of 
people he r e p r e s e n t s . ^5 His role Includes not just repre­
senting his constituents but also deliberating and making 
decisions In their stead on a basis of a "public" need, etc.
The function of the legislative assembly Is not 
only fairly to represent the people but to de­
liberate upon public policy and arrive at those 
decisions dictated by political prudence which 
will best promote the common good. The legis­
lative assembly has both representative and de­
liberative functions.26
Since the representative organ Is also the organ of 
deliberation, the concept of representation presupposes the
24
See Hanna Fenlchel Pitkin, The Concept of Repre­
sentation (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1967).
25
Carl J. Friedrich maintains that there are two 
types of representation: one Is "purposive" and the other 
Is "existential." Friedrich recognizes the difficulty of 
reconciling the mere representative with the leadership qual­
ity of representation. See 0£. cit., pp. 304-09. The notion 
of representation advanced by the "realist" school of contem­
porary political scientists will be examined later In this 
chapter.
2 g
John H. Hallowell, 0£. cit., p. 59.
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superior quality of some men within the society. Yet in 
democracy, rulers are supposed to be selected by the people. 
Thus Hallowell says that democracy "places its faith in the 
ability of the average man to select men of sound judgment 
and good character to perform the function of the legislator, 
but it does not demand that we regard every man as a compe­
tent legislator."27
Yet again since "self-government" is accomplished 
through the recruitment of the few, democracy faces another 
dilemma. Although the modern democratic political system and 
its concept of representation have been developed in support 
of the idea that rulership and government should not be ex­
clusively in the hands of a few on the basis of wealth or 
birth, many commentators have claimed that an actual aristo­
cratic system operates modern democracy, at least at the 
administrative level. Thus Holcombe says that democracy is 
a kind of aristocracy because many important offices are 
distributed according to merit:
The further extension of the merit system and 
in general the better organization of the 
national planning mean the attraction of wiser 
and abler men into the public service and the 
development of the power of the whole system
27Ibid., p. 60.
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of government. This is the essence of true 
aristocracy.
The aristocratic character of democracy is further 
acknowledged by A. D. Lindsay when he states that "in a 
democratic state those who have power and expert knowledge 
are to serve the community and be controlled by the ordinary 
people who have neither power nor knowledge . . . Democracy 
is not, properly speaking, government by the people."^9 
The idea of government by the knowledgeable few is also re­
flected in the words of Merriam: "Far from crushing out talent, 
democracy may place the highest premium upon it and strike at 
all artificial l i m i t a t i o n . Hallowell recognizes the ex­
istence of a kind of democratic elitism:
To the extent that aristocracy means government 
by those who are wealthy or well-born, the 
principle of aristocracy is clearly incompatible 
with democracy; but to the extent that aristocracy 
means government by those best qualified by virtue 
and capacity to rule, it is not, I think, a prin­
ciple opposed to democracy.31
28Arthur N. Holcombe, Government in a Planned 
Democracy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1935), pp. 171-172.
OQ
A. D. Lindsay, o£. cit., p. 281.
30Charles E. Merriam, New Democracy and the New 
Despotism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), p.
19.
^^John H. Hallowell, o£. cit., p. 51.
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It does not deny the aristocratic principle that 
those best qualified should be in positions of 
public responsibility, but it removes any arbi­
trary definitions of quality and puts its trust 
in the judgment of the electorate.3%
If democracy means popular sovereignty and self- 
government even though through the few competent represen­
tatives or administrative experts (without necessarily 
agreeing with these somewhat "happy” views of democracy), 
Confucian theory of government should seem by and large 
acceptable to them also at least as far as the ends of gov­
ernment are concerned. Thus, Confucianists believe that the 
people are the most important element in the nation and that 
the purpose of government is to promote the welfare and 
morality of the people, that is, of ordinary people, not 
just the superior men or even highly moral man.33 It was 
also as it was seen earlier the Confucian ruler's foremost 
duty to look after the people's welfare.
It was the lesson of our great forefathers:
The people should be cherished and not 
looked down upon. The people are the root 
of a country. When the root is firm, the 
country is tranquil. When I look at all 
under heaven, even the little man and woman 
may surpass me in wisdom and virtue. If the 
king makes mistakes repeatedly in conducting
32ibid., p. 52.
^^Mencius, Bk. VII, pt. II, Ch. XIV.
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government, dissatisfaction will prevail and 
dangers appear. Before they appear, they should 
be guarded against. In my dealing with the 
millions of the people I should feel as if I 
were driving six horses with a rotten rein. The 
ruler of men should have reverence for his
duties.34
The concept of an ultimate popular sovereignty is 
also clearly evident in the Confucian equation of the will 
of the people with the "will of heaven." As has been seen 
previously, Confucianists maintained that Heaven sees ac­
cording as the people see, and "Heaven loves the people. 
Whatever people desire, heaven gives them."35 There is no 
raison d 'etre for the ruler and political institution other 
than the good and harmonious life of the people. "Heaven," 
and the rulers here actually represent the people even in 
terms of their "desires." The rulers do not decide what the 
desires "ought" to be. This is about as anti-elitist as 
political thinkers--including anarchists--have been prone to
go-
In Lockean vein, Confucianists also recognize the 
right of revolution to oust a ruler who misgoverns although 
in Confucianism this right is more implicit than
^^Book of History, pt. Ill, Bk. III.
35Ibid., pt. V, Bk. I, sec. 1.
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explicit. Locke claimed that "the reason why men enter 
into society is the preservation of their p r o p e r t y , a n d  
that if a ruler fails to provide security for private prop­
erty and bodily safety there is no longer a justification 
for living in a civil society. Inasmuch as Locke’s social 
contract was made to alleviate or even to eliminate some of 
the "inconveniences" under the state of nature, any action 
on the part of people is justified when those "conveniences" 
are not obtained. Locke argued that:
. . . whenever the legislators endeavour to take 
away and destroy the property of the people . . . 
they put themselves into a state of war with the 
people . . . who are thereupon absolved from any 
farther obedience, and are left to the common 
refuge which God hath provided for all men 
against force and violence.^8
Thus, for Locke, people alone have the right to determine
whether the trust has been violated, although he warns that
people should not resort to a revolution over "every little
mismanagement in public affairs." Only "great mistakes in
the ruling part" warrant the people's action "to resume
36
Mencius, Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. V, sec. 8; and Book of 
History, pt. V, Bk. I, sec. 1.
37John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Quoted 
from William Ebenstein, op_. cit., p. 417.
3Gibid.
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their original liberty.
In the case of Confucian thought ruler and government 
officials are not representatives of the people in the modern 
Western democratic sense since they are not chosen by the 
people, even if they should have the people's welfare at 
heart. A  person becomes ruler by virtue of his superior wis­
dom and high level of morality, and he is responsible only 
to "Heaven," from which he received the mandate. Furthermore, 
for Confucianists, revolution is still the will of Heaven 
manifested in the minds of people. Should revolution occur, 
it is the judgment of Heaven rather than of the people 
directly. Thus the people are not conceived of as directly 
the ruler's judges. At this point, it might seem there is a 
wide gap between Confucianism and Lockean theory of revolution 
Yet Confucianists are quick to point out that Heaven and the 
mind of people are identical; people act according to the 
will of Heaven; and Heaven acts according to the wishes of the 
p e o p l e . T h e y  simply believe in this because nature is
39
Ibid ., pp. 417-18.
^®See for the Confucian nature of Heaven and its 
operation in human affairs, pp. 26-28 and pp. 73-78. Heaven 
stands for the people's welfare. Thus in one sense, the 
will of Heaven is the will of the people--an interesting 
parallel to the Western notion of vox populi-vox dei.
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harmonious and it does not act in such a way as to cause 
disharmony among men. To act against the nature of man 
would bring about calamities. Thus a Confucian ruler who 
has failed to provide a harmonious society would sooner or 
later face a revolution by the people who have Heaven's 
approval. Furthermore, from the Confucian point of view, 
there is no distinction between peaceful change and violent 
revolution. Peaceful abdication and violent revolution are 
regarded simply as two different methods of replacing an im­
moral and incompetent ruler. Since both methods have Heaven's 
sanction, there is no essential difference Thus in the 
final analysis there seems to be no practical difference be­
tween the Confucian concept of the "loss of the mandate of 
heaven" by revolution of the people against a ruler who could 
not give security to the governed. Empirically and prag­
matically, people only have the right of "successful" revo­
lution for it alone is sanctioned by Heaven.
There are some other contrasts between the Confucian 
system and the modern democratic theories not mentioned 
earlier. Superficially Confucianists hold a more
^^See for a detailed discussion, Yuji Muramatsu,
"Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies," The Confucian 
Persuasion, Arthur Wright, ed. (Stanford University Press, 
1960), pp. 241-67.
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"aristocratie" view of government, although being committed 
presumably to the welfare of the people. Yet Confucius 
always exhorted rulers to employ the capable and virtuous 
for government posts and not to choose officials on the basis 
of wealth or birth. In this there is a parallel to Western 
government by administrative expertise.
Thus, Confucianists emphasized the fact that govern­
ment by the people is not possible in immediate actuality.
It is quite obvious, they imply, that the people, meaning all 
the members of society in all their multifarious relations, 
cannot govern, and government must be in the hands of a 
relatively small number of people. This Confucian aristoc­
racy, moreover, is a non-representative aristocracy. Also 
unlike modern democratic systems, these political leaders are 
not directly accountable to the people since they are not 
subject to the electorate's judgment. The elite-rulers in 
Confucian politics occupy governmental positions by virtue of 
their superior knowledge and morality, and again they are 
responsible theoretically only to Heaven, even though this 
may mean the people's desires as seen earlier.
In this regard the nature of Confucian ruling- 
aristocracy is perhaps even more reminiscent of the aris­
tocracy suggested by Edmund Burke than of administrative
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experts since he, like Confucianists, asserted that political 
leaders and representatives should be the men of superior 
wisdom and moral standards. Confucianists like Burke also 
had a great respect for the wisdom of the past, and of social 
order and harmony. Furthermore, for Confucianists, superior 
men should not only govern by their wisdom but be good 
examples of the public interest as was true of Burke's notion 
of the standard for elected representatives. Also as Burke 
felt that although v^en elected representatives take their 
offices, they should have a careful regard for the people's 
interests and should even consider common people's opinions, 
yet those representatives should never be dominated by them, 
so did the Confucianists. This Burkean theory of representa­
tion is known as "virtual representation." Burke wrote in 
1792:
Virtual representation is that in which there is 
a communion of interests, and a sympathy in 
feelings and desires, between those who act in 
the name of any description of people, and the 
people in whose name they act, though the 
trustees are not actually chosen by then . . .
Such a representation I think to b e , in many 
cases, even better than the actual. It pos­
sesses most of its advantages, and is free from 
many of its inconveniences ; it corrects the 
irregularities in the literal representation . . .42
42
Edmund Burke, A Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe 
(January 3, 1792), quoted from William Ebenstein, op. cit., 
p. 479.
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Confucianists too discount political wisdom and capacity of 
the common man for immediate self-government. Government is 
the business of a knowledgeable few who have a farsighted 
view of the general interest, not that of a "hair-dresser” 
or a "tallow-chandler.”
There are, however, some significant differences 
between the notions of political leadership in Confucianists 
and Burke. Confucius would not agree with Burke that a rul­
ing class should be selected on the basis of ability, 
grounded in property and birth. Ability, including moral 
knowledge, according to Confucianists, may be found outside 
this realm. The difference is more than a matter of seman­
tics, for Confucianists have much more faith in reason, a 
priori knowledge, virtue, and righteousness in the affairs of 
government, than prescriptive right and utility growing out 
of property and rank. In this regard Confucianism is more 
democratic than Burke.
Constitutionalism.--Finally, modern "democratic" 
political systems are characterized by the principle of 
constitutionalism. In a modern political system, political 
power is exercised through a series of publicly acknowledged 
and accepted relationships between the holders of power and 
the governed. In this relationship the definition and
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distribution of political power is supposed to be limited 
and can be applied only in certain domains and according to 
known procedures agreed on prior to action. The framework 
in fact, which defines and limits political power is called 
a constitution, whether written or unwritten.
In fact, a political system that boasts a constitu­
tion does not necessarily have constitutionalism, because 
the spirit of constitutionalism goes beyond the mere posses­
sion of a document. The principle of constitutionalism means 
essentially the rule of law binding both ruler and ruled by 
which the functions of government are executed. As Mc- 
Ilwain says, "the essence of constitutional government is 
the recognition of the existence of 'a law that puts bounds 
to arbitrary will.'"^^ Thus a constitutional government is 
generally understood both as a "limited government," and 
"the rule of laws."
There is yet another significant dimension to this 
notion of constitutionalism and limited government. Modern 
constitutionalism has been profoundly shaped by the Hebraic- 
Christian tradition which emphasized a "human" person which
^^Charles H. Mcllwain, "The Fundamental Law Behind 
the Constitution of the United States," in Conyers Pead, 
ed.. The Constitution Reconsidered (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1938), p. 3.
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government must respect. As Friedrich says:
Probably the most distinctive religious root of 
modern constitutionalism is the Christian belief 
in the dignity and worth of each person, each 
human being, no matter how lowly. For if we ask 
the political function of a constitution, we find 
that the core ofjective is that of safeguarding 
each member of the political community as such a 
person. Each man is supposed to possess a sphere 
of genuine autonomy. Constitution is meant to 
protect the self; for the self is believed to be 
the (primary and ultimate) value. This pre­
occupation of the self, rooted in Christian 
beliefs, eventually gave rise to the notion of 
rights which were thought to be n a t u r a l . 44
Thus modern democratic government with the concepts of con­
stitutionalism and limited government recognizes the certain 
rights of the individual and freedom from governmental inter­
ference in certain spheres of activity. In fact. Western 
constitutionalism itself is "an elaborate set of devices to 
subject the political freedom of the holders of political 
power to institutional limitations and legal controls."45
Constitutional democracy therefore is known to demand 
a great deal of freedom and liberty in terms of a so-called
44
Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and 
Democracy : Theory and Practice in Europe and America,
Fourth Edition (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 
1968), p. 8.
^^Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Dilemmas of Freedom," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, no. 3 (September, 
1957), p. 717.
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"human" self or person. Many modern political scientists 
argue that liberty and democracy are inseparable and that 
democracy, by very definition, includes a vast amount of 
liberty for this "self."^^
However, this principle of constitutionalism and the 
doctrine of the rule of law in the modern "democratic" sense 
and the "freedom" of such an "individual self" are not 
found in Confucianism. There is no constitutional limita­
tion on Confucian rulers save the mandate of Heaven, and 
their power can be applied in any domain without following 
precedents. The only limitation on the ruler's power is his 
oim conscience and the fear of losing Heaven's mandate. The 
fact that Confucianists ignore this idea of the rule of law^^ 
and place most emphasis upon the ruler's personal virtue 
strongly supports the contention that Confucianism is not 
conducive to the principle of constitutionalism.
On the other hand, it may be argued that Confucian­
ism does contain the spirit of modern constitutionalism in 
the sense that the ruler is bound by the true law, that is, 
by the impeccable moral quality he is supposed to have to be
46
See a discussion of this question, ibid., pp. 714-
23.
^^Analects, Bk. II, Ch. III.
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a ruler. Because of this, the ruler would rarely violate the 
law of nature and universe.48 Furthermore, Confucianists, 
although not bound "legally," do pay a great deal of defer­
ence to precedents, customs, and convention,49 so that the 
procedure of government in Confucian culture is fairly well 
known. As has been seen earlier, there seem to be two types 
of law in Confucianism: one is immutable natural law in the 
Stoic sense, and the other is human law largely made up of 
penal codes. That Confucian rulers are bounded by the natu­
ral law seems to be compatible with the essential spirit of 
constitutionalism and limited government.
This does not mean to say that Confucian theory of 
government is completely agreeable with Western democracy. 
Certainly, Confucian theory is devoid of such modern "demo­
cratic” aspects of constitutionalism and limited government 
as specific guarantees of freedom and rights for "individ­
uals."^^ Moreover, Confucian theory provides no specific 
institutionalized means to check the arbitrary exercise of 
power by a non-virtuous ruler. If democracy means an
4Glbid., Bk. XIV, Ch. XXVII; Bk. IV, Ch. X.
49Ibid., Bk. Ill, Ch. XIV.
S^The problem of freedom and individual rights will 
be discussed further later in the chapter.
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objective and institutionalized system of order, the Con­
fucian system, because it is completely at the mercy of the 
ruler’s qualities and the power of revolt, lies far removed 
from so-called Western "democratic constitutionalism."
Thus far Confucian theory has been compared and 
contrasted with what some consider a "childlike" classical 
view of democracy. Since democracy is not exactly what 
Western classical writers say it is, it thus seems equally 
judicious to examine and contrast Confucianism with more 
realistic and critical views of democracy.
Realistic and Critical Views 
of Democracy
As has been noted there seem to be few political 
words more than "democracy" that appeal to people throughout 
the world today. Most people, regardless of their political, 
social, economic, and even intellectual positions, feel that 
some social situation called "democracy" is somehow valid as 
well as desirable.51 A number of very sophisticated defenses
See for the problem of uncritical acceptance of 
democratic ideas and their premises by the American political 
scientists, John Paul Duncan, "The Political Philosophy of 
American Political Scientists," a paper delivered at The 
Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Associa­
tion, Dallas, Texas (March 25, 1967).
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or justifications of democracy have consequently been written 
and the list of important names or theories is extensive.
Many students of political science and democracy, 
however, have simply assumed that "democracy” is good because 
it is presumably government "by the people" and thus assures 
self-governing. Furthermore, it is more conducive to the 
notion of man's equality and that each man can enjoy "free­
dom" and "liberty" whatever these mean to particular persons.
However, few theorists have examined the premises 
upon which much of Western democratic theory operates, that 
is, views of the nature of man and society and politics. It 
might be at least an easier task to justify democratic 
political systems if they were really controlled by people 
who are actually even politically equal and if so-called 
political "freedom" actually existed by which to achieve a 
better life. Unfortunately, much of the "classical" theory of 
democracy even in terms of what presumably exists is question­
able and quite contrary to human personality, nature and
52
See for example, Charles E. Merriam, What is 
Democracy? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941); and 
The New Democracy and The New Despotism (New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Co., 1939); Thomas Landon Thorson, The Logic of 
Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), etc. 
The list is by now ^  infinitum and some of it ad nauseam 
according to Professor John Paul Duncan.
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experience. True, it is an integral part of the American 
consensus that the United States is a democracy.53 However, 
some American political scientists have abandoned the 
classical notion of democracy. Especially since World War 
II there have been several attempts to revise or reconstitute 
at least the "classical" theory of democratic political sys­
tems . These have by and large concentrated their attack upon 
the descriptive inaccuracy of the classical conceptions of 
democracy such as the role of citizens in terms of political 
influence, self-government through representation, e t c . 54 
These modern revisionists, generally referred to as "the 
realist school,” have advanced a new theory known as "elitist 
theory" or "group theory" of democracy. Nevertheless, the 
scholars in this realist school essentially reaffirm the 
"democratic" nature of American politics and agree that 
democracy is still to a great extent the popular control of
53 "
James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, Fundamental
Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," 
Journal of Politics, XXII, no. 22 (May, 1964), p. 276.
54
See, for example, W. N. Chambers and R. H. Salisbury 
(eds.). Democracy in the Mid-20th Century (St. Louis: Wash­
ington University Press, 1960); Henry B. Mayo, An Introduction 
to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press,
1960); Robert A. Dahl, o£. cit., and Who Governs? (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1961); V. 0. Key, Public Opinion and 
American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961); 
and Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co., 1965).
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important decision-making in the government. The realist 
theorists simply claim that people influence and control 
government policy basically through the electoral process. 
Thus in arguing that people participate in the policy-making 
process in a systematic way, they maintain that democracy 
is still self-government.
For instance, Maclver and Lipset argue that a citizen
participates in governmental policy-making by selecting those
rulers who he believes will advance his own views. "In every
modern democracy," Lipset writes, "conflict among different
groups is expressed through political parties which basically
represent a democratic translation of the class struggle."55
The purpose of political parties is to enable the people to
use government for advancing their own interests.
Party focusses the issues, sharpens the differences 
between contending sides, eliminates confusing 
cross-currents of opinion . . .  In short, the 
party, in its endeavors to win the pv’.lic to its 
side . . .  is making the democratic system work­
able. It is the agency by which public opinion is 
translated into public p o l i c y . 56
Yet if people only occasionally select their rulers
^^Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959), p. 220.
^^Robert M. Maclver, The Web of Government (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 213.
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on the basis of issues and policy, and they are only passive 
judges of rulers except on election day, then the arguments 
of Maclver and Lipset do not sufficiently demonstrate the 
self-government character of American democracy.
The self-governing process of American politics as 
described by Dahl and Key seems to be more complex. They 
too believe that people influence government policy by sup­
porting the political candidates who are most likely to ad­
vance their interests. But the crucial argument here is 
that most people belong to various interest groups in this 
country, and these groups exert a continuous influence on 
government p o l i c y . I n  other words, they believe that the 
interest groups' influence upon government policy is felt 
not only through the regular electoral process but also 
through the other means of interest struggle between the
^^Group theorists including David Truman assert 
that there is no phenomena but group phenomena in politics. 
The role of individuals in politics is infinitesimal, and 
through group activity and group identification the voice 
of the individual can be heard in politics. Truman notes 
that controversy and conflict of group activities are the 
essence of politics. David B. Truman, The Governmental 
Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 502-03. The 
group concept of politics was first advanced by Arthur F. 
Bentley, who wrote that society was the resultant of all 
interest groups' interactions. He viewed that "interest" 
is merely an attribute of a group, and society is "nothing 
other than the groups which compose it." See his The 
Process of Government (1903) (Evanston, 111: Principle 
Press, 1935), p. 222.
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elections.
The existence of free, competitive, and periodic 
elections Is still considered however the crucially necessary 
precondition for Insuring the responsiveness of the rulers to
C O
the wishes of the ruled. At this point, the thesis of 
Dahl, Key and Truman Is not too different from that of Mac­
lver and Lipset. They maintain that elections are "the 
crucial process for assuring that political leaders will be
somewhat responsive to the preferences of sorm ordinary 
59citizen." If rulers fall to live up to the expectations 
of the electorate, then the rulers would lose in their next 
election. Key wrote In his book published posthumously 
that:
National elections . . . reflect teh electorate In 
Its great, and perhaps principal, role as an 
appraiser of past events, past performances and 
past actions. It judges retroactively; It commands 
prospectlvely only Insofar as It expresses either 
approval or disapproval of that which has happened 
before.
58
Robert A. Dahl, A Preface . . . ., p. 131; V. 0. 
Key, op,, cit.. Ch. 21; David B. Truman, op. cit., ch. 16.
59
Robert A . Dahl, A Preface . . . , p . 131.
0. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate, with 
the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), p. 82.
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Despite their claim that elections are a "crucial 
device for controlling leaders," Dahl and Key concede that 
periodical elections as a means of popular control are some­
what inadequate. Dahl says, "in no large nation-state can 
elections tell us much about the preferences of majorities 
and minorities beyond the bare fact that of those who went 
to the polls a majority, plurality or minority indicated 
their choices for some particular candidate or group of can- 
dates."Gl If people are only passive judges of public events 
and if their will does not clearly emerge in the elections, 
then the "realist" theorists face enormous difficulty in ex­
plaining the self-governing process of democracy.
Dahl, Truman and Key at this juncture introduce 
"pluralism" to their theory-building of democracy. They feel 
that since election results do not clearly manifest the will 
of people but show only the preference for candidates in 
terms of majority and minority, the notion of self-government 
through representation has to be explained in terms of 
pluralism of the interest struggle, not exclusively in terms 
of the electoral process.
Those group theorists or pluralistic elite theorists,
^^Robert A. Dahl, A Preface . . . , p. 130.
162
under the influence of, or by the "rediscovery" of Bentley, 
thus assert that the visible components of society are groups, 
not atomic individuals, insofar as political life is con­
cerned. Dahl says that "we can only distinguish groups of 
various types and sizes all seeking in various ways to ad­
vance their goals, usually at the expense, at least in part, 
of o t h e r s . T h u s  they argue that people could influence 
the policy of government which affects them as members of 
various interest groups.
As to the sensitivity of government and the politi­
cal leaders to the interest-seeking activities of groups 
in American society, Dahl describes it first in terms of 
the nature of political parties. According to him, a 
political party is constantly engaged in the task of aggre­
gating an electoral majority and seeking support from the 
various interest groups. People are in general inarticu­
late about political issues and there is virtually complete 
absence of a clear voice of the people. But the rulers of 
American society in their search for an electoral majority 
cannot ignore the demands of interest group leaders who are
G^Ibid.. p. 131.
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supposed to represent their group m e m b e r s . T o  the 
pluralist elitists democracy is, therefore, government by 
the various group leaders, or "polyarchy" as Dahl calls it.
Realist theorists have also significantly modified 
the role of citizen. According to classical theorists, an 
average citizen in democracy is viewed as an active par­
ticipant in political process and as deeply committed to 
basic democratic b e l i e f s , a n d  finally, his political power 
or influence is about equal to that of any other fellow 
citizen. Realists argue that those "classical" views of 
citizens are simply not true empirically, although there is 
little to be alarmed about, for the United States is still 
very much a democracy.
"Homo civicus," as Dahl calls an average citizen,
"is not, by nature, a political a n i m a l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
Dahl does not delve into detail as to why an average man is 
apathetic. Dahl's only explanation for non-participation
See for detailed discussions on the subject, Robert 
A. Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 307-308; and V. 0. Key, Jr.,
Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 518-24.
^^For a critical analysis of a citizen's "agreement 
on fundamentals," see Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Gov­
ernment , op. cit., pp. 237-38 & pp. 345-46.
65Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 225.
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of homo civicus is that an average man in America can attain 
his goals through non-political channels, and the political 
apathy is a typically middle-class phenomenon. These 
middle-class Americans are too busy to take advantage of 
the abundant opportunities provided by the affluent society.
As to the questions of political equality, the 
pluralist elitist theorists try to be merely descriptive. 
Political power or influence is dependent upon such political 
resources as money, job, social standing, appearance, intel­
ligence, education, etc.^? Thus, by the very nature of 
political power and influence, people are not equal in ac­
tuality. However, Dahl insists that resources are dispersed 
and not cumulative. People can obtain political resources of 
one kind or another. "Virtually no one, and certainly no 
group of more than a few individuals is entirely lacking in 
some influence r e s o u r c e . T h u s  people are potentially
^^Although Professor Dahl implies here that public 
participation is not necessary for democracy, he later ad­
mits that he would like to see more participation, "par­
ticularly among some segments of the population whose par­
ticipation has been lowest." Robert A. Dahl, "Further Re­
flections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" American 
Political Science Review, LX no. 2 (June, 1966), p. 301.
^^Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 15-16.
^^Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 226. Dahl 
believes that equality of political power is impossible to
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equal to others and with some luck they can even be superior 
to others.
The absence of deep commitment to democratic ideals 
by large numbers of people is no threat to all pluralist- 
elitist theorists of democracy. Quite contrary to the "clas­
sical" view that democracy, being the product of public 
political consciousness, is supported by the people, they 
argue that the "intervening structure of elites" are far more 
committed to the democratic creed. Thus, Truman argues that 
the continuing existence of the democratic process depends 
on the "consensus of elites," as a necessary basis upon which 
established elites can repulse the threat of irresponsible 
demagogues.
Key agrees with Truman that the chief responsibility 
for the survival of democracy rests with elites, not with 
the masses of the people. He states that "the critical ele­
ment for the health of a democratic order consists in the
realize in any large political system. Continuing to espouse 
it as a major democratic goal will simply further cynicism 
toward democracy. See his "Power, Pluralism and Democracy:
A Modest Proposal," a paper delivered at the 1964 annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago, September 9-12, 1964, p. 14.
6 9
David B. Truman, "The American System in Crisis," 
Political Science Quarterly (December, 1959), pp. 481-97.
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beliefs, standards, and competence of those who constitute 
the influential, the opinion-leaders, the political activists 
in the o r d e r . "^0 Dahl also concludes that the skillful and 
active political leaders in the American political system 
are the true democratic "legitimists."71
Nevertheless, this "realist" theory of democracy as
essentially self-government is far from persuasive. In
general it fails to show what democracy ought to be in terms
of ends. Democracy is thus viewed mainly in procedural 
72
terms. They merely have taken the on-going political sys­
tem for granted, and tried to show how American "democracy" 
and its self-governing aspect operate in terms of process.
Not only have they "stripped democracy of much of its [the 
classical theory] radical elan and have diluted its utopian 
vision, thus rendering it inadequate as a guide to the
0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and the American 
Democracy, p. 558.
71-Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 309-12. This 
work is a study of a city of New Haven, Conn., but Dahl 
says it applies to the entire United States.
72
For critical examinations of the elitist theory, 
see Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A 
Critique (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), es­
pecially Chapters 4 and 5; Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of 
the Elitist Theory of Democracy," The American Political 
Science Review, LX, 2 (June, 1966), pp. 285-95.
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73future," but also many of the explanations offered by Tru­
man, Key and Dahl are somewhat less than convincing.
For example, they argue that the majority of the 
people are politically apathetic and yet they maintain that 
the latter still somehow govern themselves by belonging to 
various interest groups and associations. As Walker puts 
it, they "generally accept the prevailing distribution of 
status in the s o c i e t y , a n d  do not take into account a num­
ber of people who do not belong to any interest group. More­
over, there is no proof that all of the politically apathetic 
men join the interest group with political intent. Political 
apathy is not necessarily the product of middle-class con­
tent, as Dahl writes; but it may very well be the result of 
the repeated frustration and low degree of political efficacy 
among the people.
Granted that people make use of their group affilia­
tions as a means of participating in the policy-making of the 
government, the "realist" theorists cannot argue that leaders
^^Jack L. Walker, ibid., p. 295.
74ibid.
^^For a general discussion and comparative study of 
political efficacy, see Gabriel A. Almond and S. Verba, The 
Civic Culture : Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
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of the various groups democratically represent the views of 
the members. For the Internal structure of private Interest 
groups Is undemocratic almost without exception. The leader­
ship recruitment of the Interest groups In the United States 
Is made through co-op tat Ion rather than through free, com­
petitive and periodic election, which Is one of the basic 
requirements of democratic theory according to Dahl and K e y . 76 
As nearly everyone knows, even the presidents of the American 
Political Science Association, A.M.A., A.B.A., etc. are not 
elected by all their respective members. It Is thus diffi­
cult to argue that "Interest" groups operate democratically.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion Is not so 
much to make a thorough criticism of the realist theory, but 
rather to show how It too Implicitly defends the democratic 
political system and believes that "governmental decisions 
are the resultant of access by various Interests,"77 thus 
"public Interest" will emerge out of Interest conflict within 
a society, despite their claim that modern "democratic" theory 
Is above Ideology.
7^An excellent discussion on the Internal process of 
private groups Is found In Henry S. Karlel, The Decline of 
American Pluralism (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,
1961), pt. I.
^^Davld B. Truman, The Governmental Process, op. 
clt., p. 507.
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This is because many contemporary American political
scientists, according to Professor Duncan, have accepted a
subjectivist definition of individuality, group theory, and
interest as the ground of law growing out of philosophic
positions, e.g., logical positivism or logical empiricism,
or scientific empiricism, value-non-cognitivism or value
relativism, metaphysical skepticism, scientism, naturalism,
pragmatism, and naive realism. ^ 8 More specifically, American
political scientists:
imply in one way or another that the best form of 
political society is democratic. We do not say 
we believe this because ^  like it or prefer it 
(or think we had better believe it due to our 
respective economic and social positions); we 
develop a defense of it from the foregoing primary 
and secondary premises. Thus we argue that 
democracy allows a maximum of freedom (demand 
flexibility) for our individual selves or interest 
groups to seek power and participate in the 
making and enforcing of rules (allocating 
values or supporting or opposing the demand flow).
The implication is that this is good or valid be­
cause it results in peaceful (non-physical 
violence) competition (although it is not clear 
why this "fact" is good), acceptable compromise 
and accommodation, maximization of individual 
satisfactions and fluidity of struggle for 
"individuals" and classes in their desire (demand) 
for power and other goods. It is not always 
clear why these goals are valid either except as 
they are implicitly related to the nature of man 
and society (in turn assumed) and the utilitarian 
ethics that "each shall count for one . .
78john Paul Duncan, o£. cit., pp. 3-5.
^^Ibid., p. 8.
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Thus the actual nature of modern democracy and its predi­
cates--the subjectively defined "individual," indeed seems 
to contain far more paradoxes, inconsistencies and absurdities 
than some contemporary political scientists who "defend it" 
are willing to admit.
But another reason for this is that the ideological 
foundation of m odem democracy is based upon several con­
flicting ideas that were simply useful to the rising middle 
class. They have come up with the notions of "will" in 
Marsilio and the "masterless man" of Machiavelli and the 
Renaissance, and blended them with the "soul" in Christianity 
which becomes moral soul and therefore it is supreme "worth 
and dignity." Although the new concept of man was indebted 
heavily to Stoicism for its inspiration, it is more than a 
reiteration of the Stoic idea which still retained an idea 
of an intimate connection with a "universe." The present 
ideas affirm the unique and atomic and autonomous individual. 
A man's "soul" is not obligated to God. His "soul" belongs 
to a man himself. This is comforting to the middle class.
It is also useful when transformed to the final person of 
economics--the "wanting, producing animal," or the individual 
with natural rights in government and law.
Even Niebuhr, an apologist for this democratic
171
predicates admits that the religious ideal of "liberty" as
freedom to choose God or evil was turned into a weapon of
the middle and commercial classes who rose to power in
Europe during the past three or four centuries. In fact,
they turned freedom of the "soul" into freedom as the sec-
ularistic, humanistic natural right to seek happiness and
property without governmental restraint or indeed often
social moral restraint.
The middle classes defeated the combination of 
economic and political power of merchantilism 
by stressing economic liberty; and, through 
the principles of political liberty, they added 
the political power of suffrage to their growing 
economic power. The implicit assumptions, as 
well as the explicit ideals, of democratic 
civilization were also largely the fruit of 
middle-class existence. The social and histori­
cal optimism of democratic life, for instance, 
represents the typical illusion of an advancing 
class which mistook its own progress for the 
progress of the world.
80
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the 
Children of Darkness : A Vindication of Democracy and a 
Critique of its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 2. Emphasis added. Due to the 
paradoxical nature of the predicates of democracy, it has 
hardly been near its own alleged ideals, i.e., the equality 
of mankind, liberty and freedom for every individual, self- 
government through representation, and, above all, the 
emergence of social harmony and the "public interest." Con­
temporary democracy thus, despite the earlier influence 
upon it by Stoic natural law, operates actually under the 
principle of anarchic natural right of Locke and others.
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However, absurdities and fallacies of contemporary
democratic theory have nowhere been shown more clearly than 
81by E. Jordan. The tragic reality of democracy, according 
to Professor Jordan, is that it is grounded upon a sub­
jectivist definition of personality objectified into the 
false principles of interest; thus by its very nature 
democracy is not pointed to social harmony nor is it con­
ducive to "public i n t e r e s t . "82
Briefly, Jordan feels that the ancient Greeks had 
appreciated the objective system of order and viewed man as 
having an "obligatory tie which bound him to his objective 
self in the 'nature' which embodied his purpose in final 
harmony," indeed to his polis as his very own personality. 
But, unfortunately, after the collapse of the Greek
81
Professor E. Jordan, 1875-1953, is rightly re­
garded as one of the most original social and legal philos­
ophers in the history of American thought. It is far be­
yond the scope or possibility of this paper to describe 
Jordan's philosophy, but it seems quite necessary to note 
his criticism of democracy.
82
In fact Jordan argues that by definition "interest 
can never become public nor serve validly for a harmonious 
or just society." See, John Paul Duncan, "The Normative Im­
portance of the Concept of Interest," Oklahoma Law Review, 
Vol. 20, no. 3 (August, 1967), p. 272.
83E. Jordan, Forms of Individuality : An Inquiry into 
the Grounds of Order in Human Relations (Indianapolis: 
Charles W. Laut & Co., 1927), p. 93.
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civilization including the polis, there emerged the religious 
concentration on the individual soul and its salvation, and 
individuality came "to mean a mass of inner, private, ex­
clusive feelings centered around their own i n t e n s i t y . "84 As 
time went on, the subjectivity of individualism was more and 
more expressed in the doctrine of interest as a so-called 
objectification. Today subjectivity, as interest, contami­
nates all intellectual and practical concepts and discipline,
i.e., ethics, law, economics, politics, and so-called 
"social" science. Thus it undermines the principles upon 
which a sound and just social order or intelligent approach 
to its problem must rest.
Interest, according to Jordan, is inevitably in­
competent as principle, because it is synonymous with a state 
of mind and in terms of pure feeling. Thus orderly and har­
monious life is impossible on its basis, for " . . .  no 
organization of subjective phenomena is possible, . . . sub­
jective facts do not submit to order," for "the order of 
mind is not the superficial juxtaposition of mental states."85
At this juncture, therefore, Jordan simply could not
8A
I b i d ., p .  9 5 .
85Ibid., p. 20. Emphasis original.
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agree with Truman, Key, Dahl, et to the effect that in­
terest can serve as a basis of solution for social and politi­
cal problems. They "simply identify interests as objective 
phenomena which can be found in the behavior of groups seek­
ing something the members want,"®^ and see interest as the 
group-phenomena in the United States. Yet, although it has 
thus normative significance for them, the conflict of interest 
cannot really bring about compromise and "mutual" interest.
For by the very nature of interest, according to Professor 
Jordan, it still retains its subjective character:
The other case of interest, and the pure instance
of subjectivity, is that which expresses the re­
lation of individual subjective intent to the power 
which is conferred by the realization of the intent 
in overt forms. It is subjective in the sense 
that both of its terms are simple psychological 
facts, since intent as realized is here anticipated 
in idea . . .
Empirically it is something private and subjective, 
a pure psychological state of mind. It has neither stability 
nor objectivity. Thus, Jordan argues that interest cannot 
really serve normatively, and therefore it cannot be the
^^John Paul Duncan, loc. cit., p. 269. E. Jordan's 
criticism on modern interest theory is heavily relied upon 
and drawn from this article by Professor Duncan.
8 7
E. Jordan, Forms of Individuality, op. cit., p. 16. 
Cited from ibid., p. 280.
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basis of law. The upshot of "democratic" theory of govern­
ment on the basis of "interest" groups "becomes dissatis­
faction subjectively."88 "The 'harmony' that ensues is 
actually discord which, if expressed overtly, is suppressed 
by the force of law. In effect, the 'law' and the 'state' 
represent under this system, not harmonious adjustment, but 
military and police power."89 Hence, democracy and its 
liberal ideals are here based upon subjectivity and discord.
Democracy defined in terms of interest is nothing 
but subjectivism. It becomes expressed in simply such sub­
jective attitudes as liberty, equality, fraternity, self- 
government, "public welfare," i.e., representation reduced 
to state of mind and blindness. That is the greatest blunder 
of democratic theory in the assumption that "the realities 
of social and public life can be attained through and in 
states of m i n d . "90 However, since public reality is merely 
a state of mind of an individual, anything is supposed to be
Q  Q
E. Jordan, Theory of Legislation : An Essay on the 
Dynamics of Public Mind (Indianapolis: Progress Publishing 
Co., 1930), p. 126. Cited in John Paul Duncan's article in 
loc. cit., p. 282.
89john Paul Duncan, loc. cit., p. 282.
90
E. Jordan, "The False Principle of Liberalism," 
Journal of International Ethics, XLVI (1936), p. 283.
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able to be realized in democracy by the change of mind even 
though it has no competent instruments through which the 
state of mind can be actually implemented and realized.
Naturally, therefore, many democratic principles 
are not only subjective but also are false and self-contra­
dictory. For example, the notion of representation, which 
is an offshoot of atomic individualism, is impossible because 
wills of individual men cannot be substituted for one 
a n o t h e r . A s  Jordan points out, democracy supposedly means 
liberty and the rejection of authority, yet the democrat 
seems to accept authority created by himself, although the 
so-called self-authority is exercised by someone other than 
himself. The democrat, according to Jordan, is thus both a 
nihilist at heart and an authoritarian because he cries out 
for freedom and self-government, while realizing that they 
are not possible, calling for a strong government and liberty 
under law. Self-government is tantamount to no government 
or dictatorship.
. . . since government implies the control of 
relations among persons, self-government means 
the absolutism of one great individual, as is 
realized in industrial society. And where there 
is no discipline there is no order, and where 
there is no order there is disorder--chaos.
91Rousseau saw through this.
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Where there is nothing but discipline there is 
orderly stagnation. And democracy becomes an 
expression of the contradiction that is in­
herent between order and freedom.92
Again quoting Jordan from his last analysis of democracy and
its principle:
. . . thus, self-government becomes self-deception, 
and its principle is fraud. Fraud in this case, 
as subjective, is psychological force, propaganda; 
and political experience is the process of con­
vincing yourself of the truth of what you know to
be false.93
The fraudulent nature of democracy is not limited 
just to "self-government,” "freedom," etc., but extends to 
much of democratic ethics, which is largely drawn from Chris­
tianity and liberalism. Sympathy, well-wishing, benevolence 
are nothing but "a state of wistful vacuity and empty yearn­
ing." As a state of mind it is not actionable, and "our
moral relations to it can only be attitudinal and prepo- 
94tential." The good-will of man will simply transform into 
desire when it makes contact with reality, and thus lose all 
moral potentiality. So in the fields of law, economic and 
industrial life, this subjectivism and false principle of
92
E. Jordan, loc. cit., pp. 283-84.
^^ibid., p. 285.
94
Ibid.. p. 286.
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interest and liberalism have resulted in "tragedy" beyond
q c
description.
How could Confucian assumptions and system of gov­
ernment be compared or contrasted with either these realistic 
or the latter more critical views of modern democracy? Com­
parison with democratic theory advanced by the m o d e m  
American political scientists, especially that of Truman,
Key, and Dahl, or of Jordan's critical view, is indeed diffi­
cult to make. As was discussed earlier, Confucianism is 
actually close to the Greek and Stoic in its spirit and defi­
nition. It is in a way amenable to certain aspects of 
democracy as conceived in terms of equalitarian ends. Such 
Confucian virtues as man's equality in condition, modesty, 
humbleness, brotherly love, unpretentiousness, honesty, etc., 
are quite compatible with and implicit in democratic "aims" 
as well as in Stoic-Christian ethics.
Yet Confucian theory of government and politics is 
far removed from the modern democratic pluralism and its con­
cept of interest. Confucianism does not fit modern demo­
cratic capitalism nor the "democratic process" of American 
political science. It seems quite obvious that the interest
^^Ibid., pp. 288-91.
179
theory cannot be applied to Confucian politics, because there 
is no pluralism of this kind in the Confucian familial society. 
Confucianists would have little regard for the competition of 
interests of American political scientists, and they would 
not agree with the pluralist elite theorists that the "public 
interest"--let alone social harmony--stems from the conflict 
of various subjectively defined "interests" within the 
society.
For Confucianists, politics is not simply "contro­
versy and conflict" to achieve compromise but rather role- 
differentiation to attain harmony and social equilibrium.
Thus it is an anathema to Confucianists that public policy 
and the end of society should be determined through the "in­
terests" conflict. To them, neither the role of each man nor 
the "values" are created by the ruler or the ruled; but they 
are--and should be--created by philosophers and historians.
Thus Confucianism does not fit the "self-governing" process 
of American democracy. Furthermore, Confucianists would not 
accept the subjectively defined "individual" and "freedom" 
for maintaining "self."
The Confucian rejection of interest theory would 
seem to agree with Jordan. Yet Confucianists could not 
agree with Jordan in criticising the state-of-mind approach
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because Confucian theory depends on this extensively. That 
is, the most critical aspect of Confucian approach to poli­
tics would be, for Jordan, its heavy dependence upon the sub­
jective attitudes of rulers and ruled. Confucianists believe 
that such qualities as benevolence, propriety, righteousness, 
etc. are extremely important for politics. But these are 
for Jordan still very much simply subjective virtues like 
sympathy, generosity, friendship and love, as long as they 
remain simply state of mind of subjective personality they 
mean little politically. Practically and politically, these 
subjective virtues are imperfect and limited insofar as 
building a system of order and good life is concerned. And 
it is true that Confucianists fail to provide any competent 
explanation by which those subjective virtues can specifi­
cally be implemented.96
Confucianism believes in the good man as the key to 
politics as does Western democracy. Yet critics like Jordan 
argue that good life is not possible as long as good will of 
man has no solid substance in which to embody itself. The 
state-of-mind approach of Confucian theory simply will lead 
to no practical solution. As Professor Jordan argues,
Jordan, The Good Life (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1949), p. 432.
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the man who lives the good life cannot be iden­
tified by his state of mind. Men live equally 
good lives whose inner experiences are of ex­
actly opposite characters so far as their 
feeling quality is concerned. The part of the 
man's mentality that is real is the part which 
becomes realized in what is not a state of 
mind in any s e n s e . 97
However, some of the Confucian thought does not 
seem to see virtues as completely subjective states of mind. 
Confucianists claim at least to set up a system of "ob­
jectified" or "generalized" values very much in Stoic and 
Greek manner as the will of Heaven for the rulers, and to 
insist that these mean objectively: material things such as 
food and defense for the people, as well as such attitudes 
as obedience for the subjects and filial piety of the ruler 
expressed in actual behavior, etc. Thus individuals are not 
considered the key as they are in modern democratic theory. 
Certainly Confucianists are not relativists and subjectivists 
in regard to ethics. Nevertheless,- an objective ethics as 
the ground of politics is not necessarily democratic for the 
ethical values are not created by individuals and the result 
of implamentation--"father-ruler," etc. is not a democratic 
system.
Thus in conclusion, Confucianism is not really 
^^Ibid., p. 434.
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democratic nor should anyone so twist it to be considered as 
such. It is quite explicable in view of recent trends that 
the "former” Confucian nations should wish to appear to 
develop Western democratic political systems even though 
democracy does not, as has been seen, operate in actuality 
according to the standard claimed by so many political speakers 
and writers who are proponents. However, as has also been 
seen, not only is the implicit defense of democracy by many 
contençorary American political scientists inadequate in many 
ways, as Professor Jordan points out, but many of the prin­
ciples and assumptions upon which modern democracy are grounded 
are false and fraudulent. But this means that since Confucian 
theory, too, basically takes this subjective approach to the 
concept of social order and politics, many of its principles 
not only seem to be false in terms of effectiveness as to 
democratic ends but the result is a subjectivist elitist 
system of "paternalism," and both in terms of ends and means.
CHAPTER VI
CONFUCIAN ASSUMPTIONS AND IDEOLOGY;
A FURTHER CRITIQUE
Confucianism as a political theory, like the theo­
ries of many past thinkers, is by no means beyond criticism, 
internally and externally, and enç)irically and logically.
As was shown earlier in this study, the Confucian theory of 
the good life and of the functions of politics was attacked 
by many modern Chinese critics during the political and 
social stress acconçanying the coming of Western influence. 
Some of their arguments may seem to be justified; but, on 
the other hand, other arguments of those early political and 
intellectual leaders of China are not always grounded on 
sound logic nor on extensive and valid empirical evidence.
Analysis of Confucian theory in the light of m odem 
democracy in the preceding chapter has shown that some Con­
fucian notions of government and its ethical foundation are 
to some extent amenable to the ideas of so-called m o d e m  
"democracy” as propounded by some proponents. However, as
183
184
was also seen in the preceding chapter, this does not inq>ly 
that Confucianism is basically "democratic."
The purpose of this chapter is to present a further 
critical view and evaluation of Confucian theory. More 
specifically, an attempt here will be made not only to ex­
amine some of the more apparent weaknesses of Confucianism 
but to present also a critical analysis of Confucian assump­
tions and ideology not covered by the leading Chinese in­
tellectuals in chapter four. An attençt will also be made 
to examine the implications and empirical effects of Con­
fucianism which are relevant to the question of the political 
and social development of Confucian nations toward 
modernization.
Weaknesses of Confucian Theory
As in the case of most classical political theories, 
Confucian political thought makes certain assumptions about 
life, man, social organization, etc. which become the basis 
of its argument. Also, as is true of these other theories, 
Confucian theory is primarily normative. Thus it is diffi­
cult to validate empirically--at least in a fully satisfac­
tory way to social "scientists." Here two Confucian assump­
tions are not only misleading but also attenuate the validity
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of the entire theory.
The first of these assumptions of Confucian thought 
is the postulate that human nature is innately and basically 
"good"--good being defined in a special way. If the defi­
nition of goodness and the result could be validated empir­
ically, inherently or logically, the ensuing theory of 
Confucianism might have greater amount of credibility. How­
ever, it is difficult, if not impossible, to validate 
"objectively" such a "normative" concept of human nature. 
Confucian literature does present a number of examples which 
attempt to demonstrate that man's nature is basically good 
according to the Confucian notion of goodness, but these 
examples show merely that human beings express certain kinds 
of goodness at certain times.^ In fact, they actually 
describe more how human nature is good in these ways than 
they explain why it is good. Thus the Confucian explanation 
of the postulated basic goodness of human nature is neither 
empirically validated nor adequate.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that modern 
psychologists can prove or disprove this Confucian hypothesis 
Even if a definition of "goodness" and "badness" could be 
agreed upon, human nature cannot be explained in such terms
^Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Chs. II & VII, secs. 1 & 2.
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as a ground of the "political." Describing human nature in 
terms of certain ideas of goodness or badness is too sim­
plistic an approach to a more complex question.
Even if one determines whether human nature is in­
nately good or bad in certain ways, such a determination 
would not be of much practical help as far as political life 
is concerned. As Professor Elijah Jordan argues, "human
nature" definitions of good or bad result only in describing
states of mind,
. . .  we have only such knowledge of good and evil
as we have from objective facts . . . Evil, . . .
if it is real, is not a state of mind; or if it is
only a state of mind, it is not real, and so is
practically unimportant. The evil that we are 
concerned about, moral evil, evil that is defined 
by reference to action, lies in those objective 
conditions of existence and culture upon which the 
good life as an objective fact rests.%
Particular definitions of goodness or badness have little 
practical meaning in man's life except as expressed in 
practical realities as, for example, in institutions. "In­
herent" good and evil definitions of mind as the ground of 
politics thus mean little.
The fact of the matter is that man has the capacity 
to do something that is considered by another or others as
2
E. Jordan, The Good Life, o p . cit., p. 431.
Ençhasis original.
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good or evil,3 but that capacity need only be taken into 
account for political theory if the structure and function 
of government and other institutions are concerned. That 
is, it is the objectively structured and functioning "good­
ness" or "badness" that is important. As was said in 
another connection, benevolence, love or what is "in the 
heart" alone are trifling matters. "What states of mind or 
attitudes are connected with action are accidental; that is, 
circumstances of the actor's subjective history, and feeling 
qualities are even more remote than accidental and properly 
described as phenomenal.
But a second doubtful assumption is that the particu­
larly defined good behavior of rulers and government offi­
cials transfers to others. This assumption is simply not 
consistent with human experience. It has not been proven 
that others will necessarily emulate the good behavior of 
one man or of a few men on the institutional scale important 
to politics. It seems that Confucius dwelt so much on the 
qualities of virtue and benevolence as such (as so many 
philosophers do) that he ignored by default both the
O
David Hume would have said "painful or pleasurable."
^E. Jordan, loc. cit., p. 431.
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frailties of human nature and the ephemeral qualities of 
states of mind. The ruling class's good beliefs and conduct 
may be an asset in enhancing legitimacy and maintaining 
power, but this alone hardly comprises the method and solu­
tion to the problems of government. It is highly probable 
that Confucianists' naive understanding of human nature and 
some of the resultant assumptions caused a serious de­
ficiency in institutional elaboration.
As has been noted earlier, one serious weakness of the 
Confucian theory of government is that it failed to provide a 
"democratic" institutional device to implement its benevolent- 
welfare-ideology insofar as the latter had democratic ten­
dencies in terms of "end." Instead, Confucian government is 
conç)letely subject to possibly non-actionable subjective 
qualities of men, such as virtue, benevolence and right­
eousness. According to Confucianists, schemes of elaborate 
institutional arrangement are not too important since a vir­
tuous ruler constitutes the panacea for the problems of 
governing. If the ruler provides a Burkean exemplary model, 
the people will be moral and orderly, and the problem of 
governing is thereby resolved. In fact, the concept of neces­
sary institutions of government is so insignificant to Con­
fucianists that the literature contains no discussion of forms
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of government.
It may very well be, however, that Confucianists 
simply assumed that the family is the epitome of the state 
and government and that the structure of government would 
follow that of the family.^  The family is also organized 
hierarchically, and, as in the family, it was assumed that 
government would be headed by one man, the most virtuous man 
in the country. That man would rule through his good be­
havior and knowledge for the people’s welfare. At the very 
most, institutionally, the Confucianist government is merely 
an extension of the family, not an elaborate equalitarian 
institution created beyond the family model. By propound­
ing further that the nation be operated as the family, Con­
fucian political theoiry in a way negates the necessity of 
politics as it is known today when gentilism is relatively 
unimportant even under the influence of modern "nationalism." 
Without non-familial institutional structures, government 
is also to be conducted on a personal basis.
However, even if one accepts the proposition that 
the people will be moral and orderly under the virtuous 
ruler, an institutional mechanism is needed for removing the
^Analects, Bk. II, Ch. XXI.
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not-so-virtuous ruler, if peaceful change and responsible 
political rulership are preferable to their opposites.^ 
Contending that man is innately good, Confucius placed the 
people completely at the mercy of a supposedly benevolent 
ruler or assumed "Heaven" or revolt would remove him. It 
seems that what Conficius sought in the ruler was a 
"philosopher-king," who is, as Plato painfully discovered, 
virtually impossible to find and who is very difficult to 
remove. The absence of institutional means (peaceful means) 
of political change is probably the most important cause 
for the autocratic nature of Confucian government.
Empirically, Confucian government has also not been 
compatible generally with the normative theory of Confucian­
ism. ^  The latter is not a good explanation or rationalization
^Most political speakers and writers feel that insti­
tutional mechanism is a must for good government and "democ­
racy." Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, argues that democracy 
is an institutional device to check will-to-power and in­
ordinate pride of man. This writer is aware that institu­
tional devices, such as political participation by means of 
balloting, checks and balance, legislature, executive, etc., 
are not essential paraphernalia for gooc government.
^See Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; A Com­
parative Study of Total Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1957); David S. Nivision and Arthur F. 
Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1959); and Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., 
China in Crisis : China * s Heritage and the Communist Politi­
cal System, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1968), pp. 1-92.
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for the "facts." There have been nunerous non-virtuous and 
not-so-capable Confucian rulers, but a negligible few have 
been removed from the post through violent revolutions. When 
there was no violent revolution, incompetent rulers stayed 
in power. The result was often a long period of misgovern- 
ment and people's suffering. The myth of heaven's sanction 
of revolution simply did not and does not constitute a mechan­
ism for selection or removal of non-virtuous rulers. In 
fact, heaven's sanction is nothing but a belief in poetic 
justice : man's extreme desire for heaven's punishment of 
those who misruled led to the assertion that heaven will in­
deed condemn them.
Finally, the Confucian view of family and ideal 
social order on the basis of family virtue is probably the 
most fraudulent aspect of Confucian theory. Family provided, 
according to Confucianists, the ultimate model for harmonious 
human relationship and social order. One "loving example" 
of a family should be the lesson for community and the
Q
nation. A "harmonious" family behavior would extend to 
social and political life. Most important of all, the con­
cept of filial piety would be applied to government.
Q
The Great Learning. Ch. IX, sec. 3.
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Apparently, Confucianists were discussing the ideal 
and normative family life and ignoring the sometimes tyran­
nical nature of actual family life. The family was and is 
not an institution of love; the father often runs the family 
at will, demands obedience from all; and his wife is often 
treated as an object, ect. Thus social order on the basis 
of a familial model very often proved to be a sham for 
tyranny. Mao Tse-tung once said that he hated Confucius 
because his father quoted Confucius against him when he was
Q
a little boy. But it does not really take a Marxist to see 
the whole "ideological” life of man in Confucian society 
serves the function of concealing man's self interest and 
animalistic nature, and the result is a system which does not 
consciously come to terms and deal with it. Confucian society 
was thus not "harmonious” and "loving" and "orderly" as 
Confucianists believed it to be; it was rather autocratic 
and tyrannical most of the time, and it failed to deal 
realistically with human nature.
Ruling Class Ideology
Confucianism itself was not at all equalitarian, 
and it has always been promoted consciously or unconsciously
Q
Robert Payne, Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Weybright 
and Talley, Inc., 1969), p. 31.
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by the ruling class. One able Chinese emperor in the early
eighteenth century said with rather unusual candor:
Ordinary people know only that Confucius' teaching 
aims at differentiating human relationships, dis­
tinguishing the rights and obligations of the 
superior and the inferior, rectifying human minds 
and thoughts, and amending social customs. Do 
they also know that after human relationships have 
been differentiated, the rights and obligations 
of the superior and the inferior distinguished, 
human minds and thoughts rectified, and social 
customs amended, the one who benefits the most 
[from his teaching] is the ruler himself?^®
Thus it is quite clear that Confucianism, despite all its 
ençhasis upon virtue, benevolence, righteousness, morality, 
and social harmony, rather served an inequalitarian elite. 
Thus too, as someone aptly observed, when one is in power 
he becomes a Confucianist ; when he is out of power he be­
comes a Taoist; ano when approaching death he becomes a 
Buddhist. Confucianism is clearly an upper-class ideology 
as Mencius clearly pointed out the necessity and desirability 
of class division in society:
Great men have their proper business, and little 
men have their proper business. . . . Some labor 
with their minds, and some labor with their 
strength. Those who labor with their strength 
are governed by others. Those who are governed 
by others support them; those who govern others
^^Quoted in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, ibid., pp. 14-
15.
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are supported by them. This is a principle uni­
versally recognized.il
In accepting the above contention, but pretending 
to benevolence, etc., Confucianists demanded preferential 
treatment for and justified the positions of the ruling 
class. The traditional stratification of Confucian soci­
eties reflects a class division in line with the Confucian 
principle that a man of knowledge belonged to the ruling 
class and an ordinary man to a subservient class, analogous 
to ethnic divisions in the United States. In fact, his­
torical evidence attests to the argument that traditional 
China, Yi Korea and Tokugawa Japan subscribed to the Con­
fucian ideal at least partly to justify the ruling class's 
position.
Furthermore, inequality in Confucianism existed
not only between the superior man and inferior man but also
12between the old and the young. One of the Five Relations 
claims that there should be order in governing the relation­
ship of the old and the young. This principle was not
James Legge, trans., Chinese Classics; The Life 
and Works of Mencius, Vol. II (London: Trubner & Co., 1875), 
pp. 125-26.
12In American political life the ideal of order 
between the old and the young in a sense exists in the form 
of the "seniority" principle.
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applied to the length of service in employment; rather, it
was extended far beyond the operation of government. It
meant inequality among men in their social life. The older
was to render wisdom and kindness, and the younger to show
deference and to seek guidance. Although this principle did
not apply to the relationship between the superior man and 
1 ^
inferior man, it provided a convenient "pecking order" in 
Confucian society, thereby denying the equality of man.
Problems of Political Development
It is not an easy task to evaluate Confucianism and 
its ideology as such in terms of its usefulness in political 
development because any meaningful evaluation must be made 
against the background of a specific Confucian nation. It 
is, however, feasible to evaluate certain theoretical aspects 
of Confucianism in the light of political development.^^
13Tuk-hwang Kim, Hanguk Sasang-sa [History of Social 
Thought in Korea] (Seoul; Namsan-dang, 1958), p. 146.
^^The term "political development" has gained gen­
eral currency among political scientists today, yet defi­
nition of the term is not easy. For a discussion of the 
problem of defining the concept as well as for a variety 
of existing definitions, see Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of 
Political Development (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1966), Ch. 2. In this study the term is used in the 
sense of an effort toward or a spirit of increasing political 
efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources of
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One difficulty Confucianism presents in terms of 
political development and modernization is its ideal of 
morality. Confucianism places its highest value upon man's 
virtue and knowledge. However, although the ideal of the 
superior man may still be admirable today, most of the 
specific moral standards and rites prescribed for various 
occasions now seem quite ludicrous. As Ch'en Tu-hsiu argues 
in his attack upon Confucianism, most of the Confucian pre­
scriptions for leading the good life are undoubtedly anachro­
nistic. In addition to examples cited in Chapter Four, Con­
fucian literature, especially the Book of Rites, is replete 
with such declarations as "To be a woman means to submit";
"No marriage after the husband's d e a t h " ; 15 and "The rules of 
decorum do not go down to the common people and penal statutes 
do not go up to great officers."!^
The problems such customs and mores pose as the 
background of political life are quite obvious and need lit­
tle explanation. The elaborate moral and ritual injunctions
a country to attain goals. See A. F. K. Organski, The 
Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1967), p. 7.
^^Book of Rites, IX:24. 
l^Book of Rites, 1:35.
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might have been designed to attain a good and orderly social 
life in a primitive state or technologically underdeveloped 
society, but such feudal and rigid arrangements inhibit ex­
ploration of new life-styles and political development in an 
age of science, technology and "invention." Coirçaratively 
less adherence to the Confucian ethical theory and the waning 
of Confucian influence in Japan during the post-Restoration 
period may well be a partia^ explanation of Japan's rapid 
political modernization and epoch-making development.17
Certain Confucian mentality and attitudes thus ex­
plain, at least partially, why Confucian nations had a poor 
level of rapid industrialization. From the ideological 
"good" point of view, the Confucian man of virtue is the man 
who has risen above the desire for material comfort and 
devotes himself to leisure and the cultivation of the mind. 
Confucianism prefers leisure to employment or to manual 
labor. As Confucius said, "The superior man concerns him­
self with righteousness, while the inferior man thinks only
^^For a discussion of the problem of Confucian 
ethics in Japan after the Restoration see Robert E. Ward, 
"Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Political 
Culture and Political Development, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney 
Verba, eds. (Princeton, N. J . : Princeton University Press, 
1965), pp. 39-49.
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of benefit."^® Mencius, agreeing with his teacher, seconded:
"Those who rise at the first crow of the cock to do good are
the people of Shun and those who rise at the first crow of
19the cock to seek benefit are the people of Chih. The Cal­
vinist business classes have little base in Confucianism.
The Confucian disdain for work and esteem for lei­
sure were also reflected in the traditional social hierarchy.
A man of ability and knowledge rarely sought a career in the 
commercial and artistic fields, which were left to those in 
the lower echelons of Confucian society.20 Furthermore, those 
who occupied the upper social rungs did not concern themselves 
with the kind of study which might have created an atmosphere 
conducive to scientific investigation and increasing production 
and goods. As Fairbank argues, this is probably due to the 
ascendancy of neo-Confucianism.
Chu Hsi had taught that sincerity of heart was 
to be approached by a study of external objects,
1 8
Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. XX.
19
Mencius, Bk. I, pt. II, Ch. XVII, sec. 2.
20See for discussions on Confucian social structure, 
Tung-tsu Chu, "Chinese Class Structure and Its Ideology," in 
Chinese Thought and Institution, John K. Fairbank, ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 235-42; 
Gregory Henderson, Korea : The Politics of the Vortex (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 36-55; John W. 
Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu, 1719-1788: The Forerunner of Modern 
Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) .
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"the investigation of things," after which one 
might proceed to the understanding of oneself.
This phrase, "the investigation of things," 
however, was interpreted to mean not scientific 
observation but rather a study of human affairs.
Human society and personal relationships con­
tinued to be the focus of Chinese learning, not 
the conquest of man over nature.21
Confucian scholars thus contributed little to the improve­
ment of material surroundings save some creature comforts 
for the few and to the development of mass production in­
dustrial societies. Certainly they did not provide the 
Calvinistic ethics which defied work. It may be concluded 
therefore that Confucian ideology was at least partially 
responsible for the lack of industrial development.
Another problem area of Confucianism involves the 
generalization that political development and modernization 
might be achieved more smoothly if the traditional ideology 
of a nation is susceptible to the spirit of experimenta­
tion and exploration. Yet it is not an easy undertaking to 
prove that Confucianism which was conservative in nature 
allowed dynamic change. It is true that some of Confucius' 
teachings ran quite contrary to the goal of preserving the 
old order. In advocating employing the capable and virtuous
21
John K. Fairbank, The United States and China 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1962), p. 64.
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men in government, Confucius deplored the political cor­
ruption of the day and attempted to build a new s o c i e t y . 22 
From another point of view, it can be argued that Confucius 
was interested in returning to the days of Yao and Shun, 
for he admired everything about them. Confucius said:
"Chou has the advantage of viewing the two past dynasties. 
How complete and elegant are its regulations'. I follow
0 Q
Chou." Confucius thus displayed a Burkean reverence for 
the past and a desire to preserve the existing system. Thus 
although it may be argued either way, Confucius seemed to be 
quite adament about what he considered the nature and char­
acteristics of the good life; and Confucianism generally 
lacked the experimental spirit.
Certainly considering Confucian theory, not as it is 
inscribed in the texts, but rather as it has been reflected 
in Confucian societies, the spirit of experimentalism and 
exploration has been notably absent. As discussed earlier, 
Confucianism has almost always been the ideology of scholars 
and the ruling elite. They were the first to accept the
22
See for a discussion on this subject, Sang-eun 
Lee, "On the Criticism of Confucianism in Korea," a paper 
delivered at XXVII International Congress of Orientalists, 
held at Ann Arbor, Michigan during August 13-19, 1967, pp. 
18-20.
23
Analects, Bk. Ill, Ch. XIV.
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Confucian Ideology, and they promoted its precepts because 
it provided a convenient explanation of and legitimization 
for the coveted social positions they occupied. It would 
seem quite contrary to the empirical theory of government 
that the ruling class would promote any set of beliefs that 
would endanger and undermine the power structure of their 
s o c i e t y . I t  may indeed be difficult to prove that the 
reason Confucianism was originally adopted as the official 
ideology was to justify a ruling class, but it is not dif­
ficult to see the obvious benefits that would accrue to the 
ruling class with such adoption. It therefore seems futile 
to debate, as does K'ang Yu-wei, the original intention of 
Confucius. At least empirically analysis supports the argu­
ment that Confucianism was a hindrance to progress and 
modernization because it was little tolerant of adventurism 
and change.
^K'ang Yu-wei's abortive attempt to give a Confucian 
justification for drastic reform is largely academic and 
polemic. K'ang's position adequately attests to the fact 
that the Confucian ruling class was reluctant, to say the 
least, to venture the much needed reform and was unable to 
accommodate itself to the changing political and social 
climate.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The foregoing shows that Confucianism is a loosely 
organized body of thought that has been subject to the 
vicissitudes of time throughout East Asia for well over two 
millenia. The teachings of Confucius and those of his next 
standard-bearer, Mencius, subsequently wielded an enormous 
influence upon the political, social and ethical lives of 
people in China, Korea, and Japan throughout history even if 
only as rationalizations. Confucian theory served as the 
major subject of academic inquiry and as the standard for 
the moral and good man.
Confucianists, as has been seen, considered human 
nature innately good, though their explication of this was 
somewhat inadequate and they offered no empirical proof, 
nor did they clearly define ’’goodness." Also, Confucianists 
simply conceived that nature and the universe are moral, 
orderly, and harmonious, and since man was part of nature 
and the universe, he was thought to be moral and good. Yet
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they argued that the evil of man was due to certain en­
vironmental factors. How could the universe then be good 
and moral, and yet certain environmental factors could be 
evil? Like St. Augustine and many Western religionists 
Confucianists at this point seemed to be quite mixed up.
Thus although the original source of evil environment is 
not at all clear, one can only gather that they ignored 
that man does have evil within him or that the universe has 
the evil in it as an environmental factor. Naively they 
refuse to face the paradox.
Again, the nature of men is very much alike accord­
ing to Confucianists, but here again they mixed up their 
thesis. At one point, they said that men were alike in 
terms of taste, desire, and appetite; but they also said 
that men were different in terms of morality, intelligence 
and ability. This is confusing, to say the least. All men 
are equal in the sense that their basic natures are innately 
good, but their equality seems to end right here. Some men 
are superior to others by virtue of their knowledge and 
morality. For Confucianists, a man of superior quality em­
bodies three basic principles, i.e., jen, and ]J., which 
can be acquired through the cultivation of the mind. The 
Confucian dichotomy of mankind into the superior and the
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inferior contains the clear socio-political implication that 
men should not be treated equally because they are not equal, 
even though at times they seem to expect men to be treated as 
equal. In this regard, they are no better (or worse) than 
equalitarian democrats in the West today including "civil 
liberty" political scientist humanists.
Hsun Tzu of course saw human nature as evil but as 
to the problem of social order and the good life his conclu­
sion was essentially the same as that of Confucius and 
Mencius. He showed little faith in man's capacity to have an 
orderly life because most people were governed by desire and 
emotion and in search for fame and wealth. Although he con­
cluded very much the same as did Confucius and Mencius to 
the effect that people should perform their assigned roles, 
Hsun Tzu had more faith in 1^ and rules and regulations. He 
also believed in employing rewards and punishments to keep 
people in their proper places instead of relying solely upon 
a ruler's virtues. Perhaps he is closer to a Western realist, 
positivist than most Confucianists.
Much in Confucian philosophy dealt with the nature 
of the good life and the possibility of the peace and order 
that would automatically follow if every man adhered to the 
highest ideals of his particular social role. This part of
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Confucian theory is single idealism more feeble than that of 
Plato who at least expected institution to channelize weak­
nesses. When a prince is a prince, a father is a father, 
and a son is a son in fact and practice as well as in es­
sence, the Confucian ideal of equilibrium and a perfectly 
harmonious life supposedly can be attained. Like Stoics, 
Hebrews and Christians, Confucianists were extremely impres­
sed with the idea of the "orderliness" of the universe.
They also believed strongly that the family was a part of 
the universe and the most "natural" institution among men. 
After the "right think" by the individual the social and 
political order should be built after the familial model.
The family should be the model for government, and the ruler 
should possess all the basic virtues which stem from family 
life.
Like Western idealists from Plato to medieval 
Christian thinkers, the goal of politics and government, 
according to Confucianists, was to consummate social harmony 
and orderly life. Like Plate again, the function of Con­
fucian politics is educational and the government was a 
primary agency for moral inculcation. Although all men 
should make an effort to acquire virtue and knowledge and to 
fulfill themselves, the government and family should be the
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channel and device. It was also most natural that the most 
virtuous--Hsun Tzu added "ability" to this--should be the 
ruler. Thus the most inçortant method of government was to 
assure that the virtuous men occupy the government posts. 
Obviously, Confucianists felt that government was the most 
important agency in the country in terms of influencing the 
behavior of others. Confucian rulers therefore were sup­
posed to govern the nation with their exemplary behavior, 
which would flow down to the lowest people and inspire others 
to emulate them: here Confucianism has not only shades of 
Plato but of Burke.
This traditional ideology of Confucianism was 
challenged wien the Confucian nations were unable to reject 
the Western nations' desire for trade and commerce in the 
last half of the nineteenth century. Intellectuals and gov­
ernmental leaders in the Confucian societies, especially in 
China, began to re-examine the validity and utility of 
their traditional political and ethical theory and ideology. 
Without the Calvinist rationalization and religious concept 
of human Sin and an omnipotent God, some attempted to pro­
vide justification for the much-needed reform within the 
Confucian framework; others singly denounced Confucianism 
and ascribed all China's political and social problems to
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Confucianism and its ideology. Still others made some effort 
to coupromise the Confucian way of life and of government 
with the Western exanple, but again they lacked the Calvin­
ist God or Marxist "devil” of capitalism.
More practically, the controversy over the nature of 
Confucianism centered around the question of the modern-day 
utility or superiority— or inferiority--of Confucian ideology 
to Western ways of politics and life, which might be ex­
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove with some de­
gree of objectivity. Here an argument could be made for any 
side, depending upon the individual's temperament and per­
ception of the good life. Thus those who extolled Confucian­
ism based their argument on the Confucian emphasis on moralism, 
and those who assaulted it pointed out its anachronistic for­
malities and rituals which they considered completely incom­
patible with and inconvenient in modern-day life.
Yet, even though some might be tempted to find a 
scapegoat in Confucianism for the unprecedented problems 
Confucian nations faced, Confucian ideology should not be 
blamed for all the ensuing problems. Some of the Confucian 
nations' problems posed by the Western imperialism and 
capitalism were not due to the traditional ideology but 
rather due to the social, economic, and political problems
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caused by the spiritual indolence and intellectual lack of 
self-reflection and short-sighted views on the part of Con­
fucian leaders. And the real fault lay in the incompati­
bility between Confucian morality and its state of mind 
solution as the answer to technology--just as is true in 
the failure of religion and "democracy" to solve the same 
problem in the West today.
The great trial of Confucian ideology, however, 
happily exposed much of its negative, critical, and "unhappy" 
side. Obviously, Confician political life was not "har­
monious," "orderly," "benevolent," and humanistic. The 
rulers were not always the men of virtue, and even when a 
virtuous man governed, social order did not automatically or 
ever really follow. Both the assault on Confucianism and 
the frantic efforts to reinterpret the traditional ideology 
were probably a clear manifestation of unhappiness with 
Confucian theory and its inability to cope with both old and 
new problems.
Yet, few Chinese leaders and intellectuals made any 
attendît to analyze with objectivity Confucian theory in the 
light of modern democracy. When there was an analysis, it 
was invariably shallow and a biased publicist, political 
effort. However, those intellectuals cannot really be
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faulted, because they were mostly political activists who 
probably had little luxury of academic repute at the time of 
national exigency.
One thing is certain and that is that despite the 
lip service Confucianism pays to humanism, benevolence, 
popular sovereignty and the people's importance, Confucian 
theory is considerably different from that of m o d e m  demo­
cratic political systems.1 A perusal of Confucian litera­
ture reveals no real democratic theory even as muddy as the 
latter is in the West today. The Confucian concept of man, 
for instance, is not the same as modern democratic equali- 
tarianism. Confucian literature is also devoid of the idea 
of the innate worth of man regardless of his capacity for 
reasoning, moral knowledge and social position. In fact, 
much of Confucian doctrine seems to contradict the "best" 
of the dichotomous ideas of modern democracy. Confucianists' 
insistence upon the rule of the virtuous man and their 
correlative neglect of the institutional device which some 
interpreters of democracy consider so important are quite 
contrary to the general principles of democracy as an end as 
well as a means.
^However, certain comparison with historic "demo­
cratic" Western thought has been noted in p.
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In addition, Confucianists envisioned the good life 
not so much as a "free" life in which the individual may pur­
sue his own goals and fulfill his potentiality, but rather 
as an orderly and harmonious life in which a person should 
cultivate his own mind and scrupulously adhere to the 
principles that govern human relationships as well as to 
such trivial etiquettes and formalities as those enumerated 
in the Book of Rites.
When con^ared and contrasted with the "realistic" view 
of modern democracy, especially with that of American politi­
cal scientists, Truman, Key, and Dahl, Confucianism is simply 
not democracy by any standard. In many areas of Confucian 
theory, the pluralist-elitist theory with its concept of 
interest simply defies any comparison. Also although some 
of Confucian ethics are compatible with democratic "aims," 
they are in general much closer to Greek and Stoic ideas of 
an ethical "place" in society.
One crucial problem in this study was not as much 
in the analysis of the "realistic" view of democracy by 
many contemporary American political scientists as in the 
inçlicit defense of democracy and its "self-governing" 
process by the same people. However, as has been seen, the 
latter generally failed to produce any convincing argument
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as to why democracy is good. This not only dilutes the com­
monly held belief and assumption that Western democracy is 
good and should be imported by the Asian nations (including 
of course Viet Nam) but also the universal acclamation for 
democracy. That is an analysis of Western democracy showed 
that it also is grounded on many paradoxical and absurd 
notions which have been simply useful to the rising middle 
and commercial classes and their political puppets. It is 
grounded upon a subjectivist definition of the individual 
objectified into the false principle of interest. As Pro­
fessor Jordan argued, democracy as identified with property 
as private is nothing but subjectivism, and its approach to 
the practical problem is based upon the states of mind and 
on divisiveness in social affairs. The contemporary theory 
of democracy obviously does not seem to bring about a har­
monious or just social order. The recurring question here 
then is whether or not Western democracy is really the an­
swer to Confucian societies, no matter how weak the latter 
may be because of the "errors" of Confucianism.
Yet Confucianism, too, seems to take this state of 
mind approach in political problem-solving. Thus much of 
the good life illustrated by the Confucianists is difficult 
to be realized. Furthermore, it has a number of logical
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weaknesses and theoretical limitations within it. Confucian­
ism and its ethical teachings also were advanced by the rul­
ing classes, and they have been invariably employed by the 
rulers to consolidate and legitimize political power. Like 
natural law and democracy in the West, Confucian theory was 
easily ençloyed to tyrannize the subjects, women, wives, the 
young, the "inferior" men, etc. This is amply corroborated 
by history.
From a practical point of view, then, Confucianism 
contributed little to— if it did not outright hinder--the 
political development and modernization of Confucian socie­
ties. If the adoption of Western industrialism and commer­
cialism is desirable, then the Confucian mentality to a large 
extent would have to be overcome. Furthermore, Confucian 
ethics and its way of thinking seem totally incompatible 
with modern-day living. But then, none of the "way of life 
belief systems," philosophies or religions or ideologies 
which are posed as "social glue" upon a basis of individual 
attitudes and feelings appear to have much to contribute to 
institutional problem solving when the latter are all de­
pendent on technical, industrial processes as the ultimate 
determinants of human life. These only "worked,"--even as 
rationalizations in agricultural, familial societies--not 
in an age such as ours.
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